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This dissertation draws on theories of citizenship and civil-military relations, historical 
policy analysis, and contemporary polling data to argue that the principle of jus meritum 
or citizenship for military service is a long-standing route to political incorporation. 
While it does not have the formal status of the two traditional legal principles, jus 
sanguinis (parentage) and jus soli (place of birth), jus meritum operates as a foundational 
principle for inclusion in the United States. The logic of jus meritum asserts itself most 
forcefully during wartime, when the state is in critical need of resources. The traditional 
principles of political membership based on parentage and place of birth are insufficient 
guides to understanding the historical development of American citizenship. Scholars of 
immigration and civil-military relations, too, only deal with the practice of alien 
enlistment and naturalization tangentially. Drawing on these related literatures, I argue 
that jus meritum is a foundational citizenship policy deserving of greater scholarly 
attention. Persons willing to serve in the national interest during these critical moments 
later pushed the boundaries of political inclusion and transformed the institution of 
citizenship. Contemporary public polling data that confirm this principle, although latent, 
has strong support. A fuller understanding of historical record may also help current 
policymakers craft a set of immigration reform proposals consonant with American 
political ideals and identity. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
From the Revolution to the present-day armed conflicts, the foreign-born have 
served in America’s militaries and have made a substantial contribution to every major 
war. Although the standard narrative of political and social development in the United 
States assigns military service a leading role in integrating marginalized groups into 
society, little has been written about how military service leads to citizenship. Much of 
the literature focuses on two traditional principles for assigning citizenship, jus sanguinis 
and jus soli, by virtue of parentage or location of birth. Although US citizenship is most 
likely to be gained through one of these two means, the American “citizen-soldier” 
tradition has also enabled a significant number of individuals to gain citizenship by 
performing military service. To elucidate this underexamined naturalization route, this 
dissertation argues that the path to citizenship through military service is a stable, durable 
feature of American identity and political life. The similarities among military 
naturalization statutes across periods of American history suggest that the commitment to 
awarding citizenship to those willing to serve and sacrifice on behalf of the nation 
transcends the varied ideological commitments of political coalitions concerned with 
restricting immigration and immigrants’ rights. Explicating the path to citizenship 
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through military service, jus meritum, gives a fuller picture of the mutual imbrications 
among American political development, immigration politics, and civil-military relations. 
According to the principle of jus meritum, the natural right of membership is 
derived by merit gained from service for, contributions to, and the willingness to sacrifice 
for the state. The standard typology of claims to American citizenship characterizes jus 
meritum as, at best, an exception to the rule (Brubaker 1992; Schuck and Smith 1985; 
Smith 1997). Taking a different approach, this study conceptualizes the practice—
historically and in the contemporary period—as an essential element of American 
identity and community. Rather than classifying it as epiphenomenal to the military needs 
of the state, this study concludes that jus meritum is best understood as a permanent and 
enduring means of gaining American citizenship. To this end, this dissertation provides 
the first systematic treatment of the forms of jus meritum enshrined in statute, case law, 
and policy history, as well as offering an analytical framework for understanding the 
practice of admitting aliens into the political community on the basis of individual 
contributions to the state.  
Military service has shaped the institution of American citizenship in 
underacknowledged ways. One cannot understand the development of citizenship and the 
criteria for inclusion in American political life without reference to the principle of jus 
meritum. With alien soldiers only comprising about 5 percent of today’s active duty 
military force, their contribution would appear to be merely symbolic.1 However, the 
                                                 
1 I use “noncitizen” and “alien” interchangeably throughout the dissertation. Alien is the term found in 
immigration and naturalization law, per the Immigration and Nationality Act, whereas noncitizen has been 
used by political scientists and in the field of public policy. 
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service of these persons—like that of other minority groups—justifies not only their 
recognition as full citizens but also the greater attention of American political scholars. 
Those who aspire to citizenship through military service follow and build upon a tradition 
of service to—and sacrifice for—the state. As Samuel Huntington writes, “National 
defense is the responsibility of all, not just a few. If war becomes necessary, the state 
must fight as a ‘nation in arms’ relying on popular militias and citizen armies” 
(Huntington 1957, 91). During his presidency, George W. Bush called military service 
“the highest form of citizenship” (Bush 2001). In the spirit of this tradition, minorities 
have effectively used their military service as “proof” of their allegiance to the 
community, persuading the majority to accept them as full citizens (Krebs 2006; Parker 
2009).  
The contributions of alien soldiers justifiably prompts Americans to reconsider 
some of the basic features of our political order, such as ideas about political 
membership, civic obligation, and shared sacrifice. These historical links explain why the 
American public overwhelmingly supports granting citizenship to those who serve, 
despite remaining split on immigration policy in general. Military sacrifice thus reshapes 
the political community’s obligations to individuals and groups.  
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This dissertation has two central aims. The first is to show that citizenship 
acquisition through military service, or jus meritum, is a stable feature of American 
identity and politics. Drawing on an array of historical sources, policy analyses of alien 
military enlistment and naturalization statutes, as well as contemporary polling data, this 
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study provides the first systematic examination of the practice of jus meritum in the 
United States.2 Jus meritum is conceptualized as a subset of naturalized citizenship. As 
this dissertation will demonstrate, military service is a path to citizenship that is, in theory 
and in practice, distinct from other ways of becoming a naturalized American citizen.  
The second objective of the study is to understand how this avenue of political 
incorporation has functioned over time. This concept is important because military 
service—an historically prominent method of demonstrating allegiance to the 
community—is not a current method of mass political incorporation, nor does it appear 
likely to reemerge as one in the near future. Therefore it is particularly important to 
understand how the government has applied jus meritum in novel ways beyond the 
naturalization of active duty members after World War II (WWII), when a large 
proportion of the public served in uniform. A greater appreciation for the American 
public’s support for jus meritum throughout US history can lay a foundation for 
policymakers to create laws consistent with long-standing public opinion, although this 
support may be latent in an era where less than one-half of 1 percent of American citizens 
serves in uniform. Because it is unlikely that the military will serve as a major site of 
political incorporation without mass armies, the final part of this study turns to a 
discussion of how the principle behind this phenomenon can be applied or revived to 
meet contemporary challenges. 
                                                 
2 In fact, there is empirical support that beyond conceiving of jus meritum as an equally central claim 
to membership in the United States, the principle of citizenship for service should be regarded as the only 
primary and direct claim to inclusion. “Primary and direct” means that, unlike jus soli and jus sanguinis, jus 
meritum is not a derivative claim for membership. The distinction between accidental and intentional 
citizenship is meant to underscore this point. 
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IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
Understanding the path to citizenship through military service has important 
implications for American politics in general. The principle of jus sanguinis, codified by 
Congress in the 1790s, and jus soli, enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, have been affirmed by the courts in the United States. For this reason, 
debates about the contours of citizenship and belonging often invoke one of these two 
traditional principles for determining membership. For example, although jus soli was 
briefly debated in the 1980s regarding whether Congress had the authority to restrict the 
bestowal of automatic citizenship on children born in the United States to those with at 
least one citizen parent, the public affirmed jus soli as the appropriate standard (Schuck 
and Smith 1985). Moreover, even as some controversy has arisen more recently regarding 
President Barack Obama’s status as a native-born citizen (i.e., the “birther” movement), 
critics noted that because there was no question of his mother’s nationality, there was no 
question of his native-born status regardless of his place of birth (an application of the jus 
sanguinis principle). A similar question regarding Senator John McCain’s status as a 
native-born American (he was born in the Panama Canal Zone to two citizen parents) was 
raised and resolved publicly during his 2000 presidential campaign. These examples 
demonstrate that contemporary debates about political inclusion refer back to these two 
traditional of principles for inclusion based on parentage and place of birth. 
Studying the practice of offering citizenship for military service also contributes 
to the literature on political incorporation. Military service—a symbolic, highly visible, 
and recognized contribution to the community—is perhaps the most direct route to 
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political inclusion (Krebs 2006; Lamm 2010). By way of example, military service 
played a critical role in the expansion of suffrage in the early 19th century, the 
development of social policy (Skocpol 1992), and the political recognition of previously 
marginalized groups (Klinkner and Smith 1999; Parker 2009; Ural 2010).3 Reframing the 
citizen-soldier tradition as the observable implications of public support for jus meritum 
thus warrants a reexamination of the military’s role as a political institution. In fact, the 
entire body of literature linking military service and political membership, e.g. including 
the citizen-soldier in the United States, is a testament to the practice of this principle 
throughout American history. 
This study makes a unique contribution to theories of citizenship and nationality 
by incorporating civil-military relations scholarship on alien military service and 
naturalization. In these pages, the military is conceptualized as one of the earliest and 
most durable political institutions: a “nation builder” that socializes new immigrant and 
previously marginalized groups into the political community (Krebs 2006; Riesenberg 
1992; Samito 2009; Smith 1981). As such, the policy history of jus meritum factors into 
the dialectical relationship between the state’s military needs and the criteria for political 
inclusion that has previously been examined in general terms (Krebs 2006), and specific 
periods of US history (Klinkner and Smith 1999; Ural 2010; Parker 2009).  
After the past forty years of an all-volunteer military force, the reason why 
political scientists studying American politics should care about military organization 
                                                 
3 Skocpol (1992) traces the origins of social policy in the United States to veterans’ benefits following 
the Civil War. 
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may not be entirely clear.4 As the generation of political scientists with direct experience 
of military institutions recedes, we have “to spend lots of time and energy rediscovering 
institutional interrelationships that once were intuitively obvious” (Ackerman 1998, 
255).5 In this vein, the study of alien military service and naturalization has important 
policy implications and enduring contemporary relevance. With alien soldiers 
constituting about 5 percent of today’s military force, their material contribution is 
largely symbolic. The current population of alien service members among a military 
force of 1.4 million people stands in stark relief to the two hundred thousand foreign-born 
soldiers that comprised nearly one-fifth of the US Army during World War I (WWI).6 
However, as the course of twentieth-century America has shown, much is at stake in how 
narratives about service to—and sacrifice for—the state are defined. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the contours of jus meritum so that national leaders can imbue 
new institutions with the essential elements of the tradition. 
Finally, examining the application of jus meritum highlights the way that both 
liberal and civic republican strands have shaped the institution of citizenship over time 
(Smith 1997). In particular, draft laws and enlistment regulations reflect changes in how 
the United States has defined membership in the community. Indeed, the stability of the 
principle of jus meritum strengthens the case that multiple traditions have contributed to 
                                                 
4 The norm of civilian control over the military has occupied the attention of scholars of international 
relations, as the deference to civilian authority appears to be a bedrock of professional American military 
culture.  
5 Ackerman (1998) is referring to another generational paradigm shift. 
6 It is important to keep in mind that the definitions of aliens and non-citizen shifted during this period. 
For example while Jacobs and Hayes (1981) estimate that 9 percent of WWI military personnel were aliens, 
their tally does not include Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, and Native Americans (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 193). 
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the institution of American citizenship and demonstrates that jus meritum is a durable, 
essential feature of citizenship rather than an exception to the rules of access to American 
nationality.  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
As Schattsneider (1942) emphasized, political institutions are not neutral; making 
their arrangements—how they structure opportunity, what behavior they incentivize, and 
their political consequences—of interest to political science (Klinkner and Smith 1999; 
Mettler 2002, 2005; Smith 1997). Still, scholars of citizenship, nationality, and 
immigration have overlooked the political incorporation of aliens based on military 
service. Those who have taken it up as a subject draw from and build on the work of 
political theorists, experts in civil-military relations, and researchers on immigration and 
citizenship policy. The primary evidence for recognizing jus meritum as a citizenship 
policy is the citizen-soldier tradition itself. This study of military naturalization 
contributes to the literature on the role of military service in state- and citizen-building, 
presenting the historical substantiation for conceptualizing jus meritum as a regular, fixed 
part of the naturalization regime. 
Theories of Citizenship and Citizenship Policy 
This study contributes to the literature on citizenship and nationality by 
elaborating a path to US citizenship through military service. While accounts of 
naturalized citizenship appear in the literature on immigration and naturalization, jus 
meritum is virtually absent from this body of work. Even though the vast majority of US 
citizens have acquired—or will acquire—citizenship at birth, the issues surrounding 
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persons incorporated as adults warrant more scholarly attention. In what follows, I lay out 
the basic problem with the traditional model of citizenship, discuss how scholars have 
attempted to “fit” the lived experience of immigrants into this model, and propose an 
alternative way of thinking about the principles that have shaped the institution of 
American citizenship over time. 
Political scientists have traditionally contrasted two ways of assigning 
membership in modern, liberal democracies including the United States (Brubaker 1992). 
In his seminal work, Rogers Brubaker (1992) describes two “styles” for assigning 
citizenship in Western democracies: the principle of jus sanguinis, or right of blood, 
associated with the German model, in contrast to jus soli, or right of soil, associated with 
how French citizenship is assigned. Brubaker’s work is seminal because it is the first 
attempt to develop a theory of nationality and naturalization (Janoski 2010, 4). Other 
scholars of citizenship and nationality also posit that jus soli and jus sanguinis are the 
principal means for determining membership in modern, liberal democratic nations 
(Brubaker 1989, 1992). But even as most scholars of citizenship take Brubaker’s binary 
model for granted, they—as well as Brubaker himself—acknowledge that states by 
necessity blend some elements of jus sanguinis and jus soli principles (Brubaker 1992; 
Cohen 2010, 2011; Wong and Cho 2006; Wong 2007).  
In contrast to jus sanguinis and jus soli, however jus meritum is a policy that 
applies to naturalized citizens or those who were not recognized as US citizens at birth. 
For scholars of American politics, the distinction between citizenship and immigration 
policy is sometimes difficult to conceptualize because the United States is a “nation of 
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immigrants.” Given the relatively “open” naturalization regime in the United States, 
immigration policy is synonymous with is citizenship policy (Freeman 1995; Janoski 
2010). In restrictive regimes, i.e. the German model, “naturalization is anomalous and 
infrequent, a privilege bestowed by the state on certain deserving individuals” (Brubaker 
1992, 33). The United States lies “at the other pole…[,] in this system naturalization is 
expected of immigrants; the failure to naturalize is anomalous. Naturalization is actively 
promoted by the state” (Brubraker 1992, 33). The open and unrestrictive naturalization 
regime in the United States may be one reason that studies of nationality and citizenship 
have been subsumed by theories regarding immigration patterns (how many and from 
where) and immigrant rights (how persons are treated after their arrival). 
While the distinction between parentage and place of birth succinctly summarizes 
the paths to native-born citizenship, it does not explain when, why, and how persons are 
naturalized in modern, democratic states. This study contributes to literature on 
immigration and citizenship by examining and classifying the ways aliens have acquired 
US citizenship through national service. As such, this study goes beyond an exploration 
of the conventional, static model for determining political membership to more accurately 
accommodate the dynamic nature of citizenship in immigrant-based nations—or what 
Louis Hartz calls “settler nations”—such as Canada, the United States, and Australia 
(Hartz 1955; Krebs 2006).  
Chapter two, the policy history of jus meritum, demonstrates how the federal 
government adopts more inclusive immigration and naturalization policies to meet its 
manpower needs in times of war but returns to more exclusive practices once the crisis 
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has passed (Krebs 2006). While scholars of American political development after WWII 
have explored this specific action-reaction trend (Klinkner and Smith 1999), the present 
study examines the practice of alien military incorporation throughout US history. 
Although the route to naturalization through military service is a known quantity, 
evidence for a direct, causal relationship between military service and citizenship remains 
lacking.7   
This study of alien military naturalization also takes into consideration the 
significance of alien military service in terms of liberal and democratic theory in the 
United States. Historically, this service includes a willingness to participate in the state’s 
defense. Jus meritum is particularly salient in the United States because, in contrast to the 
Europe, American traditions are based on a commitment to a set of ideals, which include 
individual rights, political equality, and the merit system (Huntington 1981).8 Unlike 
European concepts like jus soli and jus sanguinis that devolve to an accident of birth, jus 
meritum contains both the liberal and civic republican elements of American political life 
(Lamm 2010). Its liberal elements include the recognition of individual conscience, 
consent, and freedom of association. Its civic republican features comprise a commitment 
to self-determination, distinction based on individual merit, and sacrifice for the common 
good. These features make jus meritum a fertile site for exploring how citizenship has 
been conceptualized and practiced over the course of American history.  
                                                 
7 For example, blacks served in every American army but were only admitted to citizenship (practically 
speaking) in the mid-1960s. In the same vein, Native Americans were classified as “foreign-born” until the 
1920s. These examples alone cast doubt on the veracity of the citizen-soldier tradition as it is 
conventionally understood. 
8 In fact, jus meritum may be the only principle for determining community membership that does not 
violate some foundational aspect of American political identity.  
 12 
Theories of Immigration and Immigrant Policy 
This study provides the first systematic examination of the practice of alien 
military service and naturalization in the United States. Those who acquire citizenship 
through national service are a distinct group. Historical and civil-military relations 
literature have documented the experiences of this group as integral elements of the 
citizen-soldier tradition. This practice may stimulate other programs to link the 
aspirations of undocumented aliens to national goals and priorities. As some scholarship 
indicates, citizenship “earned” by military service may be more politically acceptable 
than a blanket amnesty program (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 201). At a naturalization 
ceremony for military service members in 2006, President George W. Bush crystallized 
the logic of the arrangement by stating, “If somebody is willing to risk their lives for our 
country, they ought to be full participants in our country” (Bush 2006). Despite such 
high-profile attention, the practice of awarding citizenship in exchange for military 
service has not been subject to comprehensive study by political scientists and is virtually 
absent from the dominant theories of citizenship and belonging. 
Veteran status does not guarantee equal social status or equal protection under the 
law; rather, both individual veterans and veterans’ groups have effectively leveraged the 
rhetorical power of service and sacrifice to win political and social rights. For example, 
the policy history chapter trains a lens on the particular case of Asian veterans of WWI, 
whom the Supreme Court deemed ineligible for citizenship on racial/ethnic grounds in 
1925. Ten years later, and with much public lobbying by veterans’ organizations, 
Congress made Asian veterans of WWI eligible for naturalization decades before 
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restrictive racial and ethnic quotas were removed from the US immigration and 
naturalization code. Remarkably, this case highlights how “anti-immigrant” groups, such 
as the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, have found themselves allied 
with “pro-immigrant” forces, suggesting that the jus meritum principle is independent of 
historically and culturally conditioned viewpoints. 
This study also contributes to comparative work on theories of immigration and 
immigrant policy. While the study of naturalized citizenship in the United States is of 
enduring import for immigrant nations, it is also of increasing interest for countries like 
France and Germany that are currently grappling to accommodate immigrant claims to 
inclusion. The study of naturalized citizenship in the United States may also have 
implications for comparative theories of nationality law. Moreover, this study has 
meaningful policy implications given that these intentional paths to inclusion—although 
only used by a small proportion of those who acquire citizenship—have become the 
focus of intense, current debate over immigration policy and immigrants’ rights in the 
United States.  
Theories of Civil-Military Relations 
While a great deal has been written about the citizen-soldier tradition, the extant 
literature has rarely been brought into direct dialogue since the end of mass armies and 
the introduction of the all-volunteer force in 1973. However, the principle of “citizenship 
for service” has been enacted in immigration and naturalization laws throughout US 
history. Janowitz (1976) observes “from World War I onward military service has been… 
a device by which excluded segments of society could achieve political legitimacy and 
 14 
rights” (Janowitz 1976, 191). It is well known that aliens have served in the military 
during past conflicts; however, with the advent of the all-volunteer force, how and why 
the practice continues today has not been fully explored. Writing in 1981, Jacobs and 
Hayes observed, “The United States military has been a relatively ‘open’ institution with 
respect to immigrants and has contributed to their assimilation into American society” 
(Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 200). As the public and scholarly communities consider another 
revision of the nation’s immigration code a new study of alien military service and 
naturalization is timely. 
An entire sub-field within the civil-military relations literature concerns the 
consequences of decoupling citizenship and military service (Burk 2001; Janowitz 1976; 
Moskos 2003). Heater (1999) argues that the contemporary scholarly interest in civic 
republicanism can be traced to the disintegration of mass armies. While concern over 
what Elliot Cohen calls “the twilight of the citizen-soldier” and the erosion of civic virtue 
amount to a perennial republican critique of American liberalism, it is true that in the 
contemporary period national service is no longer synonymous with military service 
(Cohen 2001; Sackett and Mavor 2003). Analysis of longitudinal data of youth 
perceptions show that, beginning in the mid-1990s, young adults viewed civilian careers 
as just as likely—or more likely—to “do something important for the country” as military 
careers (Sackett and Mavor 2003, 214-5). If the military no longer functions as a 
mechanism of mass incorporation or “school for the nation,” and if young people no 
longer view military service as the primary route to making an important contribution to 
the nation, then leaders must ensure that other organizations and institutions are serving 
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this vital sense of purpose (Janowitz 1976; Krebs 2006). Given America’s changing 
demographic profile brought on by new immigrant groups, and the natural population 
growth estimates among these groups, knowing whether our political institutions—
including the military—are still capable of performing their nation-building role is a vital 
line of inquiry.9 
 The next section discusses why the military is best conceptualized as a political 
institution and how military service is rhetorically tied to citizenship in the United States. 
Last, it lays out the plan for the dissertation.   
THE MILITARY AS A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 
Political theorists have long been interested in the relationship between the 
method of building armies—such as universal service and conscription—and regime type 
(from republics to constitutional monarchies), examining whether certain models of 
service are more or less compatible with certain political principles of organization 
(Cohen 1985; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1976; Krebs 2006). For 
nearly all of Western political history, scholars have theorized a link between the 
democratic principle of equality and the principle of responsibility for the common 
defense (Chambers 1987; Cress 1982; Riesenberg 1992). In early Greek democracies—as 
described by Thucydides and others—citizens were soldiers and soldiers were citizens. 
Alien enlistment, through conscription or an all-volunteer model, exposes the tension 
between tenets of liberalism, democratic theory, and the various conceptions of 
                                                 
9 Krebs (2009) argues that the citizen-soldier tradition still performs this function rhetorically, making 
the disintegration of mass armies politically irrelevant.  
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citizenship that have all been embraced as part of the American creed. Indeed, this 
country’s founding figures held radical and democratic principles (Adams 1980; Carter 
1998; Cress 1982) about the rights of the individual, the proper limits of government, and 
the relationship between the two. Jus meritum exhibits many of these foundational 
American values. 
The presence of a civic republican tradition in the United States reinforces the 
military’s role as a political institution and “bridging environment” for the incorporation 
or recognition of new immigrant and politically marginalized groups. The military is a 
political institution par excellence, linking ordinary people to the state and serving as one 
of the most important sites of incorporation and assimilation of new groups. The military 
is one of the earliest and most durable institutions—a “nation builder” that socializes new 
immigrant and previously marginalized groups into the political community (Krebs 2006; 
Riesenberg 1992; Samito 2009; Smith 1981). The military is also a national symbol; it 
serves as a “repository of mythical constructions of the past” (Krebs 2006, 17). Like other 
nations, the United States has a long history of extending citizenship and other benefits to 
newcomers in exchange for service to the nation, especially during wartime (Janowitz 
1976; Lamm 2010; Plascencia 2009; Smith 1997; Tichenor 2002).  
War is part of nation building, as reflected by the role that the citizen-soldier 
plays in political and social narratives in the United States (Hedges 2002; Linderman 
1999; Smith 1981). The dominant narrative posits that military service—a symbolic, 
highly visible, and easily understood contribution to the community—is perhaps the most 
direct route to political inclusion. Americans describe military service as a means for 
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non-dominant groups to “earn” status as full members of the political community, 
“proving their allegiance” to the nation through sacrifice (Krebs 2006; Samito 2009). A 
great deal of scholarship documents the empirical link between the military service of 
marginalized groups and their successful efforts to be recognized as equal citizens. In the 
nineteenth century, many property-restricted suffrage laws yielded in response to the 
demands of property-less veterans (Adams 1980; Williamson 1960). Japanese, Native 
Americans, and Black Americans enlisted in the segregated Jim Crow Army during 
WWII in an effort to prove their allegiance to the country (Walsh 1994). Mettler (2002, 
2005) has documented how Black GI Bill recipients were more likely to become 
politically active in the civil rights movement. More recently, feminists argued in the 
1970s and 1980s that barriers to women in the service must be removed if women were to 
be treated as full and equal citizens (Hasday 2008). Similarly, supporters of homosexual 
rights applauded the 2010 repeal of the Department of Defense’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
policy. In the early part of the 21st century, reflecting the larger demographic changes in 
American society, Latino and Latina Americans are enlisting in greater numbers (Asch et 
al. 2009; Dempsey and Shapiro 2009). The entire corpus of citizen-soldier literature is a 
testament to the military’s success in nation building and the political efficiency of 
bearing arms in service to the state.  
The rhetorical power of these arguments derives from universal norms concerning 
the balance of rights and obligations in relationships among the individual, group, and 
state. Several scholars have explored the mechanisms of this phenomenon in the 
twentieth century (Mettler 2002; Parker 2009; Plascencia 2009; Samito 2009), 
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demonstrating how military service generates claims to political and social inclusion. 
Service to and sacrifice for the nation transforms the individual, who forms and joins the 
campaign for political recognition. In their efforts, these claimants often appropriate the 
very language used by the state to mobilize the population during war (Krebs 2006; 
Parker 2009). Doing so forces political elites who are not otherwise interested in more 
inclusive policies to either acknowledge their service or not—thereby undermining the 
state’s credibility in calling for shared sacrifice, identity, and fate when the next crisis 
occurs. In this sense, war serves as a “focusing event” (Pierson 1993), highlighting the 
service of these individuals and reminding Americans of the most fundamental of their 
commonly held values (Kriner and Shen 2010). Politically and socially excluded groups 
have won rights and recognition by successfully juxtaposing their second-class status to 
their record of military service through a process Krebs (2006) calls “rhetorical coercion” 
(Krebs 2006, 13). 
THE INSTITUTION OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 
Military service has shaped the institution of citizenship in the United States. 
Historically, military institutions played a major role in the expansion of suffrage, such as 
the removal of property requirements in the early 19th century (Krebs 2006; Williamson 
1960), the development of social welfare policy in the late 19th century (Skocpol 1992), 
and the integration of new immigrant and other marginalized groups into society 
throughout American history (Mettler 2002, 2005; Moskos and Butler 1996; Parker 
2009). On this subject, other scholars document how the liberalizing benefits of policies 
designed to meet the government’s immediate needs emerged years, some decades after a 
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crisis passed. For example Irish American volunteers of the Civil War used their service 
to prove their allegiance to the US, eventually recasting Catholicism as compatible with 
American citizenship (Samito 2011). Similarly African Americans were able  to knock 
down racial and ethnic barriers to national citizenship (Mershon and Schlossman 1998; 
Moore 1996; Morehouse 2000). In the 20th century, Suzanne Mettler (2002, 2005) 
documents how the experience of black veterans under the GI Bill furthered the civil 
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s. In these cases and others, military service 
played a role in shaping the institution of citizenship in the US by providing a path for 
marginalized groups to secure the same social and economic benefits as their citizen 
peers (Klinkner and Smith 1999; Krebs 2006; Mettler 2005; Parker 2009; Plascencia 
2009).  
The link between citizenship and military service is most obvious in the 
similarities between the Oath of Naturalization (or, of Renunciation and Allegiance) and 
military oaths of enlistment. The next section examines the similarities between the oaths 
of citizenship and military enlistment. Unlike military oaths of enlistment which were 
codified by Congress (the first by the Continental Congress in 1776), the United States 
did not even have a standardized oath of allegiance or naturalization until one was 
promulgated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in 1929. It is 
significant that this Executive agency, the INS, turned to the language of military oaths 
when drafting an Oath of US citizenship. The 1929 Oath of Naturalization, the final step 
in becoming a naturalized American citizen, is still in use today. It reads: 
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United States Oath of Citizenship (or, of Renunciation and Allegiance): 
 
I hereby declare, on oath / or solemnly affirm, 
that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any 
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have 
heretofore been a subject or citizen; [1] 
that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of 
America [2] against all enemies, foreign and domestic; [3] 
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; [4] 
that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; [5] 
that I will perform noncombatant service in the armed forces of the United States 
when required by the law; [6] 
that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when 
required by the law; [7] 
and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of 
evasion; so help me God. [8] 
 
I have numbered each clause (in brackets to the right) to make clear the below analysis. 
The core of the US Oath of Naturalization is borrowed from Military Enlistment Oaths. A 
history of the military enlistment oaths, as well as the text of each, appears in Appendix 
A. Generally speaking, Congress codified a new military oath during or after every major 
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war in accordance with its constitutional responsibility “to make rules of the government 
and regulation of the land and naval forces”. 
Clause 1 of the Citizenship Oath, rejection of previous political allegiance, 
appears in the 1776 oath for military officers.10 In 1789 Congress passed a new military 
oath for officers and enlisted men that begins “that I will support the constitution of the 
United States,” clause 2 of the 1929 Citizenship Oath. Clause 3 of the Citizenship Oath, 
“against all enemies foreign and domestic” first appeared in an 1862 military oath for 
officers of the Union. Clause 4 of the Citizenship Oath, “that I will bear true faith and 
allegiance to the same,” first appears in the 1830 oath of military enlistment. Clauses 5, 6, 
and 7 of the Citizenship Oath are the only ones not borrowed from a military oath and 
concern the military obligations of citizens and civilian alternatives to military service 
during wartime. Finally, clause 8 of the Citizenship Oath, “and that I take this obligation 
freely without mental reservation or purpose of evasion” are borrowed from the 1862 
military oath.  
It is clear that when drafting a uniform oath of US Citizenship in 1929, the federal 
agency charged with this responsibility borrowed heavily from military oaths of 
enlistment. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents may have 
appropriated is language because each military oath was passed by Congress and 
affirmed by the President. It may well have been simply expedient for INS agents to use 
pre-approved text. Textual and historical analysis of the Naturalization Oath further 
                                                 
10 See Appendix A for the history and evolution of the military oaths. Not surprisingly, the 1776 oath 
for officers in the Continental Army (and civilian office holders), specifically rejects political allegiance to 
“said King, George the third, and his heirs and successors, and his and their abettors, assistants, and 
adherents” (Continental Congress 1776). 
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supports the argument that military service and citizenship are linked. More research is 
needed to confirm that the drafters of the Naturalization (citizenship) Oath knowingly and 
intentionally borrowed from military oaths.11 At a minimum, the similarities between the 
Naturalization and Military Oaths provides evidence of a rhetorical link between 
individual allegiance to the political community and military service. 
PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION 
Chapter Two presents the historical evidence for conceptualizing jus meritum as a 
permanent feature of the naturalization regime in the United States. It examines the legal 
and policy history of alien military naturalization—that is, aliens that acquire citizenship 
through enlistment in the armed forces of the United States. This chapter analyzes 
enlistment regulations, draft laws, citizenship laws, and relevant judicial rulings 
regarding alien military service and naturalization. Following Smith (1997) and others, 
these data are a rich source of information for assessing the politics of membership, as 
well as the delineations of civic obligation in American society. Over time, the US 
government liberalized the immigration and naturalization regime to encourage 
enlistment as a national strategy for mobilization during wartime. When the crisis passed, 
a postwar struggle to accommodate new claimants began (Krebs 2006). 
As Chapter Two discusses, the military has long served as an institution or 
mechanism of political incorporation. The practice of alien enlistment in the armed forces 
of the United States predates the country’s founding and has since been regarded as a 
way for new or previously marginalized groups to prove their allegiance to the nation. 
                                                 
11 Archival research might confirm that this is what the drafters had in mind. 
 23 
Revealingly, the Civil War provisions for military naturalization are more similar to those 
for the First and Second World Wars and the post-9/11 period than they are to the 
immigration and citizenship policies of the mid-nineteenth century.  
Chapter Three turns to the politics of citizenship for service in the contemporary, 
post-9/11 period. The first part of the chapter summarizes the changes to the military 
enlistment and naturalization code in response to security imperatives of the post-9/11 
era. Numerous major changes are observed. First, in line with what is observed in earlier 
periods of armed conflict, the federal government relaxed enlistment regulations to attract 
immigrants to serve in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congress and the president 
provided for the naturalization of service members that served after 9/11 regardless of 
previous residency and properly admitted requirements. Additionally, the Department of 
Defense introduced the Military Ascensions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) 
program in 2008 that enlisted aliens with special language and medical skills although 
these persons are not statutorily authorized to serve in the “peacetime” volunteer force.  
The second part of Chapter Three examines the post-9/11 policy changes to the 
immigration and naturalization regime that depart from what was observed in earlier 
periods of armed conflict. This section discusses the practice of awarding posthumous 
citizenship to aliens killed in action and the extension of residency and citizenship 
benefits to the surviving family members of these soldiers. The conception of revocable 
citizenship is introduced to discuss the conditions placed on service members who 
acquire citizenship through military service after 2004. The post-2004 citizenship granted 
for military service is problematic and deserves greater scholarly attention.  
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Finally, Chapter Three discusses the place of alien military families and veterans 
under immigration law in the post-9/11 period. Particularly revealing is how the 
government has cared for the surviving spouses and children of those killed or injured in 
war. The practice of awarding posthumous citizenship to aliens killed in combat does 
represent an official effort by the state to meet its obligation to the families of the fallen 
(although exactly what that obligation is remains unspecified). The military services have 
renewed efforts to make all service members citizens; however, there remains a 
population of alien veterans in the United States. Although Presidents Bush and Obama 
have taken steps to shield alien veterans and their family members from deportation, such 
executive measures are temporary. Congressional action is needed to resolve the status of 
many alien veterans, military family members not legally in the United States. 
Chapter Four moves from historical, theoretical, and policy analysis to 
contemporary empirical analysis of how the contemporary public views jus meritum. This 
is particularly relevant for the current debate over the appropriate direction and scope of 
immigration policy reform. Specifically, this chapter analyzes original polling data on the 
DREAM Act, a proposal to allow undocumented persons brought to the United States 
before the age of 16 to become legal residents if they graduate from high school, remain 
free of legal trouble, and go to college or join the military. All previous public polling on 
the DREAM Act is limited in that it asked respondents about support for a proposal to 
allow persons brought to the US as minors a path to citizenship if they joined the military 
or went to college. While it is reasonable to assume that there is more public support for 
the military than the college provision, there was no data to support this hypothesis. 
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At the request of the author the May 2011 Texas Politics Survey, for the first 
time, asked respondents about the military and college provisions separately. 
Unsurprisingly, 59 percent of respondents supported the military provision (37 percent 
opposed) whereas only 36 percent supported (59 percent opposed) the college provision. 
The public’s greater support for the military compared to the college provision of the 
DREAM Act supports the argument the argument that jus meritum is a longstanding 
feature of US citizenship policy. It is beyond the reach of this poll’s design and data to 
discern whether this support stems from knowledge of the history of the practice 
discussed in chapter 3, the citizen-soldier tradition generally, the rhetorical import of 
military service, or some combination of these. The statistical analysis of the May 2011 
Texas Politics Survey data does support the idea that military service is somehow 
exceptional in the eyes of the public.  
Chapter Five considers the implications of these findings for theories of 
citizenship, immigration, and civil-military relations literature, arguing that the path to 
citizenship through military service should be more widely regarded as a durable element 
of the institution of citizenship in the United States. Ample historical evidence links the 
state’s military needs to the evolution of immigration and naturalization policies. Despite 
its absence from the academic literature, jus meritum has functioned over time as a 
foundational claim to political membership alongside the traditional principles of jus soli 
and jus sanguinis. 
The examination of the legal and policy changes in response to the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan are also largely consistent with the overall pattern of changes to 
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immigration and naturalization law that coincide with a sharp increase in the state’s 
military needs (or at least the perception of those needs). But this finding contests the 
traditional Hartzian view that American political development is a progression of 
liberalism because it includes some arguably problematic practices such as posthumous 
and revocable citizenship discussed in chapter 3 (Hartz 1955).12 
Last, Chapter Five examines the choices faced by current policy makers. If draft 
laws and enlistment regulations reflect how Americans defined membership in the 
community during the Civil War and two World Wars, what are we to make of current 
Selective Service laws that require undocumented immigrants to register for the draft? 
This chapter specifically discusses the 2012 Executive Memo on “deferred action on 
childhood arrivals,” and the 2014 announcement that undocumented minors are eligible 
for military enlistment in light of the long-standing practice of political incorporation 
through military service.  
                                                 
12 Discussed in chapter 4, posthumous citizenship refers to the practice of naturalizing service 
members after their death in combat. About 110 such awards have been made to service members killed in 
Afghanistan and Iraq from 2011 to 2014. Revocable citizenship refers to the provision allowing the 
government to denaturalize persons that acquire citizenship through military service after 2008 if they do 
not serve “honorably” for 5 years. There is no evidence that the US government has attempted to 
denaturalize any ex-service member however the Congress has empowered the Department of Homeland 
Security to do so. 
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Chapter Two 
Policy History of Alien Military Naturalization 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the history of alien military enlistment and naturalization. 
The general process is quite simple: political incorporation is the unintended consequence 
of “casting a wide net” for mobilizing resources during crisis periods (Krebs 2006; 
Sparrow 1996). Liberalization or loosening of the state’s immigration and naturalization 
regime occurs during wars, and despite efforts to return to a more restrictive regime 
during peacetime, the performance of military service has great rhetorical power that is 
often converted to political gains (Lamm 2010). Every Congress has made provisions for 
military naturalization during or after periods of armed conflict. For much of American 
history, naturalization was decentralized and largely governed by the states—except for 
the category of military petitioners whom the popular branches of government took 
special care to manage at the federal level, never delegating this power to the states. 
Because the practice of granting citizenship for service is evident across so many periods 
of American political development and in every major war, the principle of jus meritum 
should be regarded as at least as “ingrained” as citizenship based on parentage or place of 
birth (Wong 2007, 168). 
OVERVIEW 
The main argument of this chapter is supported by the available data on military 
naturalizations throughout the twentieth century. Figure 2.1 shows the number of military 
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naturalizations and their proportion of the total naturalizations in the United States over 
the twentieth century. As previously mentioned, the United States enacted comprehensive 
immigration statutes beginning in the 1880s and centralized naturalization processes in 
the early 1900s. Data are available for the years 1907 through 2010 (excluding 1925 and 
1935).13 According to the Department of Homeland Security, to which the US 
Citizenship and Immigration Service reports, special provisions regarding the 
naturalization of military personnel expired in 1925 and again, apparently, in 1935. 
Despite these limitations, a correlation between wartime and higher numbers of alien 
military naturalizations is immediately apparent.  
Figure 2.1 shows the proportion of military personnel to total US naturalizations 
for the years 1918 to 2010. The vertical bars represent the number of naturalizations per 
year; the solid line is the military’s share of the total US naturalizations for that year. 
These data indicate that the state’s military needs have had a profound impact on the 
naturalization regime for much of US history. Significantly, the last time that military 
naturalizations neared 10 percent of the total for a given year was during the war in 
Vietnam. The number of military naturalizations drops off with the end of the draft and 
the shift to an all-volunteer force in 1973. Although these data on the number of recorded 
military naturalizations provide some idea of the number of aliens who served in uniform, 
                                                 
13 In 1906, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was created. The US Citizenship and 
Immigration Service (USCIS) was created within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that was 
established in 2002. 
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we know there were some who did not receive citizenship.14 These data are supported by 
the policy history that demonstrates how successive generations of Americans recognized 
the principle of jus meritum. For most of American history, however, military service was 
a necessary but not sufficient cause for the enjoyment of free and equal status after the 
war. Instead, as other scholars have argued, veterans often used their military service to 
extract political, social, and economic concessions from ruling coalitions (Klinkner and 
Smith 1999; Krebs 2006, Parker 2009; Smith 1997). 
 
  
                                                 
14 For example, the Posthumous Citizenship Act of 1989, examined in chapters 3 and 4, was enacted to 
recognize the service of alien veterans who never naturalized and are therefore not reflected in the official 
count. 
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Figure 2.1:  Military Naturalizations as a Proportion of Total US Naturalizations 1918-
2010 
 
Source: Data from the 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, Office of Immigration 
Statistics, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010. 
 
 
 
The history of alien military service and naturalization should be read with two 
points in mind. The first concerns American political development, and the second is 
related to the changing definition of who qualifies for citizenship. Prior to the Civil War, 
citizenship essentially meant state citizenship. Some scholars refer to the Civil War as 
America’s Second Founding because the idea of national citizenship emerged during the 
1861–1865 war and the period of Reconstruction that followed (Ackerman 1998). Other 
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scholars have identified the Union draft itself as the impetus for the creation of United 
States citizenship—specifically the shift from state to national citizenship (Kettner 1978; 
Lonn 1951; Ural 2010). During this period, the national government also began to 
centralize the processing of immigrants.15 Second, although noncitizens have served in 
all of America’s wars, the definition of noncitizen has changed significantly over time.16 
At one time, noncitizen encompassed free blacks and former slaves who fought in the 
military prior to the Fourteenth Amendment (1868) and the Naturalization Act of 1870. 
Native American soldiers were also considered noncitizens prior to the 1924 Indian 
Citizenship Act (Plascencia 2009). Along similar lines, Japanese-American volunteers 
during WWII were classified as enemy aliens (Walsh 1994). Beginning with the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution that recognized blacks as US citizens, the 
Unites States removed many of the ascriptive (usually racial or ethnic) prohibitions on 
citizenship (Smith 1997). These two general points regarding the centralization of 
political authority and the gradual liberalization of a national concept of citizenship form 
the backdrop of the history of alien military service and naturalization. 
REVOLUTIONARY WAR 
Although the idea and practice of jus meritum predates the government of the 
United States, prior to the Civil War it meant state citizenship in exchange for enlistment 
                                                 
15 In 1864, a Bureau of Immigration was established in the Department of Commerce. In 1906, this 
bureau was renamed the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and eventually the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) as the federal government centralized and standardized citizenship policy in 
the early part of the twentieth century.  
16 Although important, the changes brought by the acquisition of new territory and the political 
incorporation of territories like the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam are not the primary focus of this 
study. 
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in a state militia. As the traditional seats of sovereignty, states were the only governments 
able to offer citizenship during the American Revolution. In fact, it might be said that the 
British introduced the enlistment-citizenship exchange when Lord Dunmore issued a 
November 1775 proclamation to the slaves of would-be rebels: side with the Crown and 
become free men. The Continental Congress countered and “offered land and citizenship 
to enemy troops who would switch sides” (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 194; Franklin 1969, 
5). A large-scale slave rebellion in the American colonies never materialized and some 
scholars estimate that the tactic revolutionized otherwise neutral colonists. Dunmore’s 
proclamation was cited as one of the grievances in the Declaration of Independence: 
“inciting those very people to rise in arms among us” (Holton 1999). 
Military planners in the Continental Army debated the idea of offering slaves 
freedom in exchange for military service. Although General Washington opposed the 
enlistment of persons not eligible for citizenship, his Quartermaster (overseeing the 
army’s supply needs), Colonel Alexander Hamilton, grew frustrated with the southern 
states’ inability to meet their enlistment quotas, and suggested “Raise two three or four 
battalions of negroes… by contributions from the owners in proportion to the number 
they possess. I have not the least doubt that negroes will make very excellent soldiers… 
for their natural faculties are probably as good as ours… The contempt we have been 
taught to entertain for the blacks, makes us fancy many things that are founded neither in 
reason nor experience” (Alexander Hamilton to John Jay, March 14, 1779). Hamilton 
continued in his letter to Jay: “An essential part of the plan is to give them their freedom 
with their muskets. This will secure their fidelity, animate their courage, and I believe 
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will have a good influence upon those who remain, by opening a door to their 
emancipation. This circumstance, I confess, has no small weight in inducing me to wish 
the success of this project; for the dictates of humanity and true policy equally interest me 
in favour of this unfortunate class of men.” Hamilton’s proposal to enlist slaves as free 
persons never came to fruition.  
Hamilton’s letter to John Jay documents his belief that free men make better 
soldiers than those held in bondage (although the voluntary nature of these soldiers’ 
service would remain in doubt). It also suggests a relationship between one’s status and 
the prospect of faithful allegiance to the political community. The policy towards 
noncitizens and aliens in uniform changed when the States’ military needs waned after 
peace was concluded with England. 
Between the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, the size of the US armed forces (land 
and naval) was very small. A handful of men were stationed at West Point while naval 
forces were concerned with fighting piracy off the Barbary coast, i.e. North Africa 
(Huntington 1959). The demilitarization that followed the Revolutionary War reflected 
the Founders’ belief that standing armies were dangerous to liberty and inconsistent with 
republican forms of government. Instead, the de-centralized Union placed their security 
in the hands of state-run militias comprised of citizen-soldiers. Aliens were barred from 
enlistment in the US armed forces from the mid-1780s until war again prompted 
Congress to authorize the enlistment of aliens in the US Army in 1811 and Navy in 
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1813.17 During the Mexican War, Congress authorized alien enlistment in the Army 
only.18 
The pattern of alien enlistment eligibility during these wars, i.e. in the Army and 
Navy for the War of 1812 and in the Army only for the Mexican War, supports the 
argument that the Congress accepted alien volunteers in the armed forces in order to meet 
its security needs. However, the criteria for citizenship and process of naturalization was 
generally left to the states during this period. There was no federal or US government 
effort to see that alien soldiers and sailors became citizens. Significantly, and perhaps 
contributing to the government’s inattention to naturalizing enlistees, there was also no 
draft or large-scale effort to encourage volunteers to avoid the political consequences of a 
draft. In sum, the number of aliens that served in the US armed forces between the major 
wars is tiny compared the number that would contribute to the Union victory in the Civil 
War and the two World Wars that followed (Jacobs and Hayes 1981).  
CIVIL WAR 
The military needs of the Civil War resulted in the large-scale enlistment of 
noncitizens by the Union. As President Lincoln described the conflict in his 1861 
message to Congress, “This is essentially a People’s contest” (Lincoln quoted in Basel 
1953, 438). The Civil War engendered a “more substantial” identity in the Union that 
encouraged military enlistment from groups that were statutorily exempt from the 
nation’s first draft (Engle 2010, 11; Samito 2009). The 1862 Militia Act gave President 
                                                 
17 Act of December 24, 1811, chapter 10 section 2, 2 Stat. 669; Act of March 3, 1813 chapter 42 
sections 1, 10, 2 Stat. 809. 
18 Act of January 12, 1847, chapter 2, 9 Stat. 117. 
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Lincoln the authority to issue rules for calling up the state militias within the Union.19 
Initially, only “declarant” aliens, or those who had declared their intention to become 
citizens, were eligible for the draft.20 Establishing residency and acquiring citizenship 
was generally a two-step process until the mid-20th century (when it was replaced by the 
concept of legal permanent residency, or LPR status): first, an alien swore an oath in a 
state or federal (district) court of his intent to naturalize, and after a period of residency 
(generally two years) the individual returned to court to take the oath of citizenship. 
In 1862, Congress passed the military naturalization statute for former Civil War 
servicemen—now veterans—who had been honorably discharged and had one year of 
residency.21 This statute allowed alien soldiers and veterans to execute “one paper” 
naturalizations, meaning that they could skip the declaration of intent and proceed 
directly to the oath of citizenship. The special military naturalization law granted 
eligibility for one paper naturalization to both conscript and voluntary alien soldiers.22 In 
1864, Congress widened pool of draft-liable persons by redefining citizen-seeking or 
declarant alien as any who had voted or held public office, even if they had not formally 
declared their intention in court (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 192).23 The 1864 draft 
regulations represent one of the first federal efforts to enforce a uniform standard for 
                                                 
19 Act of July 17, 1862, chapter 201 (12 Stat. 597). 
20 Act of March 3, 1863, chapter 75 section 1 (12 Stat. 731).  
21 Act of July 17, 1862, chapter 200, section 21 (12 Stat. 594). 
22 Act of February 24, 1864, chapter 13 section 18 (13 Stat. 6).  
23 Jacobs and Hayes (1981) report that Secretary of State Seward, believing he had such authority, had 
proclaimed in 1862 that any person who voted would be subject to the draft whether or not he had declared 
his intention to seek citizenship (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 192); and the governor of at least one state 
implemented this policy by assuming that persons who lived in the territory for more than six years had 
voted (Ibid., 204).  
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political participation and obligation, a long-held prerogative of state and local 
governments.  
The 1864 draft law treated (male) residents equally in other ways, too. For 
example, aliens were eligible for enlistment bonuses, which were prevalent due to the 
process of substitution and commutation, whereby wealthy citizens could escape the draft 
by finding a volunteer replacement (Wong 2007). With regard to this incentive, Secretary 
of State William Henry Seward stated, “Exactly the same inducements to military service 
were open to them [aliens] which by authority of law were offered at the time to citizens 
of the United States” (Seward quoted in Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 202).24 Whether 
conscript or volunteer, alien soldiers and veterans who petitioned through the military 
naturalization statute during the Civil War were recognized and rewarded for their service 
during a period of national crisis (Krebs 2006). 
In the years following the Civil War, a more restrictive immigration and 
naturalization regime took shape (Jacobs and Hayes 1981; Smith 1997; Tichenor 2002). 
For example, Congress barred the admission of aliens under work contract through the 
Alien Contract Labor Law (1885), and tightened immigration control in general.25 During 
the same period—in 1875, 1882, and 1885—Congress expanded the categories of aliens 
to be prohibited from admission, in 1891 first developed an apparatus for the deportation 
                                                 
24 Historians have documented the Union’s efforts to recruit resident aliens and some unofficial efforts 
to recruit potential resident aliens, i.e., Irish seeking immigration to the United States (see Murdock 1971; 
Hayes and Jacobs 1981; Samito 2009; Ural 2010). More generally, see Paludan 1988 and Lonn 1951. 
25 For example, the Immigration Act of 1875 barred the admission of prostitutes and criminals. The 
Immigration Act of 1882 barred the admission of convicts, “lunatics,” “idiots,” and persons “likely to 
become a public charge.” This act also imposed a head tax on arrivals and required data collection on the 
number of arrivals. Of course the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which was directed at stopping Chinese 
laborers, was extended in 1888. 
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of improperly admitted aliens. Yet provisions for Civil War—and later Spanish-
American War—veterans remained, and were even expanded. For example, in 1894, 
Congress enlarged the pool of applicants eligible to naturalize under the 1862 Militia Act 
to include Navy veterans. Remarkably, Congress extended the offer of citizenship to alien 
veterans even as it expanded the categories of immigrants deemed inadmissible to the 
United States and, if properly admitted, those permanently barred from naturalization. 
WORLD WAR I 
In the years leading up to the US involvement in WWI, the American state vastly 
increased its capacity in the area of military organization and prioritized the centralization 
of the nation’s immigration and naturalization regime. For example, in 1906 Congress 
abolished the state militia system and replaced it with a National Guard. Unlike state 
militias, the National Guard is a national resource under the authority of the commander-
in-chief. Unable to train and effectively equip the militias since the founding, state 
authorities were eager to abolish the militia system, and be relieved of the responsibility 
and cost.26 Also in 1906, Congress renamed the small Bureau of Immigration that had 
been created within the Department of Commerce in 1864 the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). Congress charged the INS with overseeing all new 
                                                 
26 The militia system was certainly considered ideal by many of the Framers, but professional soldiers 
considered it inadequate for the nation’s defense. For example, George Washington’s experience with the 
nonregulars during the war led him to beg Congress not to dismantle the army, as the militia were not a 
sufficient defense. Washington and others preferred “professional” militaries. Professional militaries were 
thought of as compatible with classic liberal economic and political arrangements, whereas military service 
was conceived of as an occupation for some rather than an obligation for all. For example, in the Wealth of 
Nations, Adam Smith advocates professional militaries over militia (volunteers): professionals performed 
better, were better trained, and enabled occupational specialization and expertise to develop.  
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immigrant arrivals, standardizing residency requirements, and processing eligible persons 
for naturalization. 
The First World War encouraged and may have precipitated the transformation of 
America’s military organization. There was some debate over the constitutionality of this 
new federal approach to conscription in the lead up to the war. Specifically at issue was 
whether or not the federal government had the authority to directly conscript persons into 
a national military. Previously the national command authority relied on state militias to 
act as intermediaries. The federal government set enlistment quotas but the part-
volunteer, part-conscript military was organized by state. This arrangement was 
inefficient and the scale of the First World War persuaded Congress that “direct federal 
conscription” was justified and constitutional. The WWI draft law included “declarant 
aliens,” or alien residents, that had declared their intent to seek naturalization (the first 
step in the two-step naturalization process that continued until 1952). Refusal to serve 
meant forgoing any future possibility of becoming a US citizen; it could also mean 
leaving the country (Fitzhugh and Hyde 1942, Probst 1956, Samito 2010, Walsh 1994). 
In this same nationalizing trend, residency came to replace citizenship as the basis 
for draft liability during WWI. Nondeclarant aliens could volunteer, and many did but 
were not “draft liable.” Although the draft was supposedly nation-wide, it was not the 
national draft that would later come with WWII. The WWI draft was conducted 
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geographically, based on census data, so that a proportional number of conscripts would 
be drawn from each municipality and state.27  
The WWI draft legislation reflected the emergence of a national conception of 
citizenship that was more egalitarian and inclusive. For example, the 1917 draft statute 
rejected the Civil War-era practices of substitution and commutation as undemocratic and 
unpatriotic (O’Sullivan and Meckler 1974; Wong 2007).28 WWI was the first occasion 
since the Civil War for which large numbers of troops were needed; 687,000 men were 
chosen by lottery from the 9,500,000 that appeared before local draft boards on June 5, 
1917 (O’Sullivan and Meckler 1974, 127-8).29 Personnel requirements for geographical 
units were drawn up using census data. Because the census counts residents instead of 
citizens, a large alien population raised a city or county’s quota, making it more likely 
that any citizen resident would be drafted. As a result, the WWI draft fostered anti-
immigrant sentiments around the issue of alien residents. Concerned citizens and their 
representatives in Congress blamed what they considered alien free riders who avoided 
service “in their own country” by immigrating to the United States and endangering 
native-born sons by establishing residence in a given district (Black 1926). The public 
                                                 
27 During WWI, the War Department experimented with allowing surplus recruits from one state to 
off-set low recruitment states; i.e., allowing swaps. 
28 Section 3 of the World War 1 Draft Act (1917) reads: 
no bounty shall be paid to induce any person to enlist in the military service of the United 
States; and no person liable to military service shall hereafter be permitted or allowed to furnish a 
substitute for such service; nor shall any substitute be received, enlisted, or enrolled in the military 
service of the United States; and no such person shall be permitted to escape such service or be 
discharged therefrom prior to the expiration of his term of service by the payment of money or any 
valuable thing whatsoever as consideration for his release from military service or liability thereto. 
(Qtd. from O’Sullivan and Meckler 1974, 124) 
29 “It was felt that the most equitable way to choose the 687,000 men immediately needed would be by 
lottery, and so, on July 20, the first number was selected from a large glass bowl by the blindfolded 
secretary of war” (O’Sullivan and Meckler 1974, 128). 
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demanded through their representatives in Congress that all resident aliens, regardless of 
their stage in the naturalization process, be made draft liable. 
However, the public perception is not supported by the available data showing 
one in every five soldiers to be foreign born. The foreign-born were over-represented in 
uniform, i.e. the foreign-born population in uniform was at about twice the foreign-born 
proportion of the total population (Ford 1997). Jacobs and Hayes (1981) estimate that 
noncitizens comprised 9 percent of all WWI military personnel. Although these data are 
imperfect, aliens appear to have made up a larger proportion of conscripts in 1918 and 
1919, as Congress broadened the definition of draft-eligible aliens in later rounds of the 
WWI draft. As a result Ford (1997) estimates that noncitizens accounted for 18 percent of 
the army, or around two hundred thousand draftees, in 1918 alone. This number is not 
surprising given the great resistance to the draft. About 300,000 men were eventually 
classified as “draft evaders,” despite official efforts to effect an equitable process 
(O’Sullivan and Meckler 1974). 
In addition, the US government made changes to the citizenship regime to meet 
its military needs that are not factored in to the recorded number of military 
naturalizations. For example, despite a proclamation by the Puerto Rican legislature and 
governor in favor of remaining a territory, Congress made Puerto Ricans US citizens in 
1917. The twenty thousand Puerto Ricans drafted during WWI are therefore not counted 
among the naturalized citizen-soldiers or foreign-born troops (Amaya 2007, 2013). These 
changes explain why some scholars argue that the “foreign-born” comprised one-fifth of 
the total number of conscripts in the US armed forces during WWI (Ford 1997). 
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As in the Civil War, the mass conscription of declarant aliens and voluntary 
enlistment of nondeclarant aliens during WWI was followed by the enactment of special 
naturalization provisions for men in uniform.  In May 1918, Congress authorized the 
immediate naturalization of men in uniform, waiving all residency requirements and 
proof of lawful arrival (certificates of arrival were issued to immigrants beginning in 
1906 and were normally required of petitioners).30 The 1918 military naturalization 
statute also allowed for the overseas processing of citizenship petitions. 
Scholars point to the creation of immigration quotas in the 1920s as evidence of a 
tightening of the state’s immigration and naturalization regime (Tichenor 2002). For 
example, the 1921 National Quota Law, which limited immigration from each nation to 3 
percent of its foreign-born population in the 1910 US Census, was followed by the 1924 
National Origins Act, which lowered these quotas to the proportions of the 1890 Census. 
Restrictive quotas erected against immigrants from the “Asiatic zone” have received 
particular attention from scholars (McClain 1995; Tichenor 2002; Volpp 2001). Racial 
nativism prompted Congress to pass the 1922 Cable Act, which denaturalized American 
women who married noncitizen Asian men. In 1924, the Border Control was established 
to stem the tide of Asians immigrating to the United States through Meixco.31 
Most importantly for this study, in 1924 the Supreme Court of the United States 
ruled that Asian veterans of WWI were ineligible for naturalization under the 1918 
military naturalization statute. In Toyota v. U.S. (1925), the court reasoned that Congress 
                                                 
30 Act of May 9, 1918; 40 Stat. 512 
31 In 1924 Congress barred Asians from direct immigration to the United States and established the 
Border Control to prevent Asians from gaining entry through Mexico Thanks to David Leal for helping 
clarify this point. 
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never intended to naturalize Asian aliens.32 During one of the most restrictive (nativist) 
periods in US history, veterans’ organizations spearheaded the effort to pass legislation 
overturning the Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota (1925). In October 1934, the national 
assemblies of both the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars adopted a 
resolution in favor of citizenship for Asian veterans. It appears that the rhetorical power 
of military service ultimately surmounted nativist efforts to keep Asian veterans from 
obtaining citizenship.33 The aforementioned veterans’ organizations were instrumental in 
passing the Nye-Lea Act of 1935, which provided citizenship for Asian veterans almost 
two decades before the general barriers to Asian immigration and naturalization were 
formally lifted in 1952. “They took the obligation and they are now Legionnaires,” 
explained the American Legion Weekly Bulletin in 1935. 
The incremental nature of what Salyer (2004) calls an ideology of “militaristic 
patriotism” that allowed veterans’ organizations to embrace American veterans of Asian 
descent as brothers in arms is telling. The hypocrisy did not go unnoticed. In light of the 
early 1935 legislation, one American Legion Post commander to the Congressional 
                                                 
32 The court argued that the Congress made a special exception for Filipinos. 
33 The case of Asian veterans of WWI was publicly discussed. See Sidney Gulick, “Men without a 
Country,” New York Times, July 12, 1925; Kiichi Kanzaki, “American-Born Japanese Loyal to United 
States,” San Francisco Chronicle, January 15, 1918, 19; “Japanese in Army Entitled to 
Citizenship,” Honolulu Star Bulletin, December 4, 1918; “Cosmopolitan Heroes,” New York Times, May 
14, 1919, p. 49; “77th Artillery's Exploits on Whole American Front,” New York Times, May 14, 1919, p. 
1; Joseph Timmons, “Hawaii Is Vast Incubator of ‘American-Born’ Japs,” San Francisco Examiner, March 
23, 1921; Dorothy Dunbar Bromley, “The Pacifist Bogey,” Harper's Monthly Magazine 61 (October 1930): 
554. For scholarly accounts see Yuji Ichioka, “The Early Japanese Quest for Citizenship: The Background 
for the 1922 Ozawa Case,” Amerasia Journal 4, no. 2 (1977): 1–22; Henry B. Hazard, “‘Attachment to the 
Principles of the Constitution’ as Judicially Construed in Certain Naturalization Cases in the United 
States,” American Journal of International Law 23 (October 1929): 785; Eric L. Muller, Free to Die for 
Their Country: The Story of the Japanese American Draft Resisters in World War II (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2001). 
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Committee on Immigration and Naturalization observed: “It is poor patriotism and 
sportsmanship to use citizenship in a time of war and then permit it to be cheapened by 
the Indian-giving tactics after the war is over” (G. Edward Buxtom to Taylor, March 6, 
1935).34 Although the gains from the Nye-Lea Act of 1935 were temporary—as there 
was no public outcry in response to the detention of Japanese Americans during WWII—
they represent the principle recognizing persons as equal citizens in light of their military 
service even during one of the most nativist and restrictive periods in modern US 
history.35 
WORLD WAR II 
The principle of residency—as opposed to citizenship, which was first enacted 
during WWI—continued to determine draft eligibility throughout the twentieth century. 
The reality of a Second World War quelled concerns about the constitutionality of direct 
federal conscription as the United States mobilized every available resource for the war 
effort (Freeman 1971; Friedman 1968; Mickelwait 1940; Roh and Upham 1972). Even as 
several groups were formally barred from citizenship, including those granted “nominal” 
citizenship after WWI such as Japanese Americans and nationals of belligerent states, 
military necessity drove the United States to enlist any and every volunteer (Salyer 2004, 
851). Furthermore, the United States enlisted hundreds of thousands of Filipinos from the 
                                                 
34 Quoted in Salyer 2004, 872. Although some Native Americans were naturalized through the 1918 
Military Naturalization statute, it was not until the Nationality Act of 1940 that all Native Americans were 
granted jus soli citizenship. U.S.C. 8 §1401(b). See Haas 1957. 
35 See Lucy Salyer (2004) on this citizenship as “nominal”; see also Mae Ngai (2004). The temporary 
nature of these gains may be why the story of Asian, particularly Japanese, veterans of WWI is not as 
widely known as that of their WWII counterparts. The implications of this study for theories of citizenship 
and immigration are discussed in the following chapter.  
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then US protectorate of the Philippines (1935-1946) to execute the war in the Pacific 
(Schlimgen 2010). There was also a great deal of international (allied) military 
cooperation. For example, Mexican citizens residing in the United States could fulfill 
their service obligation by serving in Mexican units of the US Army or by serving in the 
Mexican military. Some ethnic units of the US Army, including a unit of second-
generation Japanese Americans (referred to as Nisei)— officially excluded from combat 
as US soldiers—nevertheless served in combat in both the European and Pacific theatres 
in WWII (McNaughton 2006; Sakamoto 1993). 
As during previous conflicts, the WWII series of statutes provided for the 
naturalization of military personnel at home and abroad. The eligibility requirements of 
three major military naturalization laws demonstrate how the US government relaxed its 
immigration and naturalization laws as the military crisis deepened. First, the Nationality 
Act of 1940 provided for the naturalization of aliens with three years of honorable service 
in the armed forces of the United States. The 1940 act waived the “declaration of intent” 
requirement for naturalization that had featured so prominently in the WWI conscription 
debate. For the first time, the naturalization authority (transferred from the INS to the 
Department of Justice in 1940 for security reasons) allowed citizenship ceremonies to be 
performed outside the United States under military supervision (Tichenor 2002).36 Two 
years later, the 1942 Second War Powers Act went further by providing for the 
immediate naturalization of service members. Significantly, the Second War Powers Act 
                                                 
36 In another major wartime reorganization of government in 1940, Congress transferred the 
naturalization authority from the INS to the Department of Justice, passed the Alien Registration Act, the 
Immigration Act, and the Selective Training and Service Act. 
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provided for the immediate naturalization of service members who enlisted while not 
lawfully present in the United States. Third, the December 1944 Act offered immediate 
citizenship in exchange for service even where the person enlisted and served outside the 
United States. Significantly, the December 1994 Act authorized citizenship for persons 
with no previous residency or familial ties to the United States 37 
The progressive relaxation of the immigration and naturalization regime of the 
United States demonstrates how the government used the promise of citizenship to entice 
volunteers. As the war dragged on, the government sanctioned the naturalization of 
otherwise ineligible aliens in exchange for military service. Perhaps because the crisis 
was so acute, we see the US government engage in creative policymaking. The political 
reverberations of alien and previously marginalized military service during WWII has 
been examined by historians and political scientists (Krebs 2006; Klinkner and Smith 
1999; Mettler 2002, 2005; Parker 2009). 
COLD WAR 
In the last years of WWII, the United States drastically limited the number of 
alien exemptions from military service. The experience of WWII affirmed the WWI 
standard that draft liability should derive from residency not citizenship (Walsh 1994). 
This consensus was codified in the Selective Service Act of 1948, which required all 
resident aliens—including illegal aliens—to register with the Selective Service. In 
contrast to previous periods wherein Congress passed military naturalization statutes for 
specific conflicts, the law providing citizenship for military service from the end of 
                                                 
37 Act of December 22, 1944 (ch. 662 Stat. 886). 
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WWII to the present is governed by permanent military naturalization provisions. These 
provisions first appeared in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952 (66 Stat. 
249).38 Specifically, two sections of the new code, §328 and §329, authorized special 
naturalization procedures for service during peace- and wartime, respectively. The 
peacetime provision, §328, allowed aliens who perform three years of honorable military 
service and are lawfully admitted to the United States to apply for naturalization.39 
During peacetime, military enlistment shaved two years off of the five-year residency 
requirement for legal permanent residents (LPRs) seeking US citizenship.40  
The naturalization benefits for wartime service are more generous. The most 
significant difference is that under wartime provision §329, an alien does not need to be 
lawfully admitted to permanent residence or legally present in the United States at the 
time of enlistment.41 The waiver of LPR status is significant because it authorizes the 
naturalization of “undocumented” or “illegal” aliens who serve in the US armed forces 
during wartime.42 Four periods were designated as “wartime” service from 1952 to 2001, 
                                                 
38 Act of June 27, 1952, ch 477 title III, ch 2, 66 Stat. 249.  
39 Under §328, an honorably discharged alien must submit his or her petition within six months of 
leaving the service (INA 1952). 
40 Section 328 waives certain requirements contained in the civilian naturalization provision (INA 
1952 §318). Specifically, aliens are eligible for naturalization without meeting the ordinary requirements: 
(1) five years’ residency in the United States, six months within a state; (2) residence within the jurisdiction 
of the naturalization court; and (3) a thirty-day delay between petition and hearing. These requirements are 
waived for peacetime service if the alien is on active duty. 
41 Under the 1952 INA and its amendments, such aliens must have enlisted while present in the United 
States or its territories. 
42 Under the wartime provision of the INA §329 (Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 250). 
The benefits of this section are: 1) naturalization regardless of age; 2) naturalization 
regardless of outstanding deportation orders; 3) the alien enemies provision does not apply; 4) the 
usual period of five years residence in a state is not required; 5) the petition may be filed in any 
naturalization court regardless of the person’s residency; 6) the usual thirty-day delay period 
between petition and hearing does not apply. (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 207) 
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making military personnel eligible for naturalization under the more generous §329. The 
first two conflicts, Korea and Vietnam, were declared by Congress to be periods of armed 
conflict, whereas Executive Orders designated Grenada and the Persian Gulf War as 
“wartime.”43 
 During the Cold War—from the end of WWII to the early 1990s—military 
naturalization was governed by the two permanent provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, §328 and §329.44 Both the peace and wartime military naturalization 
provisions are more liberal than the regular (civilian) naturalization requirement for legal 
permanent residents of the United States.45 The end of the draft in 1972 and the 
introduction of the all-volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 did not prompt Congress to revise 
the military naturalization provisions. Legal permanent resident aliens were (and continue 
to be) required to register with the Selective Service before and after the introduction of 
the all-volunteer force. In addition, LPRs were eligible for voluntary enlistment from 
1973–2001. Significantly, while only LPRs were eligible for enlistment, the wartime 
military naturalization statute (as far back as 1952) allowed alien soldiers “not legally 
admitted” to the United States to become citizens (INA 1952 §329). 
                                                 
43 The Korean Hostilities Act (1953) and Vietnam Hostilities Act (1968) made active duty service 
members who served during these periods eligible for naturalization through INA §329. The ending date 
for the Vietnam conflict was designated by Executive Order 12081 (1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 42237). Grenada 
was designated by Executive Order 12582 (1987, Fed. Reg. 339); the Persian Gulf War was designated by 
Executive Order 12939 (1994, 59 Fed. Reg. 61231). The Grenada EO was invalidated by the 9th Circuit 
Court because President Reagan attempted to limit the order geographically (Reyes v INS (910 F.2d 611, 
9th Circuit 1990). Executive Orders activated §329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act that allows for 
the immediate naturalization of any person serving in uniform. 
44 These provisions first appeared in 1952, but remained in the 1965 INA, and were unchanged by later 
revisions of the immigration law in 1976, 1986, and 1990. 
45 Naturalization through the military provisions also exempts aliens from the bar against those 
deemed “likely [to become a] public charge” (LPC).  
 48 
In the post-WWII period, the idea of exchanging citizenship for military service 
took on new forms. In a bipolar security environment dominated by competition with the 
Soviet Union, the US began to offer citizenship to persons either within or with 
knowledge of the Soviet sphere of influence in exchange for material support that would 
undermine its Cold War rival. Almost immediately after the end of hostilities in Europe, 
various proposals for “enlisting ‘displaced’ Eastern European anticommunists stimulated 
a lively national debate” in Congress (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 193). The first indication 
that US immigration policy would serve ideological ends during the Cold War period 
came with the 1949 Central Intelligence Agency Act, which authorized a handful of visas 
to be allocated to European refugees who would enhance “national security”—in 
particular those who had escaped communist regimes. During the Cold War, the newly 
conceptualized “refugee policy” was framed as an American “weapon in our ideological 
war against the forces of darkness” (Loescher and Scanlon 1986, 17). 
In 1950, Congress authorized the enlistment of 2,500 Eastern European aliens 
with specialized skills to serve the national security interests of the United States in their 
home countries (Lodge Act 1950, 64 Stat. 316). The cap was later raised to 12,500 aliens 
(1951, 65 Stat. 75).46 Aliens enlisted under the program that completed five years of 
honorable service and received an honorable discharge could enter the United States and 
be eligible for naturalization. The 1950 Lodge Act did not prove to be a vehicle for mass 
enlistment or political incorporation, as only about 1,300 individuals were enlisted and 
                                                 
46 Act of June 19, 1951. The final cap of 12,500 was far short of Senator Lodge’s initial proposal to 
enlist 250,000 aliens abroad for a “Volunteer Freedom Corps” not to be outdone by Senator Johnson’s (of 
Colorado) proposal of a 1,000,000-man “freedom army” (Jacobs and Hayes 1981, 206-7).  
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eight hundred received US citizenship.47 However, it did establish an important precedent 
for the use of immigration policy to serve ideological ends. Congress codified national 
security preferences in immigration policy through the 1952 McCarrren-Walter Act that 
was passed over President Truman’s veto. In his veto message to Congress, President 
Truman condemned the affirmation of the national origins quota system, which restricted 
immigration from all non-Western European countries for how the new ideology-based 
prohibitions would prevent persons fleeing communist rule from qualifying for 
immigration to the United States. 
Throughout the Cold War, presidents used the special “parole power” contained 
in Section 7 of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to admit refugees from 
communist countries who were otherwise inadmissible due to the strict national quota 
system. For example, despite opposition from Congress President Eisenhower used the 
“parole power” to admit thirty thousand Hungarian refugees in 1956. Even after the 1965 
Immigration Reform Act replaced the national origins system with one that stressed 
“special skills” and family reunification, presidents continued to admit large numbers of 
aliens (i.e. Cubans and Vietnamese) for national security reasons connected to Cold War 
politics (Tichenor 2002, 218). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, Congress went beyond admitting immigrants for 
ideological reasons and crafted citizenship policies to recognize alien military service. 
                                                 
47 “As of 1976, 812 persons had achieved their citizenship… the Army considered the program ‘highly 
successful,’ despite the fact that, as of May 1957 only 1,302 aliens had been enlisted” (Jacobs and Hayes 
1981, 196). Based on Congressional testimony, Jacobs and Hayes (1981) attribute the small number of 
Lodge Act enlistees to the “strict screening and high standards regarding quality of personnel” (Jacobs and 
Hayes 1981, 196). 
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For example, in 1989, Congress passed the Posthumous Citizenship for Military Service 
Act to honor the service of those who served in twentieth-century American wars but had 
never become citizens. The 1989 Act empowered the attorney general to oversee the 
application and approval process. 
 
(d) DOCUMENTATION OF POSTHUMOUS CITIZENSHIP - If the Attorney 
General approves such a request to grant a person posthumous citizenship, the 
Attorney General shall send to the individual who filed the request a suitable 
document which states that the United States considers the person to have been a 
citizen of the United States at the time of the person's death. 
(e) NO BENEFITS TO SURVIVORS - Nothing in this section or section 319(d) 
shall be construed as providing for any benefits under this Act for any spouse, 
son, daughter, or other relative of a person granted posthumous citizenship under 
this section. (PCA 1989) 
 
The 1989 PCA is discussed in the next chapter because it was transformed (or, in the 
terms of one scholar of American political development, “functionally converted”) in the 
post-9/11 period to meet the needs of a new class of aliens: military families (Thelen 
2000, 105).48 It is mentioned here to show how both immigration and citizenship policy 
were recalibrated after WWII to meet national security needs. 
                                                 
48 Kathleen Thelen’s (2000) articulation of “functional” or institutional “conversion” pertains to the 
post-9/11 transformation of the 1989 Posthumous Citizenship Act and is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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A similar idea was at work in the Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act of 2000.49 
The Hmong are an Asian ethnic group that supported the United States forces during the 
Vietnam conflict. The Hmong fought against communist forces in Laos—where US 
forces were secretly engaged—and eventually became refugees when communist forces 
consolidated power. The Hmong Act (2000) facilitates the naturalization of veteran 
refugees and their surviving spouses by waiving the English-language proficiency and 
civics knowledge requirements for naturalization. Waiving these two requirements—
often cited as vital to maintaining American culture and civic life when discussing 
immigration in general—for the Hmong suggests another logic of belonging or 
obligation. The incorporation of the Hmong is exceptional, considering that all the 
traditional criteria for membership—time and place of birth, nationality of parents, 
residence, family ties—are bypassed and replaced by demonstrated service at one point in 
time. 
SUMMARY 
Like other the other “settler nations” (i.e. Canada, Australia), France, and Israel, 
the United States has a long history of extending citizenship and other benefits to 
newcomers in exchange for wartime service (Hartz 1955; Krebs 2006). Over the course 
of US history, immigrants, minorities, and other marginalized groups have pursued the 
path of military service to citizenship. This chapter provides the comparative historical 
and theoretical justification for setting jus meritum apart from other claims to political 
inclusion. Scholars of American political development and others have shown the 
                                                 
49 2000 Hmong Veterans’ Naturalization Act, Pub. L. 106-107; 114 Stat. 316, May 16, 2000. 
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efficacy of military service for individuals seeking full and equal citizenship (Krebs 
2007). The narrative of the twentieth century demonstrates a substantial link between 
military service and citizenship. The military is a political institution par excellence, and 
the practice of alien enlistment and naturalization is a long-standing government policy. 
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, military necessity often liberalizes the nation’s 
immigration and naturalization regime.  
We find no federal laws for the naturalization of military personnel and veterans 
prior to the Civil War because citizenship was a state matter, although several states 
offered persons citizenship in exchange for enlistment in state militias. Seventy-five years 
earlier, only citizens (of a state) were authorized to enlist in the Continental Army. As the 
Revolutionary War dragged on, there were calls to enlist persons not otherwise eligible 
for citizenship. Hamilton’s letter to Jay highlights an important element of jus meritum. 
Freedom was a prerequisite for military service because it was commonly assumed that, 
with the exception of mercenaries, people would only fight if they had some stake in the 
outcome.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the military naturalization statutes in the United States from 
the Civil War to the post-9/11 period. 
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Table 2.1: US Military Naturalization Statutes, Civil War to Post-9/11 
 
Civil 
War 
Allows “one-paper” naturalization for soldiers and veterans. Act of July 17, 1862 
(12 Stat. 594). 
 1894 law extends military naturalization to navy personnel 
WWI 
Immediate naturalization of military personnel; waived all residency 
requirements and proof of lawful arrival; allowed overseas processing. Act of 
May 9, 1918 (40 Stat. 512) 
 Lea-Nye Act (1935) overturns Toyota v. U.S. (1925); makes Asian veterans eligible for naturalization  
WWII 1940 Nationality Act allows “one-paper” naturalization of military personnel with 3 years residency; allows overseas processing. 
 1942 Second War Powers Act waives requirement that person be legally present in United States at time of enlistment 
 
1944 Act offers citizenship to persons without previous residency in United 
States , who enlist and serve outside US. Act of December 22, 1944 (662 Stat. 
886) 
Cold 
War 
Naturalization for enlistment of cultural and military experts outside the United 
States (Lodge-Philbin Act of 1950) 
 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 makes peacetime (with residency) and 
wartime (waives residency requirement) military naturalization provisions 
permanent; wartime designated for Korea (1953), Vietnam (1968), Grenada 
(1983), Persian Gulf War (1994), and Global War on Terrorism (2002) 
 1989 Posthumous Citizenship recognizes Cold War-era service 
 2000 Hmong Citizenship Act recognizes assistance during Vietnam conflict 
Post-
9/11 
2004 National Defense Authorization Act makes post-9/11 service members 
immediately eligible for naturalization; but makes military naturalization 
“revocable,” contingent on 5 years “honorable service”; allows “posthumous 
citizens” to serve as immigration sponsor for surviving family members 
 2008 MAVNI program allows enlistment of otherwise ineligible alien residents with “vital” skills. MAVNI was suspended in 2015. 
 2014 Memo makes undocumented minors that qualify for “deferred action” eligible for military enlistment  
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 The military needs of the state demanded mobilization of every resource within its 
jurisdiction. If aliens were to be included in the draft, they should be naturalized. The 
same logic animated Hamilton’s letter to Jay during the Revolutionary War. Hamilton 
proposed that southern states, consistently unable to meet their enlistment quotas due to 
their large slave populations and the manpower needed to enforce this arrangement, 
create a battalion of former slaves. It was critical, according to Hamilton, that these men 
first be given their freedom. The Southern states, of course, never created such a 
battalion, although many escaped slaves fought for the British in exchange for citizenship 
after the war. Although crude and far from the voluntary ideal of military service 
championed today, Hamilton’s proposal contains the logic of jus meritum. It also 
illustrates how military necessity pushes wartime leaders toward more creative 
policymaking. 
As each conflict persisted during the Civil War, WWI, and WWII, the state cast a 
wider net: when the state needed soldiers, noncitizens were subject to the draft. During 
WWI, residency effectively replaced citizenship as the principle for determining draft 
liability or eligibility. The residency principle alone was codified as the principle 
determining draft liability in the 1948 Selective Service Act. The shift in naturalization 
from a decentralized function of local courts in the late nineteenth century to the fully 
federalized naturalization process in the twentieth century illustrates the state’s readiness 
to reshape critical institutions during a crisis period. Moreover, when it was deemed 
necessary, the United States undertook extraordinary efforts such as performing mass 
naturalization ceremonies abroad during WWII.  
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While many scholars point to the 1952 and 1965 immigration acts as “critical 
junctures” in the evolution of immigration policy in the United States over the last 
century, these acts did not affect the provisions for military naturalization (Tichenor 
2002). There are numerous examples of presidents using their “parole powers” to admit 
aliens from countries that are not traditional sites of immigration to the United States—
apparently a violation of the national origins system that persisted until 1965. Many of 
these aliens did not have family in the United States or “special skills” that would qualify 
them as immigrants. The post-WWII period saw increased executive action to admit 
persons in the “national interest.” The use of immigration and naturalization policy for 
ideological and political ends is not new, but the reliance on presidential in place of 
congressional action does represent a departure from earlier periods of conflict. 
The consistency of the practice of jus meritum stands in contrast to the ever-
evolving immigration and citizenship regimes over the course of American history. On 
the basis of this history, we can see that jus meritum is a consistent, distinct pathway and 
claim to US citizenship. Not only has the practice survived the more restrictive periods 
associated with the resurgence of ascriptive civic republicanism identified by Smith 
(1997), but the military naturalization statutes are also strikingly similar across 
Tichenor’s (1999) immigration policy regimes as discussed above. 
The next chapter examines the changes to the immigration and naturalization 
regime with regard to alien military service in the contemporary period. It assesses the 
degree to which the post-9/11 period represents a continuation of, or departure from, the 
general trend observed in previous periods of conflict.  
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Chapter Three 
Alien Military Service and Naturalization in the Post-9/11 Period 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter traced the evolution of enlistment practices and draft laws 
alongside the enactment of special military naturalization statutes throughout US history. 
Since WWII, all alien residents have been subject to conscription (Probst 1956). Drafted 
aliens have served alongside their citizen counterparts and are entitled to the same 
veterans’ benefits as native-born soldiers. This chapter examines alien enlistment and 
military naturalization in the contemporary, post-9/11 period. These changes include 
efforts to expand the pool of recruit-eligible personnel to meet national security demands, 
and executive attempts to shield noncitizen service-members and their families from the 
immigration enforcement that has increased dramatically following 9/11.50 
After summarizing these post-9/11 changes, this chapter then examines the 
Department of Defense’s response to undocumented aliens discovered on active duty and 
efforts to enlist persons not statutorily authorized to serve in the armed forces. These 
developments are consistent with what has occurred during previous conflicts. For 
example, the Pentagon’s response to undocumented aliens discovered on active duty in 
                                                 
50 At the time of writing, there is not sufficient public data to assess whether the effort of both the 
Bush and Obama administrations to prevent the detention and deportation of alien military families and 
veterans is merely a means of ensuring “military readiness” and bolstering voluntary enlistment or 
represents a more substantive commitment to these persons as potential fellow citizens. 
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the contemporary period is consistent with policy changes enacted during previous 
periods of conflict, i.e., waiving proof of legal entry documents during WWII. Similarly, 
the post-9/11 effort to enlist persons not statutorily authorized, through the MAVNI 
(Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest) program, has precedent in the Cold 
War-era Lodge Act. Finally, the status of alien veterans in the post-9/11 period is similar 
to that of veterans of previous conflicts: Veteran status does not provide a legal basis to 
reside in the United States. Increased immigration enforcement after 2001 has made 
many individuals in this population vulnerable to detention and removal.  
This chapter also examines how some post-9/11 developments depart from what 
was observed in earlier periods of armed conflict. The most important of these departures 
include probationary and posthumous citizenship, both of which grew out of the national 
government’s effort to meet the mounting needs of the Department of Defense in the 
post-9/11 period. The experiences of probationary citizens, posthumous citizens, and 
alien veterans provide insight into the post-9/11 nature of alien military service and 
naturalization. The status of military spouses and dependents—an issue that nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century US draft policy tried to avoid—further complicates the picture. 
While these persons and their status under immigration law is not the focus of this study, 
they warrant discussion because they make at least one category (posthumous 
citizenship) necessary and they have an impact on military readiness. As such, the 
discussion includes the Department of Defense’s efforts to protect military family 
members from detention and deportation in the post-9/11 period, where appropriate. 
Although military services have renewed efforts to make all service members citizens, 
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there is still a population of alien veterans in the United States. Presidents George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama took steps to shield alien veterans and their family members 
from deportation—however these measures are temporary. New legislation is needed to 
resolve the status of alien veterans and that of undocumented minors who wish to serve in 
uniform. 
POST-COLD WAR ALIEN ENLISTMENT AND MILITARY NATURALIZATION 
As discussed in the previous chapter, all aliens have been required to register with 
the Selective Service since at least 1948 (some classes were draft eligible under the 1917 
statute) and have continuously served as volunteers since the end of the draft in 1972. For 
the last forty years, legal permanent residents (LPRs) have been able to enlist in any of 
the services, although they were ineligible for military occupational specialties (MOSs) 
that required security clearance. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, each service had 
specific regulations about who could enlist, although there was little variation among 
their respective regulations—practically speaking. Persons holding student, visitor, or 
other special visas, as well as persons granted asylum, are ineligible to enlist, although 
some are required to register with the Selective Service.51 Other documents are required 
to enlist, however the process is diffuse since it relies on individual recruiters to conduct 
the screening.52 Prior to 2010, fingerprints were taken at the time of enlistment; however, 
                                                 
51 50 USCS App. §456(a) lists the classes exempt from Selective Service Registration including 
members of the military, students in officer training programs, i.e. academy cadets or those in the Reserve 
Officers Training Corps, and specified diplomatic personnel. Undocumented aliens are required to register 
with the Selective Service (under 50 USCS App. §453) but are not eligible to enlist in the armed forces of 
the United States (Selective Service 2012).  
52 Fingerprints are taken at time of enlistment but significantly, for most of the AVF’s history, these 
data remained only within the Department of Defense. Fingerprints are sent to the FBI only when the 
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they were not sent to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct a background check 
unless the service member applied for citizenship. Additionally, the incentive structure 
for military recruiters, who process tens of thousands of applications each year, rewards 
the number of enlistments.53 This system explains why so many undocumented persons 
found their way into active duty in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. Although such 
examples were by no means the norm, a marine recruiter in New York City was 
convicted in 2005 of procuring green cards for undocumented immigrants seeking to join 
the service.54 
Consistent with what Gary Freeman has characterized as “largely expansive and 
inclusive” immigration policies during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the military was 
open to recruiting legal permanent resident aliens (Freeman 1995). However, unlike 
previous periods, in which the Services took steps to ensure that alien service members 
acquired citizenship, the military (like civilian employers) maintained a kind of “don’t 
ask don’t tell” policy with regard to a service member’s citizenship status. While 
citizenship was and is required for re-enlistment, many members serve a single four, six, 
or eight-year enlistment. Given the risks and pay of enlisted men and women, it is 
commonly assumed that the forty thousand noncitizens currently serving active duty 
joined the armed forces to become a US citizen. A 2005 report commissioned by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
person has applied for naturalization, with the specific authorization of (or request by) the service member 
(Lescault 1998). 
53 Recruiters do inspect the documents, however there is no central database of all US residents 
containing personally identifiable, biometric information such as fingerprints or DNA by which to verify an 
individual’s identity. After closely inspecting the process, it is not all that surprising that undocumented 
persons found their way to active duty military service. 
54 US v. Lucas 2007. 
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Secretary of Defense found, however, that less than 40 percent of aliens who served in 
the armed forces between 1995 and 2004 actually acquired citizenship while on active 
duty (Hattangadi et al. 2005).55  
A preponderance of data suggests that aliens do not join the military primarily to 
become US citizens (Lamm 2010). Instead—like their citizen counterparts—alien 
enlistment is motivated by diverse factors. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, joining the 
military only shaved two years off of the five-year residency required to be eligible for 
citizenship. Additionally, some aspects of military service—frequent moves, military 
deployments, and the “greediness” of military institutions (Segal 1986)—made it difficult 
to complete the naturalization process, especially during a period that had no official 
coordination between the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, home to the 
USCIS (Lee and Wasem 2009). For this reason, alien soldiers were often discouraged 
from submitting their naturalization petitions until they arrived at their first duty station 
(Stock 2011b). 
The nonacquisition of citizenship by service members during the 1980s and 
1990s is consistent with that of the alien civilian population during the same period. A 
temporary increase in military naturalizations coincided with the surge of civilian 
naturalizations in response to the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and 
the 1995 Citizenship USA initiative, which helped naturalize a million people in 1996 
alone (Tichenor 2002, 285). In general, however, military naturalization rates for the 
entire period never spiked above 40 percent (Hattangadi et al. 2005; 2011). To explain 
                                                 
55 McIntosh et al. (2011) attempt to update the analyses of these data. 
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the low naturalization rate among US resident aliens during the 1980s and 1990s, 
immigration scholars theorize two causes: the weakening of political parties, which were 
crucial agents of political incorporation throughout the nineteenth century (Tichenor 
2002), and the Supreme Court’s decoupling of social welfare rights from citizenship 
after 1965 (Schuck and Smith 1985).  
Although military personnel are affected by some of the same factors as civilians, 
this chapter focuses on how the Pentagon’s military needs led to increased attention to 
alien military service and naturalization. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan served as 
what Paul Pierson calls a “focusing event,” increasing the salience of nonacquisition of 
citizenship among service members (Pierson 1993). In response to these conflicts, 
Congress rewrote the military enlistment and naturalization statutes in the mid-2000s. In 
2008, Congress passed two acts designed to expedite the processing of military 
citizenship petitions. The deployment of alien service members after 9/11 and, 
especially, the lack of legal protection for the surviving spouses and children of members 
killed or missing in action under immigration law pushed the Department of Defense to 
take a more active role in ensuring that all service members became citizens. In sum, 
military necessity—described by the Department of Defense as a need to maintain 
“military readiness”—transformed the process of alien military enlistment and helped 
ensure that nearly all service members could secure citizenship before being discharged 
from wartime duty. 
 62 
POST-9/11 ALIEN ENLISTMENT 
The launch of the global war on terrorism brought new attention to the status of 
active duty aliens and their families. Similar to the responses during previous periods of 
conflict, Congress enacted a number of statutory changes concerning military 
naturalization in the mid- to late-2000s. The most important of these codified President 
Bush’s 2002 Executive Order that made any person serving on active duty immediately 
eligible for citizenship.  
 In line with other wartime leaders, President Bush’s 2002 Executive Order 
expedites the naturalization of active duty military members who serve in wartime. 
Executive Order 13269 is of particular importance because it establishes the post-
September 11, 2001 period as one “in which armed forces of the United States are or 
were engaged in military operations involving armed conflict with a hostile foreign 
force” (Bush 2002; INA 8 U.S.C. §328, §329). This order makes the wartime provision 
of the INA, §329, applicable to persons on active duty. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, INA §329 has been the statutory authority for the naturalization of service 
members since 1952. Beginning with the Korean War, Executive Orders have served this 
purpose on four occasions: the Vietnam conflict (EO 12081, 1978), the Grenada 
Campaign (EO 12582, 1987),56 the Persian Gulf conflict (EO 12939, 1994), and “the 
                                                 
56 President Reagan’s 1987 Executive Order pertaining to the Grenada Campaign was invalidated by 
the 9th Circuit because it attempted to limit the scope of §329 geographically (EO 12582, Fed. Reg. 3395 
(1987)). 
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period beginning September 11, 2001” (EO 13269, 2002).57 Any person serving on active 
duty during these periods is eligible for naturalization under INA §329.  
Significantly, service members are eligible for citizenship under INA §329 
without first establishing residency in the United States (INA §1440(b), 1952).58 The 
residency waiver is important because it is often difficult for this population to establish 
“continuous residency.” Prior to 2010, the USCIS (formerly INS) also treated 
assignment abroad and deployment—circumstances outside an individual’s control—as 
a break in “continuous residency” per the immigration code. In sum, the residency 
waiver under §329 is the only way that many young aliens can qualify for naturalization 
during wartime—with or without a declaration of war from Congress. However, the 
residency requirement remains a problem for alien spouses and dependents of service 
members who are stationed abroad. 
The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) contained several 
provisions enabling President Bush’s 2002 Executive Order for post-9/11 military service 
(EO 13269). First, it extended INA §329, previously known as the wartime military 
naturalization provision, to veterans and members of the Selected Reserve and National 
                                                 
57 INA§329(a), 8 USCA §1440(a) authorizes military naturalization for service during WWI (no dates 
specified), WWII (September 1, 1939, through December 31, 1946), and Korea (June 25, 1950 through 
July 1, 1955). Executive Orders authorize post-Korea naturalizations under INA§329, and include Vietnam 
(February 28, 1961 through October 15, 1978), EO 12081, 43 Fed. Reg. 42237, (1978); the Persian Gulf 
conflict (August 2, 1990 through April 11, 1991) EO 12939, 59 Fed. Reg 61231 (1994); and “the period 
beginning September 11, 2001” (September 11, 2001 to present) EO 13269, 67 Fed. Reg. 45287 (2002).  
58 Per EO 13269, the person must serve on or after September 11, 2001. Until the president issues 
another EO specifying the ending date for this period of conflict (Bush 2002), INA §329 allows aliens, 
defined under the Immigration and Nationality Act §1440(b) as “any person not a citizen or national of the 
United States,” serving on active duty to apply for citizenship without first becoming permanent residents 
or establishing continuous residence in the United States (INA §§328, 329; 8 U.S.C.A. §§1439, 1440). 
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Guard (NDAA 2004).59 Persons who served on active duty through the Cold War and 
post-Cold War period (mid-1950s to 2001) are eligible for naturalization under INA 
§328, unless they served during one of the specified conflict periods (discussed above), in 
which case they are also eligible under INA §329. The 2004 NDAA also reduced the 
residency requirement for §328 “peacetime” applicants from three years to one year of 
military service, retroactive to September 11, 2001, and waived the processing fees for 
persons who naturalize through one of the military provisions (NDAA 2004; Stock and 
Exner 2009). 
In 2006, Congress passed a unified enlistment statute limiting enlistment in the 
all-volunteer force to (10 USC §504(b) 2006). Since 2006, enlistment has been limited to: 
 
A. A national of the United States, as defined in section 101(a)(22) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act.60 
B. An alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as 
defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act.61 
C. A person described in section 341 of one of the following 
compacts:  
                                                 
59 The Selective Reserve refers to “active” Reserve components, including those mobilized for active 
duty. Before 2004, members of the Reserve and National Guard were limited to the less generous 
“peacetime” provision (INA §328). 
60 8 USC §1101(a)(22). 
61 8 USC §1101(a)(20). 
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(i) The Compact of Free Association between the Federated States 
of Micronesia and the United States.62 
(ii) The Compact of Free Association between the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands and the United States.63 
(iii) The Compact of Free Association between Palau and the 
United States.64 
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Secretary concerned may authorize 
the enlistment of a person not described in paragraph (1) if the Secretary 
determines that such enlistment is vital to the national interest.65 
 
Interestingly, although it eliminated the provision that allowed unlimited alien 
enlistments during “wartime,” Congress kept the language in Section 2, which allows 
individual Service Secretaries to enlist any person whose service s/he deems “vital to the 
national interest” (10 U.S.C.A. §504 (2006)). This language reappears in the 2008 
MAVNI program that authorizes the enlistment of non-LPR aliens, much like the Cold 
War-era Lodge Act, which enlisted nonresident aliens with language skills and cultural 
expertise. 
In May 2008, Congress passed the Kendell Frederick Citizenship Assistance Act, 
which directs the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to track and expedite 
                                                 
62 Section 201(a) of Public Law 108-188, 117 Stat. 2784; 48 USC §1921. 
63 Section 201(b) of Public Law 108-188, 117 Stat. 2823; 48 USC §1921. 
64 Section 201 of Public Law 99-658, 100 Stat. 3678; 48 USC §1931. 
65 10 USC §504(b) 2006. 
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military naturalization petitions. Named in honor of a service member killed in Iraq while 
waiting for his naturalization petition to be processed, the act sets a goal for USCIS to 
process military naturalization applications within two years of enlistment.66 Two months 
later, Congress passed the 2008 Military Personnel Citizenship Processing Act (MPCPA 
2008). This Act expanded the definition of “military naturalizations” from service 
members only to military spouses and dependents. The 2008 MPCPA requires USCIS to 
process and adjudicate these petitions within six months (MPCPA 2008). A 2010 report 
by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the USCIS “generally met 
processing deadlines, but processing applications overseas is a challenge” (GAO 2010).67 
In 2010, the Department of Defense finally instituted e-verify for potential 
recruits in order to ensure that they were legally present in the United States at the time of 
enlistment (Department of the Army 2010).68 The following year, the Service Secretaries 
instituted measures to confirm that aliens who are lawfully enlisted start the 
naturalization process while in boot camp (Traskey 2003; Lamm 2010; Stock and Exner 
2009). Since mid-2011, the Army, Navy, and Air Force have made USCIS officials 
available to recruits at basic training (Department of the Army 2010; Stock 2011b).69 
This move is consistent with the role that the military plays in other areas—for example 
                                                 
66 Specialist Frederick is one of the service members awarded posthumous citizenship after being 
killed in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
67 The GAO’s conclusion that the USCIS “generally” met its deadlines refers to a 70 percent 
completion rate of applications from military personnel only (GAO 2010). 
68 Evidence suggests that military leaders have suspected systemic problems with recruiting ineligible 
aliens for some time. There are 2004 reports that the Department of Defense, in response to the discovery 
of active duty aliens who enlisted using fraudulent documents, directed the Military Entrance Processing 
Command to confirm the identities of alien recruits with the Department of Homeland Security (Gillison 
2005). 
69 A 2011 report commissioned by the Secretary of Defense “urged” the Marine Corps to follow suit 
(McIntosh et al., 2011). 
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with life insurance, medical enrollment, wills, child care plans, powers of attorney, and so 
on. Despite these measures, the system is not foolproof.70 To avoid the above-mentioned 
dilemmas, alien service members must be naturalized as soon as possible under the 
current immigration regime.71 
Undocumented Aliens Discovered on Active Duty 
In addition to the post-9/11 changes to the statutes governing alien naturalization, 
it appears that the Department of Defense has changed the way that it handles cases of 
“fraudulent enlistment” when undocumented immigrants who enlisted under false 
information are discovered on active duty. Although there is currently no official policy 
for these types of cases, much can be learned from the publicly available data. For 
example, in 2003, the Army learned that Private Juan Escalante was an undocumented 
immigrant when his parents underwent deportation proceeding (Davila 2003; Lorch 
2003). At that time, Private Escalante was serving as a mechanic in the Third Infantry in 
Iraq. While the army had a standard approach for handling cases of fraudulent enlistment 
in the 1980s (recommending them for courts-martial) and the 1990s (quietly discharging 
them), it took a different approach with Private Escalante in 2003. The Department of the 
Army accepted the argument that Private Escalante’s military defense counselor made on 
                                                 
70 For example, if an undocumented person enlists using another person’s identity and forgoes 
naturalization, it is possible for him or her to escape detection. In 2010, a US citizen was sentenced to six 
months in prison after successfully enlisting in the army on the basis of a previous enlistment with the 
US Marines. Many in the military community were mostly outraged that he claimed and wore medals 
that he did not earn (Robbins 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). 
71 Aliens discharged from the military with anything other than an “honorable discharge” face steep 
immigration consequences, including deportation and a permanent bar from ever seeking US citizenship. 8 
U.S.C. §1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). 
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his behalf: since President Bush’s 2002 Executive Order did not specifically exclude 
illegal aliens, it must include them (Plascencia 2009).72  
In light of the history of alien military naturalization statutes outlined in the 
previous chapter—which includes waiving residency and legal entry documentation 
during wartime—the army’s determination that President Bush’s Executive Order applies 
to legal and illegal aliens alike is perhaps not surprising. However, the Pentagon’s 
acquiescence to this interpretation diverges from the contemporary politics of 
immigration control and the standing policy during the 1980s when undocumented aliens 
who were discovered on active duty were charged with fraudulent enlistment. 
Nevertheless, the idea that Private Escalante’s wartime service made him eligible for 
citizenship regardless of his immigration status is in line with similar decisions that have 
been made during previous periods of armed conflict (O’Neil and Senturk 2004; Stock 
2011). It is clear that Private Escalante was protected by his status as a combat veteran in 
the unit that launched the invasion of Iraq, and which suffered a high number of 
casualties. Although some anti-immigration activists complained about the decision, 
Private Escalante became a naturalized US citizen only a few months after the army 
learned of his undocumented status, “after [receiving] a perfect score on his English and 
civics test” (Davila 2003). Due to his citizenship, Private Escalante was also able to serve 
as an immigration sponsor for his parents, whose status was adjusted, allowing them to 
remain in the country.  
                                                 
72 Drawing on the congressional testimony of Dr. Margaret Stock, Professor of Law at the US Military 
Academy at West Point, LT Heather Herbert, Ft. Stewart AG, argued that EO 13269 applied to both legal 
and illegal immigrants. 
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The interpretation of President Bush’s Executive Order (EO) as applying to all 
aliens in the armed forces regardless of their immigration status has opened a window for 
undocumented aliens on active duty. The cases of soldiers who received citizenship under 
EO 13269, despite violations of immigration law and Department of Defense enlistment 
policies, are particularly telling given that none of the soldiers volunteered this 
information to military officials. Instead, their status was only discovered inadvertently as 
the result of some tangential investigation. Thirty years ago and throughout the 1990s, it 
was standard practice to prosecute “illegal immigrants engaging in fraudulent or unlawful 
enlistment based on citizenship criteria” (Bixler 2003a, 2003b; Traskey 2003). Even in 
the Escalante case, conservative commentators criticized the Pentagon for “PC insanity” 
for retaining and supporting the naturalization of a person not legally present in the US 
(Maulkin 2003)  
Despite some promising cases and the apparent sympathy of national leaders for 
undocumented immigrants on active military duty during recent years, uncertainty 
remains high for these soldiers and their families. As of today, there exists no official 
policy regarding how to handle cases of undocumented soldiers who are discovered on 
active duty. Rather than leaving the fate of these soldiers to the discretion of individual 
commanders, the Secretary of Defense or the individual Services might consider issuing 
guidelines for their uniformed disposition. 
Private Escalante’s case stands in stark contrast to those of pre-9/11 
undocumented soldiers discovered on active duty, many of whom faced adverse 
administrative action and courts-martial for fraudulent enlistment in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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Cases involving nearly identical facts but with strikingly divergent outcomes are, once 
again, likely explained by the idea that wars transform the nation’s immigration and 
naturalization regimes, at least temporarily. The US Citizenship and Immigration 
Services claims, “Between September 2001 and March 2010, more than 58,000 men and 
women in the armed forces were naturalized” (GAO 2010);73 however “the agency 
doesn't track how many were undocumented” (Lee and Wasem 2009; GAO 2010).  
Recruitment of Persons Not Statutorily Eligible for Enlistment 
Congress also expanded the pool of immigrants eligible for enlistment in the all-
volunteer force to meet emerging national security requirements. This section discusses 
two noteworthy developments. First, in 2008 Congress authorized the Military 
Ascensions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program that allowed new classes, 
i.e. refugee and temporary status, immigrants with special language and medical skills to 
join the all-volunteer force.74 Legally present non-LPRs are ineligible to enlist under the 
current statute, however the Service Secretaries may also authorize the enlistment of any 
person deemed “vital to the national interest” (10 U.S.C.A. §504(b)(1)). First deployed as 
a pilot program in November 2008, the MAVNI program allowed 1,500 legally present 
aliens to enlist in the military each fiscal year from 2008-2014 (Kim and Herb 2014; 
MAVNI 2012; McIntosh et al. 2011). Upon enlistment, these persons can acquire 
citizenship through the wartime provision (§329) of the INA. Significantly, these 
                                                 
73 Disclaimer on the numbers: The numbers that officials provide to the media vary. But there is also 
variation in government studies and reports. 
74 This class of immigrants includes refugees, asylum seekers, and those given temporary protected 
status (TPS). 
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enlistees are eligible for citizenship as soon as they enlist, without first becoming legal 
permanent residents under the wartime provision of the INA.75  
Like beneficiaries of the 1950 Lodge Act, discussed in the previous chapter which 
permitted noncitizen Eastern European residents to enlist from 1950 to 1959, the 2008 
MAVNI program participants are recruited for their “special skills” (MAVNI 2012). 
MAVNI enlistees must be fluent in a “strategic language” as defined by the Department 
of Defense or hold a US medical license.76 However, unlike the Lodge Act program 
beneficiaries, MAVNI program participants are highly educated US residents. For 
example, the first pool of MAVNI applicants had, on average, a master’s level education, 
and health care providers recruited under this program must hold a US license (McIntosh 
et al. 2011). At the time of the program’s suspension, the Department of Defense reported 
that about 2,900 recruits have been enlisted and thus eligible for citizenship through 
MAVNI (Kim and Herb 2014). 
The second noteworthy development is the suspension of the MAVNI program in 
response to President Obama’s attempt to allow persons brought to the US without legal 
authorization as minors to enlist through the MAVNI program. The Obama 
administration announced a policy of deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA) in 
June 2012. In late 2014 the president attempted to make DACA participants eligible for 
enlistment through the MAVNI program, the Republican-controlled Congress suspended 
                                                 
75 INA §329 waives the minimum of thirty months “continuous residency” and thirty-month minimum 
“physical presence” requirements of the regular, nonmilitary provision of the INA §318 (the civilian 
provision). 
76 Reflecting the diversity of US global interests today, the list of “strategic languages” such as Arabic 
and Russian has grown to more than thirty (McIntosh et al. 2011). MAVNI recruits are also physicians, 
dentists, nurses, and Roman Catholic priests (MAVNI 2012). 
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the entire MAVNI program in mid-2015 (Redstate 2015).77 The authorization of the 
MAVNI program in 2008 confirms the importance of national security requirements in 
the post-9/11 period. Congress’ suspension of MAVNI in 2015 in response to the 
president’s attempt to allow DACA program participants to enlist through MAVNI 
demonstrates how partisan differences in immigration policy under conditions of divided 
government limit the Executive’s ability to recruit any alien for the all-volunteer force. 
To understand why Congress objected to the president’s attempt to enlist DACA program 
participants through MAVNI, some mention of the proposed DREAM Act is necessary. 
First, in June 2012 President Obama took the dramatic step of announcing a new 
policy of “deferred action for childhood arrivals” (DACA), but did not issue an Executive 
Order, which has the force of law. Instead President Obama relied on a Memo issued by 
the Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, “Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children,” that 
directs USCIS officials to exercise “prosecutorial discretion” with regard to certain young 
aliens unlawfully present in the United States (Napolitano 2012). The June 2012 memo 
also authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to conduct background checks and 
process applications from persons brought illegally to the United States as minors 
(Napolitano 2012). The Obama administration has essentially created the administrative 
                                                 
77 In late 2014, the president attempted to make participants in the Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA) program, discussed in the next chapter, eligible for enlistment through MAVNI. Unlike 
MAVNI, DACA does not offer a pathway to citizenship. Rather, the DACA program refers to an executive 
announcement in 2012 regarding the potential DREAM Act population or persons brought to the US 
illegally as minors. The DACA program suspends prosecution (detention and deportation) of certain young 
people under immigration law. In reaction to the president’s perceived unilateral move to rewrite 
immigration law, the Republican controlled Congress suspended the entire MAVNI program in mid-2015 
(Redstate 2015). 
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capacity to implement the DREAM Act, should Congress pass it. Not surprisingly the 
criteria for eligibility per Napolitano (2012) are nearly identical to the 2003, 2007, and 
2009 DREAM Act legislation (Immigration Policy Center 2007). To qualify, a person 
must be an undocumented alien who came to the United States before the age of sixteen; 
has continuously resided in the United States for five years preceding June 15, 2012; is 
not above the age of thirty; is in school, has a high school diploma, passed the GED, or is 
“an honorably discharged veteran” of the coast guard or armed forces of the United 
States; has not been convicted of a felony or a significant (or several) misdemeanor 
offenses; and does not otherwise “pose a threat to national security or public safety” 
(Napolitano 2012, 1). 
Every president since Truman has used the “parole power,” discussed in the 
previous chapter, to shield some group of immigrants or refugees from detention and 
removal. Congress has often objected to the president’s assertion of this power as a 
violation of the immigration and naturalization code. There are two minor differences 
between what was observed in previous periods and President Obama’s 2012 action 
regarding DACA. First, there is the matter of scope. Statistics on the undocumented 
population within the United States are notoriously variable, but millions of young people 
may be eligible under DACA. Second, President Obama announced in 2014 that 
successful DACA applicants are eligible to enlist in the armed forces. While the proposed 
DREAM Act legislation would allow undocumented minors to join the military or go to 
college in exchange for a pathway to citizenship, whether the president has the power to 
authorize the enlistment of persons who are statutorily ineligible remains unclear. 
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Arguably, the MAVNI program has also enlisted persons otherwise ineligible, however 
the MAVNI recruits are legally present in the United States whereas the proposed 2014 
DACA program participants are not.  
The President’s efforts to make DACA program participants eligible for military 
service through the MAVNI program led Congress to end MAVNI in mid-2015. This was 
disappointing to military planners and the highly educated potential MAVNI recruits 
however, this outcome is not surprising. The discontinuation of the MAVNI program in 
mid-2015 appears to be a casualty of the stand-off between the President and Congress 
over what some view as the Executive’s attempt to unilaterally rewrite immigration law 
(Redstate 2015). The Pentagon may argue that the MAVNI program provides personnel 
with critical skills that it needs in the ongoing conflicts overseas, however this dynamic is 
not well-known publically. As a practical matter, what little media accounts of the 
discontinuation of the MAVNI program exist mischaracterize the place of alien service 
members in the military today.78 To be clear, the MAVNI program was implemented 
because the Pentagon has been consistently unable to recruit enough citizens with 
language and medical skills (MAVNI 2012). After years of offering increased incentives, 
i.e. signing bonuses, to citizens, the US government began offering citizenship to 
temporary status aliens with specialized skills willing to serve in uniform in the post-9/11 
period. 
                                                 
78 For example, one conservative news outlet ran the headline “Mo Brooks [Republican-Alabama] 
stops the outsourcing of military slots to illegal aliens in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]” 
which suggests aliens are taking military jobs from citizens (Redstate 2015). 
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The president may argue that his directive to the Department of Defense is 
attached to his commander-in-chief power, although this argument has not been made 
publicly.79 Given the history of jus meritum, it is difficult to argue that persons serving on 
active duty do not deserve to become citizens. From the point of view of members of 
Congress that do not want to expand immigration, blocking DACA participants from 
military service will preempt this difficult position. These two efforts, the 2008 MAVNI 
program and 2014 failed attempt to allow DACA participants to enlist through MAVNI, 
represent an expansion of the pool of eligible enlistees. In this way, the post-9/11 period 
is similar to earlier periods of armed conflict where residency and alien status did not 
pose a barrier to enlistment in the military or the acquisition of citizenship thereafter. The 
suspension of MAVNI in 2015 suggests there are limits to the president’s power under 
divided government when the Congress is controlled by a party that opposes the 
president’s immigration reform agenda. 
Alien Veterans 
By taking the lead on naturalization processing and issuing new enlistment 
guidelines, civilian and military leaders have decreased the likelihood that any additional 
undocumented aliens will find themselves on active duty. However, these changes took 
full effect in 2011, meaning that undocumented persons who managed to enlist prior to 
2011 will not complete their service contract and be discharged until 2017–2018. 
                                                 
79 The military enlistment statute does delegate the power to the Service Secretary to enlist “any 
person” in the armed forces of the United States. 
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Because citizenship is mandatory only for re-enlistment, not for first enlistment, the 
population of alien veterans may increase over the next decade. 
There are alien veterans residing in the United States that served in the all-
volunteer force who did not naturalize while on active duty. Many alien veterans 
mistakenly assume that their military service prevents them from deportation. While this 
may have been the case in fact, veteran status has never shielded persons from 
deportation and detention by law. For example, US military veterans are not immune 
from detention and deportation if their immigration status has lapsed (Shagin 2009). The 
most recent period of armed conflict drew new attention to aliens in the United States, as 
well as to border enforcement and security. 
In response to media reports and Pentagon concerns about the treatment of current 
and former service men and women during the era of increased immigration enforcement, 
the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued the Forman Memo (2004) 
directing Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to exercise “prosecutorial 
discretion” when placing alien service members and veterans in detention (Forman 2004). 
The Forman Memo requires authorization from headquarters before issuing a “Notice to 
Appear (NTA) to current or prior members of the United States military.” Forman (2004) 
directs ICE not to initiate removal proceedings against aliens eligible for naturalization 
under INA §§328, 329. In cases where the alien is not eligible for military naturalization, 
ICE agents must  consider the alien’s record holistically before issuing an order to appear 
and/or for removal. This insistence in considering the alien’s entire record is a stop-gap 
measure to an unintended consequence of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 
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Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA 1996), which eliminates the discretion of 
immigration judges to take factors other than an alien’s criminal history into account 
when issuing deportation orders (Lamm 2010, 2011; Stock 2008). 
Significantly, the Forman Memo uses eligibility for naturalization under §328 and 
§329 as the standard, making no mention of a service member or veteran’s immigration 
status. Like Executive Order 13269 (Bush 2002), which does not specifically exclude 
undocumented soldiers and veterans, the Forman Memo includes special protection for 
the undocumented. These and other changes enacted in 2004 partially addressed concerns 
about the protection of alien service members and veterans. Although Congress has also 
tackled many related issues—including legal residency and naturalization for military 
family members, protection for alien spouses and dependents of those killed and missing 
in action, and the continued deportation of alien veterans and military family members—
some problems remain (Jontz 2007; Stock and Exner 2009; Timmons and Stock 2010).  
Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have attempted to shield 
alien veterans from deportation through administrative action. For example, the Forman 
(2004) and Morton (2011) Memos direct ICE agents to exercise “prosecutorial 
discretion” and discourage officers from issuing NTA and Deportation Orders to current 
and prior members of the US Armed Forces (Forman 2004; Morton 2011). Despite 
directives to exercise “particular care and consideration to veterans and members of the 
US Armed Forces” and requiring authorization from headquarters before placing these 
persons in Removal Proceedings (Morton 2011), alien veterans continue to be deported, 
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and endure—in the words of the Supreme Court—the “equivalent of banishment or exile” 
(Padilla 2010, 1486; Delgadillo 1947). 
Once issued a Notice to Appear (NTA), an alien is considered to be in “Removal 
Proceedings,” making it difficult to escape deportation. Alien veterans who served during 
wartime and qualify for naturalization under INA §329 are an exception because the 
statute specifically authorizes naturalization while in “Removal Proceedings” until they 
are physically deported. But many alien veterans residing in the United States have not 
served during “wartime.” Since the introduction of the all-volunteer force in 1973, 
service during only eighteen of the thirty-nine years qualifies one for citizenship under 
the wartime provision. Those who served during peacetime are eligible for naturalization 
under §328, formerly the peacetime statute, but not if they are in “Removal 
Proceedings”—that is, they are not eligible after they have been issued a NTA. These 
complications elucidate why both the Forman (2004) and Morton (2011) Memos 
discourage executive agents from issuing these notices to former members of the armed 
forces and their families. It should be noted that there is no evidence of congressional 
intent to deport current or former members of the armed forces. In fact, the strictness of 
the immigration code appears to be an unintended consequence of the 1996 immigration 
reform law coupled with increased enforcement following the 9/11 conflict. 
First, the 1996 law (IIRIRA) eliminated the executive’s ability to intervene on 
behalf of aliens deemed a threat to the national interest. During WWI—a period also 
characterized by increased vigilance toward the foreign-born on American soil—
Congress amended the immigration code (INA §319) to include deportation for aliens 
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convicted of crimes involving “moral turpitude” (Padilla 2012). However, from 1917 to 
1990, judicial recommendations against deportation (JRADs) prevented the removal of 
aliens for minor offenses or when deportation was not in the interest of the United States. 
The ability of judges to bind the executive through JRADs was limited by Congress in 
1952, and eliminated completely in 1990 (Padilla 1990, 1478-80). From 1990 to 1996 the 
attorney general retained the power to halt deportation based on convictions in a criminal 
court. The use of judicial, then executive, discretion provided a remedy for aliens with 
extenuating circumstances, such as alien veterans. 
However, as mentioned previously, IIRIRA contained a number of provisions that 
require the detention and deportation of aliens convicted of an “aggravated felony,”80 
expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” to include twenty categories, and made it 
retroactive (IIRIRA 1996). As a result, any alien convicted of one of these twenty crimes 
was subject to immediate and mandatory deportation (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); AILA 
amicus 2012, 7).81 The 1996 IIRIRA also curtailed the attorney general’s authority to 
stop the deportation of aliens when removal is the result of criminal activity, thereby 
ensuring that the executive could not blunt the impact of the law (Padilla 1990, 1478–80). 
The 1996 IIRIRA—coupled with the increased enforcement of immigration law 
following the 9/11 attacks—has resulted in the detention and deportation of alien 
veterans. The Executive, unable to intervene in removal proceedings since the 1990s, 
directed his agents as early as 2004 to exercise discretion when encountering “current and 
                                                 
80 Public Law No. 104-208, div. C, §321, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
81 Furthermore, “even broader categories of offenses require mandatory immigration custody while it 
is determined whether or not an alleged noncitizen is deportable or has available relief” (AILA 2012, 7; 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §321, 110 Stat. 3009-3546 §1226(c)). 
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former members of the Armed Forces of the US.” For example, the Forman (2004), 
Morton (2011), and Napolitano (2012) Memos discourage issuing NTAs to those persons 
whose removal is not “in the interest of the US.” Despite these directives and the 
requirement that agents need specific authorization from headquarters before issuing 
NTAs to these persons, alien veterans continue to be detained and deported regardless of 
long-standing residency or community or family ties (Barbassa 2010; De Genova 2002; 
Lamm 2010; Traskey 2003).  
As it stands, according to the Department of Homeland Security, veteran status 
has “no effect, positive or negative,” concerning a person’s legal right to reside in the 
United States (Marrero 2010). The precarious legal situation of alien veterans living in 
the United States has prompted some to call for a nonpunitive adjustment of status 
process for any person currently serving in the military to keep the alien veteran 
population from growing (Shagin 2009). An unknown number of aliens are discharged 
from the military each year under honorable conditions after satisfactorily completing 
their term of service. The 2010 GAO report found that the USCIS cannot identify 
military spouses and dependents, alien veterans who have been deported, and military 
personnel the agency is processing for deportation (GAO 2010).  
Immigration advocates such as the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
(AILA) argue that alien veterans should simply be declared “American nationals”—like 
persons born in certain US territories—to acknowledge that, although they are not 
citizens, they have some claim to belonging above and beyond other long-term residents 
(KTVU 2009; Latina Lista 2010a; Liewer 2009; NLG 2009). But such a declaration 
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would require congressional action, which—if the case of Filipinos (who enlisted during 
WWII but did not receive funding for veterans’ health benefits until 2009) is any 
indication—is unlikely to gain much traction or public attention (Levs 2009; Schlimgen 
2010; Schuering 2012). In the meantime, immigration advocates claim that over three 
thousand undocumented veterans are contesting deportation orders (Latina Lista 2009). 
The stories of some veterans who have been deported or are under deportation orders 
recently posted their stories on the website “Banished Veterans” (Banished Veterans 
2012; see also Latina Lista 2010b; Valenzula 2012; NLG 2009; Ruhman 2009).82 Once 
deported—many for old crimes reclassified under the 1996 IIRIRA—these veterans are 
barred from reentering the United States for life.83 In death, however, they are granted 
reentry, because as veterans they remain entitled to be buried at government expense in a 
veterans’ cemetery (Marosi 2012). 
POST-9/11 CITIZENSHIP THROUGH MILITARY SERVICE 
The section examines post-9/11 developments in the area of alien military service 
and naturalization that depart from what was observed in previous periods. The most 
important departures, probationary and posthumous citizenship, are examined below. 
                                                 
82 Chapters of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), among others, submitted 
amici briefs that include actual cases involving military and veteran clients (Amicus Chaidez 2012; Amicus 
Hernandez 2012; Amicus Padilla 2010; Carson 2006). 
83 The consequences of removal or deportation are steep. Per the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
“after removal for an aggravated felony, a noncitizen is permanently barred from returning to the United 
States.” 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). 
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Probationary Citizenship 
First, persons who naturalize through one of the military provisions of the INA 
acquire citizenship that is “revocable” for up to five years—conditional on the military’s 
“characterization of service.” It appears that after 2008, Congress created a new category 
of citizenship for persons who naturalize through the military provisions of the INA. 
Specifically, the statutory language of the 2008 amendment to the INA, known as the 
2008 Military Naturalization Act (MNA), appears to have created a new form of 
“probationary” or conditional citizenship for persons who naturalize through the military 
provisions (sections 328 and 329). The 2008 amendments to INA were discussed above 
as codifying President Bush’s 2002 Executive Order designating the post-9/11 period as 
“wartime” under the INA (1952). In fact, through these amendments, Congress appears to 
have narrowed the scope of President Bush’s 2002 Executive Order scope in a way that 
raises constitutional concerns. Congress’s 2008 amendments state that the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) may initiate denaturalization against a veteran in the event that 
“[t]he individual is separated from the Armed Forces under other than honorable 
conditions before the person has served honorably for a period or periods aggregating 
five years” (INA §328, §329; MNA 2008). 
The 2008 MNA effectively created a new class of citizens whose citizenship is 
contingent upon remaining in the good graces of their (military) employer. From a 
constitutional point of view, this amendment presents two main problems. First, the 2008 
amendments elevate a sometimes administrative finding of an executive department to 
the level of a judicial finding of guilt. Second, they present grounds for denaturalization 
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in addition to those specified by the Supreme Court—namely, fraudulent representation 
during naturalization proceedings. 
 The 2008 MNA creates a highly problematic form of “probationary citizenship” 
unique to persons that naturalize through the military provisions of the INA. The 2008 
MNA allows the Department of Homeland Security to initiate denaturalization if a person 
is separated “under other than honorable conditions” up to five years after taking the oath 
of citizenship. The plain reading of the statute exceeds what could generously be called 
“congressional intent.” Nonetheless, the 2008 MNA states that the military’s 
characterization of an individual’s service, as documented in his/her military discharge 
papers, is sufficient proof of “less than honorable” service (Timmons and Stock 2009). 
This characterization is based on discharge papers (known as a DD-214) that each person 
receives when they are separated from the military, which include a “characterization of 
service.”  
The type of discharge that one receives is significant, because it establishes 
eligibility for federal and state veterans’ benefits and, as the official summary of an 
individual’s military record, is useful for obtaining civilian employment. Generally, 
determining the type of discharge is an administrative manner, as most people enter and 
exit the service on good terms; however, some discharges or characterizations of 
service—such as “bad conduct” or “dishonorable” discharge—are punitive. Punitive 
discharges can only be awarded at courts-martial, which preserves most—but not all—of 
an individual’s rights to due process. “Other than honorable” discharges are 
administratively awarded, which means that the Department of Defense alone makes the 
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determination based on the recommendation of the individual’s last Commanding Officer 
(Stock and Exner 2009; Timmons and Stock 2009). At this point, communication 
between government entities can complicate the process, as it is unlikely that enlisted 
personnel or military commanders understand that their administrative recommendation 
may become grounds for revocation of citizenship, deportation, and a permanent bar 
against ever seeking admission to the United States.  
The plain reading of the 2008 MNA makes an administrative finding—
“characterization of service”—by an executive department without judicial review 
grounds for revocation of citizenship. A charitable reading of the statute is that Congress 
intended to only make punitive discharges that were awarded at courts-martial—as the 
result of a conviction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice—grounds for revocation of 
citizenship.  
Prior to the Military Naturalization Act of 2008, only discharges awarded at 
courts-martial had punitive immigration consequences. Because an “other than honorable 
discharge” (OTH) was awarded administratively, there were no adverse immigration 
consequences to receiving such a discharge, although an OTH makes a person ineligible 
for military naturalization. In contrast, depending on the criminal conviction they 
accompany, the “bad conduct” and “dishonorable” discharges can and do, respectively, 
lead to deportation. Prior to the 2008 MNA, this line also divided military discharges 
with and without adverse immigration consequences. The 2008 amendments to the INA 
are problematic because they allow DHS to initiate denaturalization proceedings against 
military members that “are separated under other than honorable conditions before the 
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person has served honorably for a period or periods aggregating five years” (INA §328, 
§329; MNA 2008). It is possible that Congress only intended revocation of citizenship to 
be applied to service members convicted at courts-martial and awarded a “bad conduct” 
or “dishonorable” discharge.84 
Under the 2008 MNA, the service member has no recourse for protesting the type 
of discharge that he or she receives until after being discharged, when he or she can file a 
petition to the Board of Corrections. What is new here is the inclusion of “other than 
honorable” discharges in the type of discharge (the others require a courts-martial and 
some finding of guilt) that rise to the level of a felony conviction in civilian court. Felony 
convictions in civilian courts often result in deportation hearings of legal permanent 
residents. Military offenses are assigned a level of severity/guilt when the DHS reviews 
an immigrant’s immigration status. Generally, conviction at courts-martial rises to the 
felony standard. Significantly, the 2008 MNA awards an administrative decision (within 
the complete control of the executive and not subject to judicial review) the force of a 
felony conviction in a civilian court.  
It is important to keep in mind that, until the 2008 Military Naturalization Act 
(MNA), only alien service members had to worry about the “immigration consequences” 
of their service. However, the 2008 amendments made the revocation of citizenship a 
possibility for persons who naturalized through the military provisions (INA §328, §329). 
While there have always been serious immigration consequences for aliens based on 
                                                 
84 Specifically, Congress may not realize that “other than honorable” is actually a type of 
administratively awarded discharge. 
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military discharge, the 2008 MNA makes naturalized American citizens just as 
vulnerable to denaturalization and eventual deportation as alien service members.85 In 
essence, the statute grants administrative findings by the Department of Defense the same 
weight as a court conviction. These administrative determinations are reached without 
judicial oversight or even judicial awareness, which presents problems regardless of the 
individual’s citizenship status at the time of discharge—although aliens face much more 
dire consequences.86 
The second constitutional concern raised by the 2008 act is that the Supreme 
Court has held that citizenship can only be “revoked” from naturalized citizens if the 
government can prove fraud or misrepresentation by the immigrant during the 
naturalization interview process. Thus, the 2008 amendments depart from longstanding 
immigration law and constitutional interpretation—even in cases where criminal 
wrongdoing is proven in a courts-martial. Whether intentional or not, the statutory 
language of the 2008 MNA allows an executive department’s administrative finding to 
effect permanent immigration and naturalization outcomes. Even denaturalization on the 
basis of the punitive discharges awarded at courts-martial is problematic because the 
military justice system protects most but not all of an individual’s rights to due process.87 
                                                 
85 Military commanders have used the threat of a “less than honorable” discharge (and subsequent 
deportation by another government agency) to pressure an alien service member into what amounts to a 
plea-bargain in the military justice system. For example, in May 2009, Marine Corporal Ahmad Siddiqi 
was nearly deported to “his native Afghanistan” following an incident in Farah province, Afghanistan, 
although his family had sought asylum in the United States in 1990, where he had lived continuously until 
enlisting in the Marines (Cavallaro 2010). 
86 In some cases, service members are not even aware of the consequences of this administrative 
sanction. 
87 It is unknown whether the military has requested “denaturalization” of any members. Sometimes an 
Other than Honorable or OTH discharge is awarded when a service member is convicted of a civilian 
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In granting the Department of Homeland Security special authority to revoke the 
citizenship of any person naturalized through the military provisions of the INA for up to 
five years after becoming a citizen, the law creates a form of probationary citizenship, 
unique to naturalized US citizens who acquired their citizenship through military 
service.88  
Table 3.1 summarizes the types of military discharges, how each is awarded, and 
the attendant consequences for immigration.89 Only military discharges are awarded at 
courts-martial, i.e. through a judicially-supervised process, have immigration 
consequences. Significantly, the 2008 Act effectively gives the Other than Honorable 
(OTH) military discharge a similar weight to those only awarded at courts-martial. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
criminal infraction, i.e., drunk in public, DUI. In other cases, an OTH is awarded because a commanding 
officer suspects that the individual has violated orders and regulations. The offenses were not serious 
enough to warrant courts-martial. All service members are subject to NJP, in which the commanding 
officer acts as investigator-prosecutor-judge-and-jury and, in case of persons assigned to US Navy ships, 
the service members do not have the right to request courts-martial (to argue their case to a disinterested 
authority). Most disciplinary action takes the form of Non-Judicial Punishment (NJP) by Commanding 
Officers (Article 15 UCMJ) that is not subject to judicial review. Service members are regularly awarded 
an “other than honorable” discharge without being convicted in any court. 
88 The most benign explanation, again, is that lawmakers are ignorant of how the military and the 
military justice system actually operate. Regardless, the statutory language raises a question of equal 
protection by treating native-born and naturalized citizens differently based on how and when they acquired 
US citizenship. 
89 In addition, there is an “entry level” discharge also called “entry level separation” (ELS) that is 
administratively awarded for active duty service of less than 180 days. An ELS is usually awarded in cases 
where an individual does not complete boot camp. There are no punitive immigration consequences but the 
person is not eligible for military naturalization (Stock 2011). 
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Table 3.1: Military Discharge Types, How Awarded, and Immigration Consequences 
Military Discharge Type How Awarded Punitive Immigration Consequences? 
Honorable (HON) Administrative None 
General under honorable 
conditions (GEN) 
Administrative None 
Other than honorable 
(OTH) 
Administrative None 
Bad conduct (BCD) Only at courts-
martial 
Depending on criminal conviction, 
may lead to deportation 
Dishonorable (DD) Only at courts-
martial 
Depending on criminal conviction, 
mandatory deportation 
Adapted from Stock 2011, 25. 
 
 
Interestingly, only service members who naturalize through one of the military 
provisions after 2008 are at risk of denaturalization if the military determines that they do 
not perform five years of honorable service after taking the oath of citizenship.90 While 
                                                 
90 Specifically, the 2008 amendment authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to initiate 
denaturalization proceedings against a service member if the Department of Defense considers the 
individual’s postnaturalization service (up to five years!) to be “other than honorable.” Service members 
cannot challenge nonpunitive types of discharge, which include: “honorable,” “general under honorable 
conditions,” and “general under other than honorable conditions.” It is the last of these three that Congress 
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the nonmilitary naturalization provision requires a minimum of five years of residency, 
the process is final, there is no probationary period, and citizenship cannot be revoked 
based on the military’s characterization of service (Timmons and Stock 2009). To avoid 
these pitfalls, the American Immigration Lawyers Association advises that clients may be 
better protected by naturalizing through the regular, rather than the military provision, of 
the immigration code (AILA 2012). 
Posthumous Citizenship 
The other important departure from previous conflicts observable in the post-9/11 
period is posthumous citizenship. Congress transformed the Cold War-era Posthumous 
Citizenship Act (PCA 1989) into a vehicle for protecting the families of service members 
killed or missing in action from detention and deportation. 
First, Congress transformed the Cold War-era Posthumous Citizenship Act (PCA 
1989) into a vehicle for protecting the families of service members killed or missing in 
action from detention and deportation. There are tremendous differences between the 
concern that the Department of Defense has shown for military spouses and dependents 
in the post-9/11 period, partly because military families did not exist during earlier 
periods when large numbers of single young men were enlisted for short periods.91 
During the post-9/11 period, the Pentagon framed the immigration status of service 
                                                                                                                                                 
specified as grounds for denaturalization. Perhaps Congress intended that these punitive discharges—those 
only awarded at courts-martial— 
be grounds for denaturalization. 
91 The period following the end of the draft (1972) and introduction of the all-volunteer force (1973) 
coincided with a transformation in military organization wherein the enlistment period lengthened, service 
members received more high skills training, and re-enlistment was encouraged to retain a “professional” 
military force. 
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member spouses and dependents was framed as an issue of “military readiness” (USCIS 
Memo 2010). Military readiness, while it generally concerns combat readiness, also 
involves pre-deployment planning such as creating wills, granting powers of attorney, 
formulating childcare arrangements, and other contingency plans while the service 
member is deployed. A 2010 US Citizenship and Immigration Service memo refers to 
“Pentagon concerns” over the policies of the agency’s enforcement division (ICE) 
regarding the cases of military spouses, family members, and alien veterans. USCIS 
memos show that there are, in fact, military leaders who are aware that some military 
families include undocumented persons or those whose immigration status has lapsed 
(Barbassa 2007). 
Under the Bush and Obama administrations, executive agents were encouraged 
and then directed via memoranda to suspend the deportation hearings of military family 
members and alien veterans. Although the trend has been toward expanding the 
protection of military-related aliens, there have been setbacks as well. For example, 
President Obama’s May 2011 announcement that his administration would no longer 
intervene in the deportation process of persons whom it is not in the public interest to 
deport came as a blow to military attorneys and civilian policymakers who have worked 
toward securing the residency status of active duty spouses, children, and alien 
veterans.92 In response, in August 2011, President Obama announced that each of these 
cases would be reviewed individually.  
                                                 
92 Margaret Stock, personal communication to author, May 5, 2011. 
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Most recent reports suggest that both the Department of Defense and USCIS are 
aware that the immigration status of many military families is questionable (Preston 
2010; USCIS Memo 2010; Stern 2010; VerBruggen 2010). USCIS statements recognize 
the Pentagon’s interest in immigration policy as it affects military readiness (USCIS 
Memo 2010). A USCIS Policy Memo (2010) recommended that ICE agents “exercise 
discretion” when deciding whether to detain “long-time lawful permanent residents, 
juveniles, the immediate family members of US citizens, veterans, members of the 
armed forces and their families, and others with illnesses or special circumstances” (Lee 
and Wasem 2009; USCIS Memo 2010). The current ICE policy “disfavors” but does not 
prohibit initiating removal procedures against military spouses and dependents (Lee and 
Wasem 2009; Morton 2011). The previously discussed Morton (2011) Memo 
implements these recommendations, giving “particular care and consideration to 
veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces” (Morton 2011). 
The lack of legal protection for family members is further complicated in the 
event of the service member’s death (Lamm 2010; Stock 2006; USCIS Memo 2010; 
Walsh 1994; Yates 2002). Existing legal institutions and structures have been reworked 
in response. For example, as discussed in the previous chapter, in 1989, Congress passed 
the Posthumous Citizenship for Military Service Act to honor the service of those who 
served in twentieth-century American wars but never became citizens (Posthumous 
Citizenship Act 1989). Per subsection (e), the 1989 Posthumous Citizenship Act was 
strictly honorific—that is there were “NO BENEFITS TO SURVIVORS.” The issue of 
posthumous citizenship was revived after the 2003 invasion of Iraq when it was used to 
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solve a practical problem arising from (mostly alien) combat deaths. An alien spouse or 
child of an American citizen soldier could also end up without benefits if the soldier was 
killed or missing in action (§329 allows for either possibility). Previously, the death of 
the service member left many spouses and dependents without an immigration sponsor. 
This applied to cases of citizen deaths as well, say, if the spouse had filed a naturalization 
petition or intended to file when he or she met the residency requirement.  
Several high profile cases led Congress to revise the 1989 Posthumous 
Citizenship Act (PCA), through §1703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004.93 The Post-9/11 Posthumous Citizenship Provision enacted through the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (NDAA 2004).94 This 2004 act 
revised INA §329, charging the Secretary of DHS—in coordination with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD)—with the authority to review applications and, if 
appropriate, issue a certificate of “posthumous citizenship” to the family, which states 
that the government considers the deceased to be a citizen of the United States “at the 
moment of death.”95 Applications for Posthumous Citizenship, Form N-644, must be 
filed within two years of the service member’s death. Quoting Casualty and Mortuary 
Affairs: 
 
Public Law 101-249, as amended, provides that an alien or non-citizen national of 
the United States who dies as a result of injury or disease incurred by active duty 
                                                 
93 The Posthumous Citizenship Act (Public Law 108-136 §1703); National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136). 
94 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1440 and note, and 1440–1; 8 CFR part 2. 
95 National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 §1703 amended the INA. 
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with the U.S. Armed Forces during specified periods of military hostilities may be 
granted United States citizenship. If the application is approved, a Form N-645 - 
Certificate of Citizenship will be issued in the name of the decedent (the deceased 
veteran). The certificate establishes that the decedent is considered a citizen of the 
United States as of the date of his or her death… 
 
To qualify for Posthumous Citizenship, the decedent must have been an alien or 
non-citizen national of the United States who served honorably in an active-duty 
status in the military of the United States from September 11, 2001, until 
terminated by Executive Order of the President and who died because of injury or 
disease incurred in or aggravated by that service and met one of the following 
enlistment requirements:  
 
Was enlisted, reenlisted, or inducted in the United States, Panama Canal Zone, 
American Samoa, or Swain's Island; Was admitted to the United States as a 
lawful permanent resident at any time; Entered the United States, Panama Canal 
Zone, American Samoa, or Swain's Island pursuant to military orders at some 
time during such service… 
 
The application may be filed by the descendant’s Spouse, Father/Mother, 
Son/Daughter, Brother/Sister; Administrator or decedents estate; or Guardian, 
Conservator, or Committee of decedent's next of kin; or Service organization 
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recognized by the Department of Veterans Affairs (www.hrc.army.mil) (Accessed 
November 13, 2012). 
 
The 2004 amendments ensured that the surviving family members of a posthumous 
citizen would be eligible for the same benefits provided to citizen spouses of citizen 
soldiers killed or declared missing in action. The new role of the posthumous citizen 
arose in response to the casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, which often left military 
wives and dependents without an immigration sponsor [usually a family member] and 
therefore ineligible for legal residency. The 2004 NDAA allows a “native-born” or 
naturalized citizen service member to posthumously serve as the immigration sponsor for 
his or her surviving noncitizen spouse, parents, and minor children. INA §329 allows for 
either possibility. The USCIS website contains information for: Survivor Benefits for 
Relatives of US citizen Military Members (including Posthumous Citizens), Survivor 
Benefits for Relatives of Non-US-Citizen Military Personnel, and Survivor Benefits for 
Noncitizen Relatives of Military Personnel (USCIS Survivor Benefits website 2012). 
Whereas the 1989 PCA explicitly prohibited the attachment of “any benefits” to 
the honorific title, the post-2004 PCA ensures government benefits to survivors, and 
creates a special category of permanent residents. The transformed PCA allows survivors 
to become permanent residents but stops short of creating a pathway to citizenship. For 
this reason, the 2008 NDAA included a provision that allows family members of citizens 
that naturalized through INA §329(a) to be immediately eligible for naturalization under 
§319. As discussed in the previous chapter, §329 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
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(INA) has been applied since WWII to naturalize alien members of the armed forces who 
serve in American wars abroad. Making civilian family members of service members 
killed in action eligible to naturalize through the wartime provision of the INA is 
exceptional. Previously, National Guard and Reserve members had to wait a year to be 
eligible.96 In contrast, the 2004 congressional amendments to the wartime section made 
surviving family members of posthumous citizens immediately eligible for naturalization 
(Stock and Exner 2009). 
Why Congress chose to add surviving family members to the population eligible 
under §329 rather than amend some other INA provision remains unclear, although the 
constellation of political forces provides some clue. During this period, comprehensive 
immigration reform was debated and rejected, discouraging policymakers from amending 
nonmilitary provisions of the INA, and essentially requiring new legislation. The 2004 
and 2008 changes to the INA regarding posthumous citizenship and the naturalization of 
their family members may have been easier to accomplish by simply attaching them to 
the Defense spending bills. In any event, the transformation of Posthumous Citizenship 
from an honorific to a vehicle of naturalization for civilians through INA §329 is a 
significant development (Amaya 2013; Plascencia 2009; Stock 2011).97 
The practice of awarding posthumous citizenship to service members killed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan—over 139 such awards have been made through 2012—and 
                                                 
96 Until 2006, when Congress eliminated the “wartime versus peacetime” distinction, Title 32 (Reserve 
and National Guard) service members activated for service in Iraq and Afghanistan were ineligible to 
naturalize through INA §329. 
97 The naturalization of dead soldiers has been criticized as a continuation imperialism through the 
appropriation of Latino service (Amaya 2007, 2013). 
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amending INA §329 to make their survivors eligible for citizenship are pragmatic 
solutions to unanticipated problems airing from the needs of the military (Perry 2012). 
While these accommodations have certainly improved the practical consequences for 
survivors, relatively little discussion has addressed the political consequences of the 
practice of awarding dead soldiers citizenship, in spite of its significant departure from 
what was observed during previous periods. 
Under the current immigration code, noncitizen family members of active duty 
personnel are vulnerable in other ways. In 2011 the USCIS Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement director Morton (2011) issued a memorandum to field agents to exercise 
“prosecutorial discretion” with regard to alien spouses and family members. Citing eight 
executive memoranda—dated July 15, 1976 to June 17, 2011—Morton (2011) states that 
“prosecutorial discretion in civil immigration enforcement matters is held by the Director 
and may be exercised, with appropriate supervisory oversight, by certain ICE officials” 
(Morton 2011, 3).98 The precedent for Morton (2011) may have been included to counter 
some of the criticism following the leak of the USCIS Policy Memo (2010), referred to 
by conservative blogs and news outlets, as well as by conservative proponents of strict 
immigration policy, as “The Amnesty Memo” (National Review 2010). Morton (2011) 
effectively extended the Forman (2004) protections against issuing NTAs and detention 
for unlawful presence to alien spouses and immediate family members of US military 
personnel. Morton (2011) also rescinded two prosecutorial discretion-related memoranda 
                                                 
98 Delegation of Authority to the Assistant Secretary, ICE, Delegation No. 7030.2 (November 13, 
2004), delegating, among other authorities, the authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in immigration 
enforcement matters (as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1 10 1 (a)(17). 
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dated October 31, 2002 and January 8, 2003. The release of the Morton (2011) Memo 
three years after Congress passed the Military Personnel Citizenship Processing Act 
(MPCPA 2008), which included deadlines for processing petitions from surviving family 
members, suggests coordination between USCIS naturalization authorities and USCIS 
ICE.  
A 2010 GAO report provides some insight into why the director of ICE has to 
reissue guidelines regarding military personnel and family members every three to four 
years. Reviewing the implementation of MPCPA (2008), the GAO (2010) reported that it 
was unable to determine the rate for applications from surviving military family members 
because their applications were “not identifiable in the USCIS’s data systems” (GAO 
2010, 35). It is difficult to understand why the USCIS cannot identify §329 petitions in 
their systems because those who apply for citizenship under this provision of the INA 
must be either active duty service members or (since 2008) a surviving family member of 
a posthumous citizen. Incidentally, this means that the USCIS also cannot track 
naturalization petitions filed by any military family members (who apply mostly through 
the regular statute), let alone the number that have been detained and/or deported. The 
threat of deportation or actual deportation of military spouses and dependents endangers 
military readiness because if a service member’s primary caregiver for his or her child 
(spouse, family member) is detained and/or deported, that service member is unable to 
deploy and may have to be processed for a “hardship” discharge.99 The Pentagon argues 
that suspending the detention and deportation of family members enhances military 
                                                 
99 The author encountered this situation as an officer in the United States Navy, 2003–2005. 
 98 
readiness by allowing service men and women to focus on mission accomplishment. 
Policy changes such as these are often criticized as doing an end run around Congress. 
Other evidence suggests that, at least with this change, executive action is simply the 
result of congressional inaction. 
SUMMARY 
Chapters One and Two provided critical background information for this chapter. 
Chapter One elaborated on the idea of jus meritum, or citizenship for service, as both a 
universal and particularly American concept. Specifically, it argued that the entire 
citizen-soldier literature is a testament to the instantiation of the principle of jus meritum 
by successive generations of Americans. Chapter Two substantiated this claim, showing 
how previously marginalized and immigrants groups earned status as free and equal 
citizens through military service. 
This chapter examined how the military operates as a site for political 
incorporation today, with the aim of informing the reader about the status of alien 
soldiers, alien veterans, and their families. Without these data, our nation’s civilian and 
military leaders are ill-equipped to address the attendant policy issues. While official data 
on alien service members are limited at best, Chapter Two drew upon a variety of official 
and nonofficial sources to provide the most comprehensive account of the practice, 
experience, and consequences of alien enlistment to date. 
The post-9/11 legislative and policy changes regarding alien military service are 
in line with what we have seen in previous periods of conflict, with some exceptions 
resulting from a change in military organization and composition. Following other 
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wartime leaders, President Bush’s Executive Order (2002) 13269 made INA §329 
applicable to active duty service members; however, unlike earlier periods, the regular 
Army and Navy were not expanded through a draft. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the immigration and naturalization law changes since 9/11. 
The post-9/11 departures from earlier periods of conflict are largely the result of a change 
in military demographics (Segal and Segal 2004).100 The majority of this chapter 
concerned the impact of the unprecedented needs of “the military family”—
unprecedented not because this generation’s military families are particularly needy but 
because they are essentially our first generation of military families. To meet the needs of 
the population of alien spouses and dependents of alien (and citizen) service members, 
the Department of Defense expanded its efforts to ensure that all service members 
become citizens to protect this population from detention and deportation, and to care for 
the surviving family members of those killed or missing in action. Some of the more 
creative responses to nascent developments pertain to military families; for example, 
survivor’s benefits—which allow the posthumous citizen to serve as an immigration 
sponsor—arise from the unprecedented needs of military families. 
 
  
                                                 
100 The composition of the armed forces is affected by larger trends in military organization, i.e., 
technology, communications, etc., but that is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Table 3.2: Post-9/11 Changes Regarding Alien Military Service and Naturalization 
Statute or Regulation Major Provisions 
2002 Executive Order 
13269 
Waives residency requirement for aliens on active duty 
2004 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) 
Amends INA §329, implementing EO 13269 (2002) 
Amends INA §318(d) to allow posthumous citizens (killed or 
missing in action post-2001) to serve as immigration “sponsor” 
for surviving spouses, dependents, and parents 
2004 Military 
Naturalization Act (MNA) 
Makes citizenship acquired through INA §§328 and 329 subject 
to revocation (conditional upon 5 years of “honorable” service) 
2004 Forman Memo Directs ICE to exercise “prosecutorial discretion” when issuing 
removal orders against current and prior members of the military 
2006 NDAA Creates a unified statute for military enlistment (U.S.C.A. § 
504(b)(1) by eliminating the peacetime versus wartime 
distinction; repeals naturalization statutes for the individual 
services 
2008 Kendell Frederick 
Citizenship Assistance Act 
Directs DoD, FBI, and USCIS to expedite and assist alien service 
members applying for naturalization. Requires USCIS to process 
applications within 2 years of enlistment 
2008 Military Personnel 
Citizenship Processing Act 
Requires USCIS to process and adjudicate military naturalization 
petitions (including families) within 6 months. 
2008 Military Accessions 
Vital to the National 
Interest (MAVNI) Program  
Pilot program that allowed the enlistment of 1,000 legally present 
non-legal permanent residents (LPRs) with critical skills, i.e., 
fluency in a “strategic language,” US-licensed health care 
providers. Suspended in 2015. 
2011 Morton Memo Directs ICE to exercise “prosecutorial discretion” with “particular 
case and consideration to veterans and members of the US armed 
forces” 
2012 Napolitano Memo Directs DHS to exercise “prosecutorial discretion” when issuing 
removal notices to certain young undocumented aliens  
Sources: GAO 2010; Lee and Wasem 2009; Stock 2011. 
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 Some issues remain, despite these changes to the immigration and naturalization 
regime in response to the military needs of the state. For example, there is no official 
policy regarding what to do about undocumented soldiers discovered on active duty 
(Traskey 2003). The publicized cases of undocumented service members who were 
discovered on active duty are instructive because none of the soldiers volunteered this 
information to military officials.101 The favorable outcomes in certain cases, as with 
Private Escalante, are no guarantee of similar treatment under different circumstances. 
No formal policy exists regarding how to handle undocumented persons discovered on 
active duty. Congress must adjudicate the final status of persons not legally present in the 
United States, including the potential DREAM Act population. Counting aliens—
undocumented or not—alongside citizens as potential soldiers by requiring them to 
register with the Selective Service is an interesting approach but does not appear to have 
political implications (Carson 2006; Plascencia 2009; Raskin 1993; Wong and Cho 
2006). Perhaps the institution of the all-volunteer force has shielded the majority of the 
public from the reality of alien service members and their precarious status under current 
law (Burk 2001; Cohen 2001; Moskos 2001, 2002). 
Although the military has recently taken steps to ensure that all enlistees obtain 
citizenship, the status of active duty aliens, veterans, and their families among the great 
mass of US citizens-never-to-be-soldiers challenges the foundations of the American 
political order. Alien veterans are but one result of the separation of citizenship and 
                                                 
101 As discussed above, the reluctance of undocumented aliens on active duty to volunteer this 
information to military commanders is a rational response in an environment of high uncertainty (Lamm 
2010). Until the early 2000s, most service members in such situations have been prosecuted for fraudulent 
enlistment under articles 83 and 84 of the UCMJ. 
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military service since Vietnam, which led to a laissez-faire approach to citizenship and an 
embarrassingly low 40 percent rate of active duty naturalization through 2004 
(Hattiangadi, et al. 2005). Congress must devise solutions for emerging problems and 
address the unintended consequences of piecemeal, politically motivated amendments to 
the INA that left some alien veterans without a path to citizenship. 
In the post-9/11 as in the Cold War period, Congress and the president continue to 
pursue gradual immigration and naturalization policies that further the national interest in 
explicitly military terms. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
of 2008 contains a provision allowing for the immigration and naturalization of certain 
Iraqis and Afghans who assisted US forces in the post-9/11 period. Like the 2000 Hmong 
Act, the 2008 amendments invite these foreign nationals to pursue US citizenship 
regardless of nationality, previous residence, and family ties. All that is required is a 
record of military service to the United States and its allies. In all such cases, individual 
action and merit mark these foreigners as semi- or proto-American. Congress 
acknowledges and rewards the service of these foreign nationals with no ties to the 
United States through special provisions in the nation’s immigration and naturalization 
code.102 
The president’s ability to provide relief in exceptional circumstances through 
parole powers can be checked by opposition from Congress. During the Cold War 
                                                 
102However, the case of Iraqi Chaldeans is one notable exception. This population demonstrates one 
group for whom the United States incurred obligations in Iraq that have since gone unfulfilled. The author 
encountered the case of Iraqi Chaldean refugees in the Hutto detention center, near Austin, Texas. The 
Chaldeans were a religious minority living in Iraq targeted for ethnic cleansing following the US invasion 
in 2003. 
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exceptional Presidential relief was codified by Congress. For example Tichenor (2002) 
notes that President Reagan’s admission of refugees fleeing communist regimes was 
generally supported by “Democratic lawmakers and liberal interest groups” (266). In the 
post-Cold War era, where refugee policy is not cast as an aspect of national security 
policy, President Obama’s attempt to regularize the status of an entire classes of persons, 
such as the population of undocumented minors, has been successfully thwarted by 
Congress.  
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have served as a focusing event, highlighting 
the disconnect between American ideals and practice—in this case, between the families 
of alien soldiers and an immigration system that cannot even identify their citizenship 
petitions or track how many citizenship-eligible alien veterans have been deported 
(Pierson 1993).103 While the practice of awarding posthumous citizenship is problematic 
for liberal theory, it is an official effort by the government of the US to meet its 
obligation to the families of the fallen, although exactly what that obligation is remains 
unspecified. Nevertheless, the history of jus meritum demonstrates that the US has a 
largely inclusive and expansive immigration system (Freeman 1995). 
  
                                                 
103 This reference is to USCIS’s inability to track the naturalization petitions of alien military 
spouses and dependents or the number of alien veterans deported. 
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Chapter Four 
Contemporary Public Support for Citizenship for Service 
 
 
This chapter moves from historical, theoretical, and policy analysis to 
contemporary empirical analysis of how the present-day public views jus meritum. 
Understanding these perceptions is particularly relevant to the current debate over the 
appropriate direction and scope of immigration policy reform. Specifically, this chapter 
analyzes original polling data on the DREAM Act, a proposal to allow undocumented 
persons brought to the United States before the age of 16 to become legal residents if they 
graduate from high school, remain free of legal trouble, and go to college or join the 
military. All previous polling on the DREAM Act in that it asked people if they 
supported a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants in exchange for military 
service or college attendance. The original research described here provide the first data 
to evaluate public support for the military and college provisions of the DREAM Act 
separately. A disparity in support between the two provisions, especially greater support 
for the military than the college provision, may evidence contemporary public support for 
the jus meritum principle. 
OVERVIEW 
In the following sections, I present the basic theories behind individual attitudes 
toward immigrants and immigration policy. None of the existing theories fit the alien 
soldier scenario, although they might predict support for other types of immigration 
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policy. Since the military is not generally regarded as difficult to enter, it does not make 
sense that respondents would oppose alien enlistment on economic grounds. In addition, 
given the history of alien military service outlined in Chapter Two, it is difficult to 
sustain the argument that immigrants that volunteer for military service threaten the 
nation’s cultural or political identity.  
Next, I discuss the context and importance of the DREAM Act, including a 
summary of legislative action. This section is followed by a description of the data, 
methods, and presentation of results. The data show more support for granting legal 
residency to those who join the military than to those who attend college. Significant 
variation in support for the military and college provisions are explored, and areas for 
further research identified. Finally, I relate the importance of these findings to the larger 
study of jus meritum. 
THEORIES OF IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY ATTITUDE FORMATION 
Political scientists have proposed a number of theories to explain the distribution 
of public opinion toward immigrants and immigration policy. These theories can be 
organized along two dimensions: economic versus noneconomic and individual versus 
collective interests. Scholars have explored and tested theories of both individual and 
collective economic interests, especially those involving threats to cultural and national 
identity. 
First, political scientists have amassed data linking individual economic self-
interest to public attitudes toward immigrants (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Jackson and 
Esses 2000). For example, the economic threat theory has been used to explain why 
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“high-skilled respondents”—members of the public in high-skilled occupations—are 
more supportive of immigration than their “low-skilled” counterparts. This theory 
predicts that the respondent’s (occupational) skill level is related to the type of 
immigration that he or she supports or opposes, i.e., high-skilled Americans would 
oppose high-skilled immigrants and low-skilled Americans would oppose low-skilled 
immigration because of competition for jobs (Mayda 2004; Scheve and Slaughter 2001).  
Another general theory of attitudes toward immigrants, the collective impact 
theory, involves the perceived collective economic impact of newcomers on US society 
(Kiewiet and Kinder 1981; Mansfield and Mutz 2009; Mutz. 1992). According to this 
theory, individual beliefs regarding immigrants’ economic impact are more significant 
than individuals’ direct experience with such impact (i.e., competing with immigrants for 
jobs). As proof of this argument, proponents of the collective impact theory have more 
recently pointed to data showing that both high- and low-skilled respondents support the 
immigration of highly skilled immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). These 
proponents posit that the lack of variance in immigration attitude based on respondents’ 
skill level demonstrates that public opinion is primarily structured by perceptions of how 
policies affect the US economy as a whole, rather than actual data or lived experiences. 
Scholars have also adapted the collective impact theory to explain anti-immigrant 
attitudes as the result of perceived competition for state welfare expenditures (but see 
Facchini and Mayda 2009 on the relationship among immigrants’ skill level, labor market 
determinants, and redistributive economics on individual attitudes toward immigration). 
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Finally, many theories and data support the idea that attitudes are based on the 
perceived threat of immigrants to American cultural and national identity. Unlike the 
individual and collective self-interest theories, these theories argue that attitudes toward 
immigrants are structured by ideas rather than material concerns—as with perceived 
threats to national and cultural identity (Chandler and Tsai 2001). Scholars rarely argue 
that public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy are driven exclusively by 
economic interest; instead, they generally acknowledge that such attitudes are also 
influenced by noneconomic ideational concerns and/or self rather than collective interests 
(Citrin and Green 1990; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Kessler 2001). 
Public polling on the DREAM Act provides an opportunity to test these various 
theories of attitude formation towards immigrants and immigration policy. Understanding 
what underlies public support for or opposition to the DREAM Act is also important 
because it likely affects the bill’s ability to become law. The DREAM Act raises its own 
set of complexities with regard to immigration because it concerns undocumented 
immigrants brought to the United States as children as opposed to immigrants who came 
to the country illegally as adults. Generally, the public provides greater support to 
integrating the undocumented children of immigrants because these children are not 
morally responsible for their illegal presence in the United States. Supporters of pro-
immigrant immigration reform have strategically placed the DREAM Act first on the 
agenda for this reason (Stock 2012).  
How do the arguments underlying the DREAM Act relate to these theories on 
attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy? The standard theories suggest that 
 108 
low-skilled respondents (measured by proxy using the education and income variables) 
will be less supportive of the DREAM Act due to economic competition. As such, the 
economic competition model might explain opposition to the citizenship for college 
provision, but not citizenship for military service. The Services do not turn away 
qualified applicants because too many people want to enlist. Therefore, we have no 
reason to believe that low-skilled respondents will be any less supportive of immigrants 
gaining citizenship through military service than their high-skilled counterparts. 
The economic competition model thus does not apply to the case of military 
enlistment because, for the most part, every qualified volunteer is enlisted. The 
mechanism underlying this theory, individual material self-interest, could still predict 
support for the DREAM Act’s military provision if respondents believed that noncitizen 
enlistment allows the United States to maintain an all-volunteer force (this perception, 
although widespread, is erroneous). The respondent’s belief that noncitizens prevent the 
reestablishment of compulsory military service during wartime may be based on 
individual material self-interest.  
Scholars have also found that higher education levels correlate to support for 
immigration through a separate mechanism—what I’ll call the “education educates” 
hypothesis (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Jackson and Esses 
2000). This phenomenon can perhaps be explained by the assumption that those with 
more education likely spend more time in environments that support diversity and 
tolerance. Those with more education may have greater awareness of the effect of 
previous waves of immigrants on the United States, making them less fearful of the 
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supposedly negative impact that immigrants are perceived to have on culture, identity, 
and the national economy. For this reason it is important to also ask respondents how 
whether or not they think immigration is a good thing for the country in general. 
THE DREAM ACT 
The DREAM Act, formally the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien 
Minors Act, failed to pass the “lame-duck” Congress in December 2010. Then, in June 
2012, Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano issued a memo titled “Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as 
Children” that directs US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) officials to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion with regard to certain young aliens unlawfully present in 
the country (Napolitano 2012). As discussed in the previous chapter, the criteria for 
eligibility per Napolitano (2012) are nearly identical to the those of the 2003, 2007, and 
2009 DREAM Act legislation: each iteration allows undocumented immigrants brought 
to the United States as children to gain legal resident status if they graduated from high 
school, stayed out of legal trouble, and attended college or joined the military.104 The 
Napolitano (2012) action is sometimes referred to as the DACA program, for deferred 
action for childhood arrivals. 
                                                 
104 To qualify, a person must be an undocumented alien who came to the United States 
before the age of 16, has continuously resided in the United States for five years preceding June 
15, 2012. The applicant may not above the age of thirty and must be in school, have a HS 
diploma or GED, or is “an honorably discharged veteran” of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of 
the United States. The applicant may not have been convicted of a felony, a significant or several 
misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise “pose a threat to national security or public safety” 
(Napolitano 2012, 1). 
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A December 2010 Gallup poll found that 54% of Americans supported a proposal 
to “allow illegal immigrants brought to the US as children to gain legal resident status if 
they join the military or go to college,” whereas 42% was opposed.105 This poll found 
greater support for the act among the following demographics: Democrats by a 2:1 
margin, youth (those under 35) by a 2:1 margin, and the highly educated. The largest gap 
in support is between those with a high school education or less, 44% of whom support 
the Act, and those with some college, 57% of whom support it. In the same Gallup 
survey, those with postgraduate education favored the Act by a 2:1 margin. 
Supporters of the DREAM Act point to a blameless population: those brought to 
the United States by their parents as children. Many of them are of Mexican origin but 
have little or no memory of Mexico, have attended school only in the United States, and 
have been socialized as American teenagers. In addition, many of these children may 
only speak English, depending on their family. Opponents to the act generally focus on 
the requirement that the person attend college in exchange for legal residency. Many 
people do not consider going to college to be a contribution commensurate to achieving 
legal residency. I have never heard a politician or commentator argue that active duty 
(military) service fails to establish justification for legal residency and eventual 
citizenship—although it is likely that certain individuals do hold that viewpoint. In fact, 
                                                 
105 Gallup found that 54% would “vote for” such a law, 42% would “vote against,” and 4% 
had “no opinion.” Gallup News Service (2010) results are based on a random quarter-sample on 
four nights of the Gallup Daily tracking survey. Gallup Daily randomly samples all adults (18+) 
living in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. This survey (n = 1,003) was conducted 3–6 
December 2010. Random-digit dial sampling includes both landlines and cell phones. The margin 
of error (with 95% confidence) for the total sample is +/- 4 percentage points. www.gallup.com. 
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while it remains divided on immigration policy as a whole, the public overwhelmingly 
supports awarding citizenship to active duty service men and women.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, from 2013 to 2014, the Department of 
Defense has allowed active duty soldiers who were not legally present at the time of 
enlistment to remain on active duty and acquire citizenship. Formerly, active duty 
members discovered in this predicament faced courts-martial, deportation, and a 
permanent bar from ever seeking US citizenship (the deportation and immigration bar 
came from federal immigration law, not the military justice system). The Pentagon has 
since accepted the interpretation of President Bush’s 2002 Executive Order 13269—
making all noncitizens on active duty post 9/11 immediately eligible for citizenship—as 
applicable to legal and illegal immigrants alike because illegal immigrants were not 
specifically excluded. Finally, the practice of awarding posthumous citizenship to service 
members killed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere suggests that the American people 
and elected officials view military service as a public contribution worthy of awarding 
citizenship. 
It is reasonable, then, to believe that military service is perhaps the only 
politically acceptable way of integrating undocumented immigrants into American 
society. Defense Secretary Robert Gates openly supported the DREAM Act before 
Congress (before it was voted down), and military and civilian leaders responsible for 
maintaining the all-volunteer service continue to support efforts to enlist all qualified 
persons, regardless of citizenship status. However the act has never been proposed as a 
military only option; attending college has always been presented as an analogous civil 
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contribution. There is good reason to believe that there is more support for granting 
citizenship to those that enlist than to those who attend college. Because previous public 
polls on the DREAM Act are limited in asking about support for both joining the military 
or going to college (taken from the legislative proposal), the difference in public opinion 
regarding the military versus college option has been impossible to verify. Immigration 
reform—including what to do about the potential DREAM Act population—will continue 
to resurface as a political issue, warranting the effort to understand what structures 
attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. The polling data analyzed in this chapter 
provide the first opportunity to confirm the hypothesis that the public supports the 
military more than the college provision of the proposed DREAM Act. 
TEXAS POLITICS SURVEY 
This section analyzes data from the May 2011 Texas Politics Survey, conducted 
by the University of Texas at Austin/Texas Tribune. Eight hundred registered voters in 
the state of Texas were surveyed between 11 and 18 May 2011. The survey instrument, 
codebook, and results are available on the Texas Politics Project website. The survey results 
have an overall margin of error of 3.46%. The descriptive statistics for the dependent and 
independent variables, as well as cross tabulations, are contained in Appendix C. 
 At the request of the author, the May 2011 Texas Politics Survey asked people 
about support for a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants in exchange for 
military service and college attendance. The May 2011 survey was the first to query the 
public about the military and college provisions separately. 
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The Texas Politics Survey’s design affords a more sophisticated analysis of public 
opinion toward the DREAM Act by specifically allowing for comparison among 
respondents who support one, both, or neither provision. The next section discuss the 
statistical analyses of these data using an OLS regression on support for the military and 
college provisions of the DREAM Act. This section is followed by discussion of the 
results, including a number of cross tabulations of the DREAM Act support by 
independent variables of interest. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable (DV) is support for the DREAM Act provisions. The DV 
was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly support, 2 = somewhat support, 3 = don’t 
know, 4 = somewhat oppose, 5 = strongly oppose) and was based on responses to the 
following. 
 
Q31. Please indicate your opinion on the following immigration proposals. 
[Randomize a-b]106 
Q31a. Passing a law that would allow illegal immigrants brought to the 
U.S. as children to gain legal resident status if they join the military. 
Q31b. Passing a law that would allow illegal immigrants brought to the 
U.S. as children to gain legal resident status if they go to college. 
 
                                                 
106 The Texas Politics Survey data do not include a question order variable (to indicate in 
what order respondents were asked the military versus college provision) so the effect of 
randomization could not be tested. 
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Table 4.1 summarizes the sample’s responses to question 33a-b, used as the dependent 
variable in the statistical analysis below. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Support for the Military and College Provisions of the DREAM Act 
 Military 
(n=797) 
College 
(n=798) 
 
Strongly support 25% 16%  
Somewhat support 34% 20%  
Somewhat oppose 12% 13%  
Strongly oppose 25% 45%  
Don’t know 5% 6%  
Source: May 2011 Texas Politics Survey  
 
Independent Variables 
The models evaluate individual-level determinants of factors believed to affect 
support for immigration. The independent variables (IVs) included in the models are as 
follows. 
Age is a continuous variable. Age is hypothesized to negatively affect support for 
both provisions of the DREAM Act since the immigration literature records that older 
citizens are more opposed to increasing immigration than younger citizens. 
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Gender is a dichotomous variable. Although gender has not been shown to 
systematically affect attitudes toward immigration it was included because military 
service is a traditionally male-dominated profession. For this reason, there may be 
politically significant differences in support for the military versus college provisions of 
the DREAM Act that have not been documented or theorized by immigration scholars. 
The respondent’s race/ethnicity is included to test for differences among three 
main groups: (Non-Hispanic) Whites, (Non-Hispanic) Blacks, and Hispanics/Latinos. 
Non-Hispanic Whites comprise the majority (63%) of the sample so it serves as the 
reference group. Dummy variables for Blacks, Hispanics, and Other (including 
Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, and Mixed) are used to measure variance by 
race and ethnicity in the OLS regression. 
Education is measured on a 6-point scale by the respondent’s “highest level of 
education” (1=less than high school, 2=high school degree, 3=some college, 4=two-year 
college degree, 5=four-year college degree, and 6=post-graduate degree). As discussed in 
the previous section, the literature demonstrates that education positively affects attitudes 
toward immigration. One theory is that individuals with more education are more 
knowledgeable of the history of the US as a nation of immigrants. Others account for 
variance by education to economic competition, i.e. those with less education will oppose 
increased immigration because they will have to compete with (mostly unskilled) 
immigrants for jobs. Analyzing support for the military and college provisions of the 
DREAM Act separately provides a unique opportunity to assess the impact of education 
on immigration attitudes.  
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Party identification is a 7-category variable that measures responses to the 
question “Generally speaking, would you say that you usually think of yourself as a…” 
and several follow-up questions. Democrats were expected to be more supportive of the 
DREAM Act provisions than Republicans and Independents. 
Finally, a Catholic dummy variable is included due to the Church’s official 
position, generally regarded as pro-immigrant, especially in the southwestern region of 
the United States. Religion or Catholicism in particular has not been shown to 
systematically affect attitudes toward immigration. 
 An Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) regression is used to model the predictors of 
support for each provision of the DREAM Act. An OLS regression is appropriate to 
model support for each dependent variable– support for the military and college 
provisions, respectively— measured on a 5 point scale. The OLS regression assesses 
whether or not an independent variable predicts the dependent variable and measures the 
strength of the relationship between each DV and the IVs. Each DV, support for the 
military or college provision, requires a separate regression. 
RESULTS 
 Table 4.2 shows the results of the OLS regression on support for each of the 
DREAM Act provisions. The age, gender, education, race (other), and Catholic variables 
do not significantly predict support for either provision. Education predicts support for 
the college but not the military provision. Party identification is also statistically 
significant in the expected direction. The race/ethnicity dummy variables are also of 
interest. First, the Black dummy variable negatively affected support for the military 
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provision but was not significant in the college model. Second, the Hispanic dummy 
positively affected support for the college provision but was not significant in the military 
model. The Other (Race) dummy was not significant in both the military and college 
models. 
 
Table 4.2 OLS Regression of Support for DREAM Act Provisions 
 Military College 
 Coef. SE Coef. SE 
Sex (Male) -0.052 (0.109) -0.193 (0.104) 
Age 0.005 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004) 
Education 0.055 (0.041) 0.078 ** (0.039) 
Black -0.496 *** (0.187) -0.277 (0.178) 
Hispanic 0.143 (0.167) 0.659 *** (0.159) 
Other (Race) -0.342 (0.221) -0.127 (0.211) 
PID (1=Strong Republican, 
7=Strong Democrat) 
0.206 *** (0.026) 0.303 *** (0.025) 
Catholic 0.003 (0.159) 0.015 (0.151) 
Constant 2.161 0.294 1.310 0.281 
* < 0.10, ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01 
Source: Texas Politics Survey May 2011 
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DISCUSSION 
Some results yielded from the military and college models were expected and 
others were surprising. One important insight gained from this analysis concerns the 
general pattern of support—specifically, the roughly equal size of both, either, and 
neither support groups—that previous surveys could not capture. All previous public 
opinion polling on the DREAM Act queried people about support for a path to citizenship 
for undocumented immigrants in exchange for military service or attending college. The 
regression results show that dichotomizing the dependent variable or asking about the 
“college or military provision” together oversimplifies public attitudes. The May 2011 
Texas Politics Survey design demonstrated the importance of asking specific, separate 
questions. These data show that roughly an equal number of respondents supported both 
(n = 260) and neither provision (n = 276); the remainder supported either provision (n = 
231; 202 of these were military only).107 
The results of the OLS regression on support for the military and college 
provisions led to a closer examination of the race/ethnicity variables. In particular, it is 
interesting that the Black dummy variable is significant and negative for the military 
provision and insignificant in the college model, while the Hispanic dummy is positive 
for the college provision and insignificant in the military model.  
                                                 
107 The models were chosen so that respondents who indicated “don’t know” could be 
included in the analysis by recoding them to the middle of scale (3 on the 5-point scale). A total 
of 5% of respondents indicated “don’t know” on the two provisions—2% on the military 
provision and 3% on the college provision. Further analysis on the “don’t know” respondents 
would be useful. 
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Since the Black, Hispanic, and Race (Other) variables are dummy variables a 
cross tabulation of each race/ethnicity variable by support for the military and college 
provisions was performed. A Pearson’s Chi2 test evaluates whether or not two variables 
are related (statistically significant). This test is appropriate for variables whose values 
are mutually exclusive, as is the case for respondents’ support for the DREAM Act 
provisions and the Race/Ethnicity dummy variables.  
In the OLS regression, the Black dummy variable negatively affected support for 
the military provision but was insignificant in the college model. To better understand 
this relationship, a cross tabulation of the Black dummy variable and Military and 
College provisions was performed (Tables 4.3 and 4.4). The Pearson Chi2 test indicates 
that the Black dummy and the military and college provisions are not significantly related 
in the cross tabulation. 
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Table 4.3: Cross tabulation of Black by Support for the Military Provision108 
  Support for Military Provision  
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Not Black 24% 11% 3% 35% 26% 100% 
Black 2$% 9% 8% 29% 29% 100% 
Total 24% 11% 4% 34% 27% 100% 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 6.3790  Pr = 0.173 
Source: May 2011 Texas Politics Survey 
 
  
                                                 
108 The row percentages for tables 4.3 – 4.6 are rounded for readability. For this reason, the cells may 
not add to 100. The exact row percentages and cell counts for the cross tabulations appear in Appendix C.  
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Table 4.4: Cross tabulation of Black by Support for the College Provision 
 Support for College Provision  
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Not Black 47% 13% 5% 18% 17% 100% 
Black 35% 10% 5% 28% 21% 100% 
Total 45% 12% 5% 19% 18% 100% 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 7.7623   Pr = 0.101 
Source: May 2011 Texas Politics Survey 
 
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 contain the cross tabulation of the Hispanic dummy variable 
and support for the military and college provisions. As in the OLS regression, cross 
tabulation of the Race/Ethnicity variables indicated a statistically significant relationship 
between the Hispanic identifier and support for the college but not the military provision.  
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Table 4.5: Cross tabulation of Hispanic by Support for the Military Provision 
 Support for Military Provision  
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Not Hispanic 26% 11% 4% 35% 25% 100% 
Hispanic 18% 11% 4% 33% 34% 100% 
Total 24% 11% 4% 34% 27% 100% 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 6.9957   Pr = 0.136 
Source: May 2011 Texas Politics Survey 
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Table 4.6: Cross tabulation of Hispanic by Support for the College Provision 
 Support for College Provision  
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Not Hispanic 50% 12% 5% 18% 15% 100% 
Hispanic 23% 16% 6% 26% 30% 100% 
Total 45% 12% 5% 19% 18% 100% 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 37.2132   Pr = 0.000 
Source: May 2011 Texas Politics Survey 
 
 
There were too few respondents who identified as “Other” Race to evaluate the 
relationship between Other and support for the military and college provisions. 
 The other major finding from the OLS regression is that support for both the 
military and college provisions of the DREAM Act are related to party identification. A 
Pearson Chi2 test for statistical significance indicated that (Democratic) party 
identification is related to support for both the military and college provisions.109 While 
this finding is not surprising – indeed this relationship was hypothesized on the basis of 
previous research that found Democratic Party identifiers are more supportive of 
                                                 
109 The cross tabulations of party identification by the military and college provisions are 
contained in Appendix C. 
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increased immigration than Republicans and Independents –it begs the question of 
whether or not party identification can account for attitudes toward immigration 
generally. 
Another variable from the same survey was used to explore whether or not 
support for the college and military provisions is related to other attitudes on 
immigration. This second immigration policy variable, Immigration Approval, is 
constructed from responses to the question, “On the whole, do you think immigration is a 
good thing or a bad thing for this country today?” Of the May 2011 sample of Texas 
registered voters 42% said immigration was a “good thing” and 44% said it was a “bad 
thing,” 14% undecided (Texas Politics Survey 2011). Immigration Approval is too highly 
correlated with party identification to be included as a separate independent variable in 
the OLS regression on support for the military and college provisions, however it does 
provide a second reference point for exploring the contours of support for the military 
and college provisions of the DREAM Act.110  
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the cross tabulations of Support for the Military and 
College Provisions by Immigration Approval.111 The Pearson’s Chi2 test indicates that 
Immigration Approval is related to support for both provisions. The value of Chi2 
                                                 
110 Descriptive statistics for this question, Immigration Approval, and the cross tabulation of 
the 7 point Party Identification by Immigration Approval are located in Appendix C. The 
immigration approval question was asked after the DREAM Act questions. 
111 The cross tabulations presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 contain the original variable for 
Immigration Approval by Support for the Military and College Provisions. Appendix C also 
contains the cross tabulations for the Immigration Approval variable with the “Don’t Know” 
responses recoded as missing. The recoded Immigration Approval variable is related to support 
for the Military and College provisions, although the value of Chi2 is lower (for both). 
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suggests that a view of immigration as a “good thing” has a larger effect on support for 
the college than on support for the military provision (Immigration Approval by College 
Provision Chi2=203.1070 versus by Military Provision Chi2=132.6894). 
 
 
Table 4.7: Cross tabulation of Immigration Approval by Support for the Military 
Provision 
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Good Thing 13% 10.% 2% 35% 39% 100% 
Bad Thing 38% 11% 2% 33% 15% 100% 
Don’t Know 1% 10% 17% 35% 24% 100% 
Total 24% 11% 4% 34% 27% 100% 
Pearson Chi2=132.6894   Pr= 0.000 
Source: May 2011 Texas Politics Survey 
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Table 4.8: Cross tabulation of Immigration Approval by Support for the College 
Provision 
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Good Thing 26% 14% 4% 22% 34% 100% 
Bad Thing 68% 10% 3% 14% 4% 100% 
Don’t Know 32% 15% 16% 28% 9% 100% 
Total 45% 12% 5% 19% 18% 100% 
Pearson Chi2=203.1070   Pr= 0.000 
Source: May 2011 Texas Politics Survey 
 
 
The cross tabulations of the Immigration Approval variable indicate that support for the 
military and college provisions of the DREAM Act is related to other immigration 
attitudes. The effect of a positive view of immigration is more strongly related to support 
for the college than the military provision. These data may support the idea that jus 
meritum is distinct from immigration policy proposals in the eyes of the public. At a 
minimum, we can say that there is greater support for the military than the college 
provision of the proposed DREAM Act and that public support for these provisions, like 
other immigration proposals, is strongly correlated with party identification. 
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SUMMARY 
 The public’s greater support for the military compared to the college provision of 
the DREAM Act is the most important finding of this analysis. This reveals that the 
college and military options are not equivalent in the eyes of the public. Although more 
data are needed to confirm these findings, the observed gap suggests that there is 
something distinctive about military service. One explanation could be that the public is 
knowledgeable about the history of alien military enlistment and naturalization, which 
was discussed in chapter two; however, this is unlikely given the dearth of scholarship 
about the practice, and the absence of jus meritum from the citizenship and nationality 
literature. Nevertheless, the public’s support for the military provision may reflect the 
more general importance of the citizen-soldier tradition in the United States, which is 
well documented in the civil-military relations literature. The next chapter considers the 
implications of the DREAM Act poll findings for the larger study of jus meritum. 
The OLS regression on the May 2011 Texas Politics Survey data suggests that 
Blacks are less supportive of the military provision of the DREAM Act than the average 
(non-Black) respondent and Hispanics are more supportive of the college provision than 
the average (non-Hispanic) respondent. While Hispanic support for the college provision 
can be accounted for as the perception of the DREAM Act as college for 
Hispanic/Latinos, it is not clear why this population would oppose the military provision. 
It is also worth remembering that Hispanic/Latino identity has not been shown to 
systematically affect attitudes toward immigration in previous studies. Similarly, it is not 
clear why Black respondents would oppose the military provision. An extension of the 
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economic competition model might explain this pattern if respondents thought that 
allowing undocumented minors to enlist in the military would reduce opportunities for 
potential Black enlistees – although, as previously discussed, the military is not generally 
regarded as difficult to enter. The data analyzed here are unable to confirm these 
hypotheses. Further research and data are needed to understand variation in support by 
race and ethnicity. Specifically, data from a representative national sample would provide 
a useful point of comparison. Such additional polling data could confirm the overall 
disparity in support for the military and college provisions of the DREAM Act and the 
variation by race and ethnicity in support for the provisions captured in the May 2011 
Texas sample analyzed above. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion 
 
OVERVIEW 
This dissertation examined the practice of granting citizenship in exchange for 
military service. As I have discussed throughout these pages, the general process is quite 
simple: political incorporation is the secondary consequence of “casting a wide net” for 
mobilizing resources during crisis periods (Sparrow 1996). The state’s immigration and 
naturalization regime is liberalized to meet the demands of the crisis and, despite efforts 
to restore a more restrictive regime during peacetime, veterans often use the great 
rhetorical power of military service to convert their wartime contribution to political 
gains (Krebs 2006). Since the Civil War every Congress has made provisions for military 
naturalization either during or after periods of armed conflict. The intervention of 
Congress in ensuring the acquisition of citizenship for military personnel and veterans 
stands in stark contrast to the federal government’s general deference to the authority of 
states in determining residency and citizenship qualifications. 
Before discussing the implications of this study for the literature, two 
observations from the policy analysis chapters bear repeating. First, prior to the Civil 
War, citizenship substantially meant state citizenship. Some scholars even define the 
Civil War as America’s Second Founding because the idea of national citizenship came 
into being during the 1861–1865 war and the period of Reconstruction that followed 
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(Ackerman 1998). For much of American history, naturalization was decentralized and 
largely governed by the states. The concept of US citizenship is coincident with the Civil 
War military naturalization statutes. Indeed, the proto-citizen-soldier is so central to the 
concept of US citizen that the federal agency charged with drafting a uniform Oath of 
Citizenship for the United States in the 1920s borrowed language from Military Oaths of 
Enlistment.112  
The second observation from the historical data presented in Chapter Two is that 
the policy of granting citizenship for service appears across different eras of American 
political development. There are striking similarities among the military naturalization 
statutes from the Civil War through the post-9/11 period. On the basis of these historical 
data alone, one might reasonably infer that the principle of jus meritum is a foundational 
principle for political membership in the United States. Jus meritum is best understood as 
a subset of naturalized citizenship acquired through military service rather than residency. 
However, this dissertation goes beyond theoretical and historical policy analysis 
to examine contemporary polling data in order demonstrate the public’s continued 
support for jus meritum. The statistical analysis of the DREAM Act polling data 
presented in Chapter Four buttresses the argument that the policy of granting citizenship 
in exchange for military service has strong support even when the public remains divided 
on immigration policy in general and even among publics that are considered most 
hostile to increasing opportunities for newcomers.   
                                                 
112 The Military Oaths of Enlistment and the US Citizenship Oath can be found in appendices A and 
B, respectively. 
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This chapter discusses this study’s findings for theories of citizenship, the politics 
of immigration and immigrants’ rights, and civil-military relations in the United States. It 
concludes by identifying some areas for future research. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF CITIZENSHIP AND CITIZENSHIP POLICY 
This study’s most important claim regarding theories of citizenship is that the 
traditional principles of political membership based on parentage and place of birth do 
not represent the full scope of citizenship policy in the United States. Especially in regard 
to the subset of naturalized citizenship, jus meritum is an essential element of how 
newcomers come to be recognized as equal members of the political community. Jus 
meritum, as a mode of political incorporation, also plays a central role in state-building. 
Chapter Two articulated this argument using historical data that show how, at critical 
moments, the government of the United States has made special provisions for the 
incorporation of foreigners willing to further its military interests. 
The argument that political membership based on accident of birth is in some 
ways inconsistent with American identity can also be made on theoretical grounds. There 
is no consent, right of conscience, or individual choice when membership is assigned at 
birth. Jus meritum’s emphasis on individual choice is at odds with the European 
principles of jus soli and jus sanguinis, which place the sovereign or state at the center of 
analysis. In this sense, the principle of jus meritum might be described as the most 
American of the principles used to determine membership in a political community.113 
                                                 
113 Elizabeth Cohen (2009) introduced the concept of jus tempus, which is similarly liberal in that it 
places more weight on events after birth and choices in adulthood to determine allegiance and political 
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Political theorists, among others, are interested in how and why different concepts 
of membership and modes of incorporation resonate more strongly in some civic cultures 
than in others. Contemporary public support for US political incorporation through 
military service may be due to popular knowledge of the military path as a historical path 
to citizenship. The polling data analyzed in the previous chapter are unable to tell us why 
people are generally more supportive of the military than the college provision of the 
DREAM Act. Some might argue that the practice of alien enlistment has not been 
sufficiently examined by the public. However, the Civil War, WWI, and WWII draft 
statutes examined in Chapter Two suggest that civilian and military leaders, as well as the 
public, were aware of the potential and actual contributions of alien residents to the 
national war effort. A preponderance of evidence suggests that Congress intentionally 
included aliens in both the population of draft-eligible persons and those eligible to enlist 
as volunteers when not conscripted. The incorporation of aliens through military service 
is an intentional, long-standing feature of American citizenship policy.  
Conceptualizing jus meritum as an independent path to political inclusion 
alongside the principles of parentage and place of birth does more than get the historical 
story right. Persons that acquire citizenship through military service have been the subset 
of naturalized citizens most welcomed by the native-born population. It may be that 
                                                                                                                                                 
membership. For example, in determining whether an individual’s claim to membership in the Early 
Republic should be recognized, jus tempus asks if a person remained in the States throughout the 
Revolutionary war and whether he resided in the territory before and after the ratification of the 
Constitution. Jus meritum, on the other hand, interprets an individual’s action as a demonstration of 
allegiance; i.e., did this person join the Continental Army or aid the British? Jus tempus and jus meritum 
place a greater weight on individual behavior, especially in adulthood, than on circumstances of birth. 
While both jus meritum and jus tempus recognize individual choice, the principle of jus tempus is more 
consistent with contemporary theories of liberalism that emphasize private behavior over public 
responsibilities. 
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military service is easily identified as a contribution to the community, whereas civilian 
contributions are more difficult to conceptualize. It should be noted, however, that 
citizenship and inclusion of alien soldiers is a secondary consequence of enlisting all 
available persons during wartime. The military service of aliens and racial/ethnic 
minorities helped erode ascriptive (racial and ethnic) restrictions on citizenship but this 
adjustment was an unintended effect of national policy during a crisis period. 
Through what Ronald Krebs (2006) describes as “rhetorical coercion,” racial and 
ethnic minorities effectively leveraged their veteran status to push for political and social 
equality.114 The study of these processes and their effects broadens our understanding of 
American political development by showing how history is more than just the backdrop. 
This history provides the template for newcomers to challenge the status quo. However, 
this history alone does not explain why the practice persists. For example, there are other 
aspects of the history of immigration and patterns of assimilation in the United States, 
such as active efforts to restrict immigration to Northern European, English-speaking, 
and Protestant peoples that were eventually rejected as un-American (Smith 1997). The 
more compelling question is why the practice of alien enlistment and naturalization 
continues whereas other practices were successively rejected.115  
                                                 
114 Krebs’ (2006) mechanism of “rhetorical coercion” is focused on the effect of alien military service 
on the public at large, similar to what Parker (2009) describes with regard to African-American citizen 
veterans of WWII, their wives and widows. In contrast, Mettler’s (2002, 2005) study of this same 
population focuses on how military service and veteran status (particularly their participation in the GI Bill 
program) affected the political expectations of these former service members. While Krebs (2006) and 
Parker (2009) focus on how the fact of minority military service was used to change the minds of the 
dominant community, Mettler (2002, 2005) examines how these experiences affected the veterans 
themselves. 
115 Political scientists writing in the mid-twentieth century looked over the course of American 
political history- the lifting of property restrictions on suffrage eligibility following the war of 1812, the 
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Alien military naturalization takes on special importance in the United States 
given that it is a nation of immigrants that is defined by adherence to certain principles 
rather than to a shared racial and ethnic history. The rhetorical value of military service is 
heightened by a civic culture committed to liberalism. Incorporation through military 
service is neither liberal nor necessarily exclusionist, although the history of military 
enlistment regulation is littered with racial and ethnic restrictions.  
The naturalization of alien soldiers is an example of an inclusive, civic republican 
strand of American identity that Rogers Smith (1997), in his discussion Civic Ideals, 
leaves room for but does not identify. Similarly, in her seminal work on American 
citizenship, Judith Shklar (1991) cites the “overt rejection of hereditary privileges,” 
specifically through the abolition of chattel slavery, as pivotal to the realization of 
political equality in the United States (1). Noncitizen military service has important 
implications for how we think about American citizenship, which has long been 
identified with individualism, merit, and classical liberalism.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF IMMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS 
This dissertation makes two important contributions to the study of immigration 
politics: it critiques the dominant theories of immigration according to scholars of 
American political development and challenges conventional wisdom on the factors that 
structure opinion toward immigrants and immigration in the public opinion literature. 
                                                                                                                                                 
rejection of commutation and substitution for conscripted citizens after the Civil War, the removal of 
sex/gender as a voting requirement in the early twentieth century, and the lifting of racial and ethnic 
prerequisites for immigration and citizenship following WWII—and characterized American political 
development as the gradual unfolding or application of liberal principles. Louis Hartz (1955) identified 
what became known as the liberal consensus.  
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First, the dominant theories of immigration in the United States are only complete 
if they include jus meritum as an avenue of political incorporation. For example, as 
discussed in Chapters Two and Three, Tichenor’s (2002) analysis of the forces that 
sustain immigration policy regimes omits important work by Salyer (2004), Ngai (2004), 
and others. Specifically, Tichenor’s neat typology does not account for the American 
Legion’s public support for granting citizenship to Asian veterans of WWI while 
remaining opposed to the expansion of immigration and immigrants’ rights generally. 
Lucy Salyer (2004) aptly describes the citizenship granted to Asian veterans of WWI as 
“nominal” (851). The temporary nature of these gains may be why the story of Asian 
veterans of WWI is not as widely known as that of their WWII counterparts.  
It may also be that political scientists look for change across policy domains. For 
example, although Asian veterans were successful in obtaining citizenship through a 
separate act of Congress in 1935, it was not until 1952 that Congress lifted the racial and 
ethnic restrictions for nonmilitary petitioners (INA 1952; Nye-Lea Act of 1935). Klinkner 
and Smith (1999) explain that the public only recognized the contributions of 
marginalized groups during WWII in hindsight, during the civil rights era.116 Looking 
across policy domains, we see that veterans are typically the first group to extract some 
political, social, economic, or civil right from the government of the United States. 
Similar developments are observed in the post-9/11 period. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, service members that enlisted without being properly admitted to the US, 
                                                 
116 Rogers Smith (1997) cites “three great eras of democratizing American civic reforms: the 
Revolution and Confederation years, the Civil War and Reconstruction epoch, and the civil rights era of the 
1950s and 1960s” (16). 
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i.e. undocumented aliens, were nevertheless granted citizenship on the basis of their post-
9/11 military service.  
The statistical analysis of public support for the military versus college provisions 
of the DREAM Act support the idea that military service is exceptional. These data show 
that 59% support the military provision of the DREAM Act (37% oppose, 5% don’t 
know) whereas only 36% support the college provision (58% oppose, 6% don’t know). 
The analysis presented in Chapter Four challenges the economic and cultural 
explanations for public perceptions of immigration and the development of immigration 
policy in the United States. The DREAM Act data show exceptions to the economic-
centered theories of attitude formation toward immigration policy when the immigrant 
volunteers for military service. At a minimum, these data support the use of separate 
questions on the DREAM Act provisions if pollsters want to accurately capture public 
opinion. Further study and polling data are needed to assess the importance of this 
hypothesis for immigration policy, especially with regard to the variation by the 
respondent’s racial and ethnic identification. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 This dissertation makes two important contributions to the literature on civil-
military relations in the United States. First, this study confirms the work of Cohen 
(1985), Krebs (2006), and Janowitz (1976), among others that identifies a link between 
military service and citizenship in the United States. The study of alien military service 
and naturalization contributes to the literature on the military as a political institution. 
Chapter One explored this connection. The Immigration and Naturalization Service’s 
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appropriation of clauses from military enlistment oaths to compose a uniform oath of 
citizenship in the 1920s further substantiates this claim. Political theorists and civil-
military relations scholars have shown the efficacy of political incorporation through 
military service (Janowitz 1976; Krebs 2006). Moreover, the work of comparative 
theorists and scholars of civil-military relations have established that this route is, 
historically speaking, nearly universal (Krebs 2006).  
The second contribution of this dissertation to the literature on civil-military 
relations is more interesting. While confirming the analytical usefulness of the concept of 
a citizen-soldier tradition in the United States—of which alien military service is a 
critical feature—this study challenges conventional wisdom that the status or health of 
this tradition has suffered as the result of the introduction of the all-volunteer force in 
1973. The need for mass armies is what led to the enlistment of aliens. The historical 
policy analysis in Chapter Two shows how a decentralized union of states reluctantly 
imposed a draft during the Civil War and encouraged the enlistment of the foreign born 
as military replacements for upper-class American citizens. However, in the 1910s, the 
public rejected the unegalitarian policies of substitution and commutation. Significantly 
the practices of substitution and commutation were not included in the WWI era draft 
law. In addition, the political consequences of the military demands of WWI led 
Congress to change the principle for determining draft liability from citizenship to 
residency. The transformation of the institution of citizenship as these veterans pressed 
for recognition for their service is an unintended consequence of the state mobilizing all 
available resources during a crisis period. 
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In short, the policy history of jus meritum challenges the conventional wisdom 
that the end of mass armies—usually marked by the introduction of the all-volunteer 
force in 1973—has severed the link between military service and citizenship. Incredibly, 
the end of the draft and the introduction of the all-volunteer force appears to have had no 
impact on aliens’ draft liability and eligibility to enlist as volunteers. Given the 
magnitude of these changes and the importance of the citizen-soldier tradition for civil-
military relations, it is reasonable to expect that the end of the draft in 1972 and the 
introduction of the all-volunteer force the following year would likewise be a critical 
juncture.  
Yet, surprisingly, these events had no impact on aliens’ draft liability or eligibility 
to serve as volunteers in the armed forces of the United States. No evidence indicates that 
Congress or the public wanted to limit volunteer enlistment to citizens (Jacobs and Hayes 
1981). The shift from a conscript to all-volunteer force had no effect on alien military 
service obligations or opportunities. Given the substantial literature on the consequences 
of this change for civil-military relations in the United States, the nonimpact of the end of 
the draft on alien military service is most surprising. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The foregoing analysis of alien military enlistment and naturalization statutes 
from the Civil War to the post-9/11 period suggests that the path to citizenship through 
military service remains open to resident aliens. The polling data examined in Chapter 
Four imply that jus meritum as a principle for inclusion remains strong despite the 
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public’s split attitude toward immigration policy in general. As such, this section 
discusses a number of avenues for future research. 
First, reflecting on the history of US citizenship policy, Rogers Smith (1997) 
argues that most modern liberal democratic theories “falter because they remain oblivious 
to the political imperatives that have structured U.S. civic identity and nation-building 
more broadly” (472). Better understanding of why the public supports alien incorporation 
through military service may lead policymakers to craft immigration and citizenship 
policies that strengthen and unify the community. Indeed, there may be other forms of 
national service that qualify as jus meritum, a possibility other scholars have discussed 
(see Wong and Cho 2006). 
In fact, public perception of what qualifies as national service may have already 
shifted. A national study of youth perceptions conducted annually by the US government 
and published in 2003 identified several problems for military recruitment (Sackett and 
Mavor 2003). Until the mid-1990s high school seniors agreed that joining the military 
was doing “something important for the country” (Sackett and Mavor 2003, 214). 
Coincident with the end of the Cold War, however, “there has a been a gradual erosion of 
this belief to the point at which more people now feel that they will be doing something 
for their country in a civilian job than in the military” (Sackett and Mavor 2003, 214).117 
                                                 
117 Sackett and Mavor (2003) write: More specifically, the net percentage attributing “doing something 
for the country” to the military rather than civilian jobs (i.e., the percentage attribution to the military minus 
the percentage attribution to civilian jobs) declined from 37 percent in 1992 to -5 percent in 1999 for men 
and from 39 percent in 1992 to -17 percent in 1999 for women…. Indeed, what is most startling about our 
analysis of the YATS data is that they clearly show a steady loss of a number of valued attributes to civilian 
occupations. That is, there has been a consistent erosion in the likelihood that many of these values are 
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While this development poses problems for military recruiters, it may also point to the 
feasibility to realizing jus meritum in the post-9/11 period through a variety of activities. 
In sum, the shift in youth attitudes from military to civilian occupations as “doing 
something important for the country” does not pose challenges for the idea of national 
service—broadly conceived. Currently there are proposals to forgive or commute student 
loan debt for young people willing to commit a number of years to national or 
community service. The US government already forgives the student loans of persons 
that enlist in the military. The loan forgiveness program operates like a reverse-GI Bill. 
Such a program could be expanded to include other forms of national service. 
Second, since WWII the principle of jus meritum has been applied in novel ways 
to meet emerging national security needs. While these readings solve immediate practical 
problems, some of the applications raise theoretical and constitutional concerns; for 
example, honorary and posthumous citizens never exercise the rights of citizenship and 
cannot participate in the political process. These new applications of jus meritum are 
distinct from the historical experience of political incorporation through military service 
examined here. 
Finally, given the historical and current importance of military service, the 
concern among civil-military relations scholars such as Morris Janowitz (1976), Elliot 
Cohen (2001), and others, about the consequences of exempting the majority of citizens 
from military service is germane for students of American politics. It behooves scholars 
                                                                                                                                                 
more likely to be obtained from the military and a corresponding increase in the likelihood that they will be 
obtained from a civilian job or equally in both (214–215). 
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to watch how the Congress, president, and American public generally, acknowledge the 
sacrifice of alien service members in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, the 
place of undocumented soldiers and veterans raises important issues about balancing 
rights and obligations. The history of jus meritum suggests that the institution of 
citizenship can be reworked to meet these obligations when the public demands. 
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Appendix A: US Military Enlistment Oaths 
 
The rules governing military forces, including the oaths of enlistment and 
commission, are written and passed by Congress.  The oath of enlistment established by 
the First Congress has changed only once, in 1950, from 1789 to the present. The oath for 
commissioned officers has undergone multiple revisions in 1830, 1862, and 1884, until it 
appeared in its present form in 1959. 
 
1775 Oath of Enlistment 
For enlisted soldiers in 1775 the Second Continental Congress established the 
following oath as part of the act creating the Continental Army. 
 
I ___ have, this day, voluntarily enlisted myself, as a soldier, in the American 
continental army, for one year, unless sooner discharged: And I do bind myself to 
conform, in all instances, to such rules and regulations, as are, or shall be, 
established for the government of the said Army.  
 
The 1775 oath reinforces the individual’s voluntary, contractual enlistment into “the 
American continental army”. It specifies the contract period of one year. The oath-taker 
“binds himself” to the rules that “are, or shall be, established for the government of the 
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said Army”, a reference to the “69 Articles of War” enacted by the Continental Congress 
roughly two weeks after the creation of the Army.118 
1776 Oath of Enlistment 
The original wording was effectively replaced by Section 3, Article 1, of the 
Articles of War approved by the Continental Congress.119 
 
I ___ swear (or affirm as the case may be) to be trued to the United States of 
America, and to serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies 
opposers whatsoever; and to observe and obey the orders of the Continental 
Congress, and the orders of the Generals and officers set over me by them. 
 
The 1776 oath swears or affirms allegiance to “the United States of America”- plural- to 
serve “them” faithfully, against all “their” enemies or opposers “whatsoever”. The oath-
taker swears to obey “the orders of the Continental Congress, and the orders of the 
Generals and officers set over me by them”. It is unclear whether the “them” refers to the 
Generals or to the Congress.  It is unclear why both “enemies” and “opposers” are 
included. 
Also in 1776, the Continental Congress enacted the following for military officers 
and civilian national officers.120 
 
                                                 
118 The Second Continental Congress created the Army on June 14, 1775 and adopted the Articles of 
War on June 30, 1775. 
119 This Oath was enacted by the Continental Congress September 20, 1776. 
120 October 21, 1776. 
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I ___, do acknowledge the Thirteen United States of America, namely, New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, independent, and sovereign states, and declare, 
that the people thereof owe no allegiance or obedience to George the third, king 
of Great Britain; and I renounce, refuse and abjure any allegiance or obedience to 
him; and I do swear that I will, to the utmost of my power, support, maintain, and 
defend the said United States against the said king, George the third, and his heirs 
and successors, and his and their abettors, assistants and adherents; and will serve 
the said United States in the office of ___, which I now hold, and in any other 
office which I may hereafter hold by their appointment, or under their authority, 
with fidelity and honour, and according to the best of my skill and understanding. 
So help me God. 
 
The 1776 oath for officers, like the enlisted oath, refers to these (plural) United States, 
“their” authority and offices.  The officer oath it is more specific politically. In the first 
part, the oath-taker “acknowledges” that the thirteen states, each of which it names, are 
“free, independent, and sovereign states” and that “the people thereof owe no allegiance 
or obedience to George the third”. In the second part, the oath-taker personally renounces 
any allegiance to King George, his heirs, and successors.  Finally, the oath-taker pledges 
to “serve said United States in the office of ___”. Unlike the oath of enlistment that 
swears allegiance to “the United States of America” and pledges to obey the orders of the 
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officers appointed by the Continental Congress, the officer oath does not mention the 
Congress or any government other than the independent states, although it does refer to 
the office (of the United States) to which he is appointed. “So help me God” appears.  
 
1778 Oath of Enlistment (Officers only) 
The Continental Congress passed a revised version for officers, voted 3 February 
1778 reads: 
 
I, ___ do acknowledge the United States of America to be free, independent and 
sovereign states, and declare that the people thereof owe no allegiance or 
obedience, to George the third, king of Great Britain; and I renounce, refuse and 
abjure any allegiance or obedience to him: and I do swear (or affirm) that I will, 
to the utmost of my power, support, maintain and defend the said United States, 
against the said king George the third and his heirs and successors, and his and 
their abettors, assistants and adherents, and will serve the said United States in the 
office of ___ which I now hold, with fidelity, according to the best of my skill and 
understanding. So help me God.   
 
The 1778 oath for officers is shorter (because each of the states is not listed) but 
communicates the same substance as the 1776 oath. In the first part, the individual states 
are not listed. The second and third parts, renunciation and allegiance, respectively, 
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remain unchanged. Again, neither the Congress nor any other government of the United 
States of America is mentioned. 
 
1789 Oath of Enlistment 
The First Congress passed a new oath for all commissioned, non-commissioned 
officers and privates on September 29, 1789.121   
 
I, ___, do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case may be) that I will support the 
constitution of the United States.  I, ___, do solemnly swear or affirm (as the case 
may be) to bear true allegiance to the United States of America, and to serve them 
honestly and faithfully, against all their enemies or opposers whatsoever, and to 
observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States of America, and 
the orders of the officers appointed over me. [underline mine] 
 
The oath-taker now swears or affirms to “support the constitution of the United States”. 
There is no renunciation, reflecting the fact that the war for Independence has been won. 
Allegiance to “the United States of America”-plural- is pledged. The oath-taker swears or 
affirms to “serve them honestly…against all their enemies or opposers, whatsoever”. 
Finally, the oath-taker promises to “observe and obey the order of the President of the 
United States of America, and the order of the officers appointed over me”. Swearing to 
                                                 
121 Section 3, Chapter 25, 1st Congress, approved September 29, 1789.  This statute also specified that 
"the said troops shall be governed by the rules and articles of war, which have been established by the 
United States in Congress assembled, or by such rules and articles of war as may hereafter by law be 
established." 
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obey the “officers appointed over me” is standard for enlisted oaths (is found in both the 
1775 and 1776 enlistment oaths) but is now extended to officers. All oath-takers swear to 
“observe and obey the orders of the President”, reflecting the Second Article of the 
Constitution. 
 
1830 Oath of Enlistment 
The oath of enlistment remained unchanged until 1950. For officers however, 
there were several changes in the interim. A change in about 1830 reads: 
 
I, ___, appointed a ___ in the Army of the United States, do solemnly swear, or 
affirm, that I will bear true allegiance to the United States of America, and that I 
will serve them honestly and faithfully against all their enemies or opposers 
whatsoever, and observe and obey the orders of the President of the United States, 
and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to the rules and 
articles for the government of the Armies of the United States. 
 
This 1830 oath returns to the tradition of specifying the office (rank) to which the oath-
taker is appointed. Like the 1789 version, there is no renunciation. The individual swears 
or affirms allegiance to the United States of America (plural) and to obey the orders of 
the President, the officers appointed over him, and the “rules and articles for the 
government of the Armies of the United States”. The last line refers to Congress’ 
constitutional power to “make rules for the government and regulation of the land and 
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naval forces”. Its appearance here may reflect the importance of the “101 Articles of 
War” enacted by Congress on April 10, 1806.  
 
1862 Oath of Enlistment (Officers only) 
On July 2, 1862 Congress changed the officer oath to read: 
 
I, ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never borne arms against the 
United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no 
aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed 
hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise 
the functions of any office whatsoever under any authority or pretended authority 
in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded voluntary support to any 
pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the United States, 
hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of 
my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the 
United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith 
and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental 
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the 
duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God. [underline 
mine] 
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This 1862 oath contains a new renunciation: the oath-taker swears or affirms his 
continued allegiance to the United States since he has been a citizen, renouncing any 
“pretended government, authority, power, or constitution within the United States, hostile 
or inimical thereto”. The second part pledges to “support and defend the Constitution of 
the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic”.  The specification of 
enemies, “foreign and domestic” is an obvious reference to Southern succession. Finally, 
the individual declares that he “take[s] this obligation freely, without any mental 
reservation or purpose of evasion”. This oath emphasizes the singular nature of political 
allegiance and the individual’s voluntary entrance into the Army of the United States.  
 
1884 Oath of Enlistment 
On May 13, 1884 Congress reverted to a simpler formulation: 
 
I, ___, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I 
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, 
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and 
faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help 
me God. [underline mine] 
 
The 1884 officer oath contains much of the text that appears in the contemporary oath. It 
pledges to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States”; the distinction 
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between “foreign and domestic” enemies remains. The individual pledges allegiance to 
the United States and acknowledges the voluntary nature of his commission. This version 
remained in effect until slightly modified in 1959, when Congress adopted of the present 
wording.122 
 
I, ___, having been appointed an officer in the Army of the United States, as 
indicated above in the grade of ___ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, 
foreign or domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I 
take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; 
and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I 
am about to enter; So help me God. 
 
1959 Oath of Enlistment 
The 1959 version is nearly identical to the 1884 oath. There is no renunciation. 
The 1959 version specifies the individual’s appointment to grade (rank), observed in the 
1830 version. It should also be noted that the provision to obey the orders of the President 
of the United States and officers appointed above them last appeared in the 1830 version; 
it did not appear in the 1862 or 1884 officer oaths. 
 
 
                                                 
122 DA Form 71, 1 August 1959 (officers only). 
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1960 Oath of Enlistment 
For enlisted soldiers, the 1789 oath remained in effect until 1960 when Congress 
adopted the oath administered today.123 
 
I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I 
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of 
the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over 
me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help 
me God. [underline mine] 
 
The 1960 oath of enlistment identifies the Constitution of the United States as the object 
of allegiance, vowing to support and defend it “against all enemies foreign and 
domestic”. The enlistee pledges to obey the orders of the President of the United States 
and senior officers according to “regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice”, 
effective May 31, 1951. 
  
                                                 
123 On May 5, 1960 Congress amended 10 USC to replace the wording first adopted in 1789; effective 
date October 5, 1962. 
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Appendix B: US Citizenship Oath 
 
The United States did not have a standardized oath of citizenship for the 
naturalization of aliens until 1929. The United States Oath of Citizenship (or, of 
Renunciation and Allegiance) remains in use today: 
 
I hereby declare, on oath / or solemnly affirm, 
that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any 
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have 
heretofore been a subject or citizen;124 
that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of 
America against all enemies, foreign and domestic;125 
that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same;126 
that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law;  
that I will perform noncombatant service in the armed forces of the United States 
when required by the law;  
that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when 
required by the law;127 
                                                 
124 Parts of this clause appear as early as the 1776 Oath of Enlistment and the 1778 Oath for Officers. 
125 From the military oath of enlistment (renunciation of foreign allegiance and pledge of allegiance to 
the United States) that was dropped by the First Congress. 
126 This language first appeared in the 1830 Oath of Enlistment.  
127 This clause and the previous only appears in the Citizenship Oath. 
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and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of 
evasion; so help me God.128 
  
                                                 
128 This clause first appeared in the 1862 Oath of Enlistment. 
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Appendix C: DREAM Act Polling Data 
 
The Texas Politics Survey from May 2011 is available on the Texas Politics 
Project website (http://texaspolitics.laits.utexas.edu). It is the only nonpartisan survey of 
Texas public opinion conducted by YouGov/Polimetrix using web-based survey 
technology (matched on gender, age, race, education, PID, ideology, political interest); 
poststratification weights are based on the 2008 Current Population Survey (N = 800, 
registered voters). Below are the descriptive statistics for the variables analyzed in 
chapter 4. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is support for the DREAM Act provisions. These 
questions were added to the survey at the author’s request. The DV is measured on a five 
point scales so that 1=strongly oppose and 5=strongly support; “don’t know” were 
recoded as 3 or the middle of the scale). The DV is based on responses to the following. 
Q31. Please indicate your opinion on the following immigration proposals. 
[Randomize a-b]  
1 = Strongly Oppose 
2 = Somewhat Oppose   
3= Somewhat Support 
4 = Somewhat Support 
5 = Don’t Know 
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Q31a. Passing a law that would allow illegal immigrants brought to the U.S. as 
children to gain legal resident status if they join the military. 
Q31b. Passing a law that would allow illegal immigrants brought to the U.S. as 
children to gain legal resident status if they go to college. 
 
Support for the Military and College Provisions of the DREAM Act 
 Military 
(n=797) 
College 
(n=798) 
 
Strongly support 25% 16%  
Somewhat support 34% 20%  
Somewhat oppose 12% 13%  
Strongly oppose 25% 45%  
Don’t know 5% 6%  
Source: May 2011 Texas Politics Survey  
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Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables included in the OLS regression  
Age       
18-29 16%      
30-44   27%      
45-64 41%      
65+ 16%      
 
Gender       
Male 47%      
Female 53%      
Race/Ethnicity       
White 63%      
African-American 12%      
Hispanic or Latino 18%      
Other * 7%      
* includes Asian/Pacific Islander, Native American, and Mixed 
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Education     
Some high school 2.5%     
High school degree 22.8%     
Some college  34.4%     
2 year college degree 10.1%     
4 year college degree 22.5%     
Post-grad degree 7.6%     
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Religion [no open response on “other”]    
Agnostic 5% Methodist* 5% 
Assembly of God* 2% Mormon* 1% 
Atheist 4% Muslim/Islam 0% 
Baptist* 20% Nondenom. Christian* 9% 
Buddhist 1% Orthodox/Eastern Orth.* 0% 
Catholic* 16% Pentecostal*   2% 
Christian Scientist* 4% Presbyterian*   2% 
Church of Christ* 4% Protestant (non-specific)* 4% 
Church of God* 1% Reformed* 0% 
Disciples of Christ* 1% Unitarian/Universalist* 0% 
Episcopal/Anglican* 2% United Church of Christ* 0% 
Hindu   0% Spiritual but not religious 9% 
Jehovah’s Witnesses 0% Other* 7% 
Jewish  1% Don’t know 2% 
Lutheran* 2%    
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Party Identification      
“Generally speaking, would you say that you usually think of yourself as a…” 
(Including four PID follow-up questions) 
Strong Democrat 21.2%   
Not very strong Democrat 10.9%   
Lean Democrat 6.5%   
Independent 10.8%   
Lean Republican 15.6%   
Not very strong Republican 8.3%   
Strong Republican 26.7%   
Other 2%   
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Cross tabulation of Black by Support for the Military Provision 
  Support for Military Provision  
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Not 
Black 
24.39% 
n=171 
10.84% 
n=76 
3.42% 
n=24 
35.09% 
n=246 
26.25% 
n=184 
100.00% 
n=701 
Black 23.96% 
n=23 
9.38% 
n=9 
8.33% 
n=8 
29.17% 
n=28 
29.17% 
n=28 
100.00% 
n=96 
Total 24.34% 
n=194 
10.66% 
n=85 
4.02% 
n=32 
34.38% 
n=274 
26.60% 
n=212 
100.00% 
n=797 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 6.3790  Pr = 0.173 
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Cross tabulation of Black by Support for the College Provision 
 Support for College Provision  
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Not 
Black 
46.87% 
n=329 
12.68% 
n=89 
4.99% 
n=35 
18.09% 
n=127 
17.38% 
n=122 
100.00% 
n=702 
Black 35.42% 
n=34 
10.42% 
n=10 
5.21% 
n=5 
28.13% 
n=27 
20.83% 
n=20 
100.00% 
n=96 
Total 45.49% 
n=363 
12.41% 
n=99 
5.01% 
n=40 
19.30% 
n=154 
17.79% 
n=142 
100.00% 
n=798 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 7.7623   Pr = 0.101 
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Cross tabulation of Hispanic by Support for the Military Provision 
 Support for Military Provision  
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Not 
Hispanic 
25.72% 
n=169 
10.5% 
n=69 
4.11% 
n=27 
34.70% 
n=228 
24.96% 
n=164 
100.00% 
n=657 
Hispanic 17.86% 
n=25 
11.43% 
n=16 
3.57% 
n=5 
32.86% 
n=46 
34.29% 
n=48 
100.00% 
n=140 
Total 24.34% 
n=194 
10.66% 
n=85 
4.02% 
n=32 
34.38% 
n=274 
26.60% 
n=212 
100.00% 
n=797 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 6.9957   Pr = 0.136 
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Cross tabulation of Hispanic by Support for the College Provision 
  Support for College Provision  
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Not 
Hispanic 
50.23% 
n=330 
11.72% 
n=77 
4.87% 
n=32 
17.96% 
n=118 
15.22% 
n=100 
100.00% 
n=657 
Hispanic 23.40% 
n=33 
15.60% 
n=22 
5.67% 
n=8 
25.53% 
n=36 
29.79% 
n=42 
100.00% 
n=141 
Total 45.49% 
n=363 
12.41% 
n=99 
5.01% 
n=40 
19.30% 
n=154 
17.79% 
n=142 
100.00% 
n=798 
Pearson Chi2(4) = 37.2132   Pr = 0.000 
 
There were too few respondents who identified as “Other” Race to evaluate the 
relationship between it and support for the military and college provisions (measured on a 
5 point scale). 
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Immigration Approval 
“On the whole, do you think immigration is a good thing or a bad thing for this country 
today?” 
Good thing 43.6%   
Bad thing 44.4%   
Don’t know   12.0%   
 
Cross tabulation of Recoded Immigration Approval by DREAM Act Provisions 
The cross tabulations of Immigration Approval by Support for the Military and 
College provisions presented in chapter 4 include the “don’t know” responses. Below are 
the cross tabulations for Immigration Approval by Support for the Military and College 
provisions with the “don’t know” responses recoded as missing. The Recoded 
Immigration Approval variable is related to Support for the Military and College 
provisions but the value of Chi2 for each is lower. 
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Cross tabulation of Immigration Approval by Support for the Military Provision 
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5 Total 
Good 
Thing 
13.26% 
n=46 
10.09% 
n=35 
2.31% 
n=8 
35.16% 
n=122 
39.19% 
n=136 
100.00% 
n=3347 
Bad  
Thing 
32.89% 
n=148 
11.11% 
n=50 
5.33% 
n=24 
33.78% 
n=152 
16.89% 
n=76 
100.00% 
n=450 
Total 24.34% 
n=194 
10.66% 
n=85 
4.02% 
n=32 
34.38% 
n=274 
26.60% 
n=212 
100.00% 
n=797 
Pearson chi2(4) =  72.4404   Pr = 0.000 
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Cross tabulation of Immigration Approval by Support for the College Provision 
 Strongly 
Oppose 
1 2 3 4 
Strongly 
Support 
5  
Good 
Thing 
26.15% 
n=91 
14.08% 
n=49 
3.74% 
n=13 
21.84% 
n=76 
34.20% 
n=119 
100.00% 
n=348 
Bad 
Thing 
60.44% 
n=272    
11.11% 
n=50 
6.00% 
n=27 
17.33% 
n=78 
5.11% 
n=23 
100.00% 
n=450 
Total 45.49% 
n=363 
12.41% 
n=99 
5.01% 
n=40 
19.30% 
n=154 
17.79% 
n=142 
100.00% 
n=798 
Pearson chi2(4) = 149.4930   Pr = 0.000 
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Other cross tabulations discussed in Chapter Four 
Cross tabulation of 7 point Party Identification by Immigration Approval 
7 point Party ID Bad Thing Good Thing Total 
Strong Republican 74.04% 
n=154 
25.96% 
n=54 
100% 
n=208 
Not very strong Republican 61.54% 
n=40 
38.46% 
n=25 
100% 
n=65 
Lean Republican 59.84% 
n=73 
40.16% 
n=49 
100% 
n=122 
Independent 57.14% 
n=48 
42.83% 
n=36 
100% 
n=84 
Lean Democrat 25.49% 
n=13 
74.51% 
n=38 
100% 
n=51 
Not very strong Democrat 54.12% 
n=46 
45.88% 
n=39 
100% 
n=85 
Strong Democrat 36.97% 
n=61 
63.03% 
n=104 
100% 
n=165 
Total 55.77% 
n=435 
44.23% 
n=345 
100% 
n=780 
Pearson chi2(6) = 72.5934   Pr = 0.000 
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